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Abstract

Counterprotests have become commonplace around the world today in various issue areas, ranging from abortion, migration, and LGBTQ+ rights to disarmament, labor, and climate change. And yet, our knowledge about the relationship between protests and counterprotests remains limited—especially with respect to concrete interactions between them in situ. This introduction outlines how the articles in the special issue contribute to a better understanding of when and why counterprotests are likely to emerge, how they are affected by—and, in turn, alter—the protests they target, and what the outcomes of their interaction might be.

Keywords

activism social movement countermovement mobilization far-right leftwing violence climate LGBTQ Germany Italy Britain United States

Introduction

Counterprotests have become commonplace around the world today as societies turn increasingly polarized along diverse political fault lines (Ayoub & Chetaille, 2020; Tilly, 2005). Counterprotests have been observed in various issue areas, ranging from abortion, migration, and LGBTQ+ rights to disarmament, labor, and—more recently—healthcare and climate change. And yet, our knowledge about the relationship between protests and counterprotests remains limited. To be sure, research on counterprotests has burgeoned in recent decades as sit-ins, rallies, and street demonstrations on diverse issues have provoked reactions from the opposite camps (Dillard, 2013). But protest-counterprotest interactions are typically viewed through the lens of movement-countermovement dynamics—as issue competition between opposing movements addressing the same topic (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Wood, 2020). As a result, researchers’ attention to their concrete interaction dynamics in situ has been limited. Questions such as when and why counterprotests are likely to emerge, how they are affected by—and, in turn, alter—the protests they target, and what their outcomes might be for the issues they espouse or the stakeholders they involve, are therefore not well understood.

This special issue foregrounds protest-counterprotest interactions as events situated in space and time. That is partly because, as Haunss et al’s. (2025, this issue) contribution argues, counterprotests are not always coupled with (counter)movements. They may at times have but a loose connection—at other times, there may be no affiliation at all. Counterprotests, therefore, ought to be studied in their own right, in terms of their interrelations with the protests they oppose. At the same time, investigating the situational dynamics of protest-counterprotest interactions is also meaningful because many counterprotests are linked with larger (counter)movements and affect them in various ways. For example, the collective identities of movement and countermovement participants, as much as their awareness of opponents’ motivations, objectives, and strategies, can emerge in and through situated interactions, influencing the actions of the movement or countermovement as a whole. Similarly, a movement’s strategy and framing may be affected by such interactions with opponents. Understanding protest-counterprotest interactions as situated events is, therefore, essential irrespective of the extent to which the actors involved and their agendas are affiliated with wider social and political struggles.

Through case studies and comparative analyses, this special issue’s articles address three overarching research questions. First, contributions examine how protests and counterprotests mutually influence each other. Second, the articles investigate the contextual conditions that shape protest-counterprotest interactions. Finally, the papers look at the consequences of protest-counterprotest interactions for various stakeholders. Empirical cases are drawn from a range of issue areas—including protests and counterprotests around far-right politics and migration (Busher et al., 2025; Drago & Sun, 2025; Meier et al., 2025; Rocchetti & Pilati, 2025), protest and counterprotest interactions about LGBTQ rights (Zhghenti, 2025), COVID-19 (Haunss et al., 2025), and climate change (Uba et al., 2025). The cases cover various countries, analyzing mobilizations in the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Georgia, and Germany, as well as exploring transnational mobilization dynamics online (Uba et al., 2025).

Mutual Influences

Counterprotests are, by their very nature, influenced by the protests they oppose. Two of the special issue’s contributions analyze how, in particular, far-right and anti-far-right protesters influence each other’s strategies. Drago and Sun (2025, this issue) help us better understand why leftist groups consider counterprotests an effective demobilization strategy. Their study of leaked online chat messages from U.S.-based White Supremacist groups shows that White Supremacists “find it difficult to mitigate the harmful effects of counterprotests” (p. XX). In particular, counterprotests pose specific strategic dilemmas. First, to avoid counterprotests, White Supremacists might choose to organize in a more secretive fashion, but this could reduce their visibility and consequently their reach. Second, they might equip participants with protective gear or weapons themselves to deal with counterprotests, but this risks “damaging their public image by amplifying the movement’s social stigma” (p. XX).

Busher et al. (2025, this issue) explore action repertoires of far-right protests with a particular focus on violence-enabling and violence-inhibiting mechanisms. In addition to contextual factors (see next section), their comparative analysis of four cases (in the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany) points to crucial mutual influences between protesters and counterprotesters. They identify key mechanisms that enable violence, such as the weakening influence of moderates on one or both sides and rising emotional hostility between them. The authors show how confrontations between protesters and counterprotesters shape perceptions of who is a legitimate target, thus either enabling or restraining violence.

Meier et al.’s (2025, this issue) study of local protests in Germany—based on an original local protest event dataset in four cities between 2000 and 2020—demonstrates that the influence between protests and counterprotests might not always pan out along expected lines. The authors question the prevailing assumption that the issue agendas of counterprotests reflect those of the (original) protests. They find that leftwing counterprotests “generally mobilize around anti-far-right claims, even if the initial protest does not explicitly advance fascism/racism issues” (p. XX). Specifically, they show that although protests on a range of issues, from migration to COVID-19 measures, could trigger a counterprotest, the response event itself is more likely to advance a broadly anti-far-right agenda. The authors link this tendency to the long history of counterprotests as a key leftwing strategy to undermine racist/fascist groups in Germany.

Together, these studies illustrate what Zald and Useem (1987) once described as the “tango” of protest and counterprotest mobilization. While a counterprotest emerges in response to a protest, it can recursively influence the protest as well. Indeed, protesters can change their tactics in anticipation of the counterprotest, which weighs upon their chances to succeed. But it would be amiss to assume that a protest and a counterprotest are mirror images of each other. Whether it terms of action frames or mobilization strategies, the two can go in different directions.

Context Conditions

The special issue’s articles also point to various contextual factors shaping protest-counterprotest interactions. Haunss et al.’s (2025, this issue) conceptual paper introduces the distinction between coupled counterprotests—which are linked to a (counter)movement—and loosely coupled or uncoupled counterprotests that have few or no links with a (counter)movement. The authors argue, first, that in uncoupled or loosely coupled counterprotests, the perceived characteristics of the specific targeted protest and its actors play a larger role than in counterprotests closely affiliated with a social movement, because in these cases the focus shifts “from issue competition to actor confrontation” (p. XX). Second, lack of access to the resources of a (counter)movement also means that an uncoupled or loosely coupled counterprotest would rely more on broader civil society infrastructures to succeed, especially in terms of finding allies opposed to the same protest. Furthermore, access to (urban) space, the sympathies (or lack thereof) of the local media and the general public, relations with the local police, and various other situational dynamics can help or hinder an uncoupled counterprotest.

Their arguments are in line with the findings of empirical studies from diverse contexts. For instance, both Meier et al. (2025, this issue) and Rocchetti and Pilati (2025, this issue) find—in Germany and Italy, respectively—that the presence of known far-right personalities and/or groups at a protest increases the likelihood of a counterprotest. In addition, Meier et al. (2025) argue that “the occurrence and maintenance of counterprotest largely depends on the collective identities and mobilization infrastructure available” to the activists organizing it (p. XX).

Rocchetti and Pilati (2025, this issue) examine the impact of elections and government structures on counterprotest mobilization over a 9-year span from the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. Their analysis suggests that the likelihood of counterprotests against the far-right can increase closer to elections—but only when the outcome of the election is uncertain. Moreover, the presence of the radical right in the government can undermine the chances of counterprotest. These findings lead them to conclude that the perceived strength of the far-right is a vital condition for counterprotest mobilization: “when it is possible to compete with the far right, the stimulus for directly countering it is higher; otherwise, counterprotesters appear resigned” (p. XX).

Uba et al. (2025, this issue) examine contextual factors in interactions between climate activists and their opponents on social media. Their overall findings point to low levels of direct interaction that are asymmetrical—in the sense that it is dominated by opponents. Their analysis also examines contextual influences on these interactions: comparing online interactions on Twitter (now X) in the context of two different events–the Global Week of Future in September 2019 organized in relation to the UN Climate Action Summit in New York that received a lot of public attention, and the less visible protests in the context of the UN Climate Change Conference, or a COP25 meeting, in Madrid in December 2019. The results are contrary to the authors’ expectation that there would be relatively more direct interaction between the two sides during the strike than during COP. Instead, only indirect references (e.g., to the name of well-known climate activist Greta Thunberg by climate deniers) were higher during the more visible strikes in September 2019 than the COP25 protests in December. The analysis is illuminating with respect to contextual conditions of protest-counterprotest interactions, pointing to the fact that (large) protest events with strong public attention do seem to be linked to higher levels of (online) interactions with opponents—but only of the indirect kind.

In addition to vital situational factors that enable or inhibit violence in far-right protests, Busher et al. (2025, this issue) also point out that developments prior to the protests are key in rendering situational escalations more or less likely. In particular, their comparative analysis of four cases highlights rising threat narratives, shrinking political opportunities for both sides, and the legitimation of violence—by political or cultural elites, or even by members of the public—as key contextual conditions that promote escalation. Meanwhile, opportunities to achieve such goals through less confrontational means, open channels of communication with security forces, and withdrawal of elite allies’ support on account of rising use of threat or violence by (counter)protesters are among the factors that can reduce the likelihood of violence.

These studies suggest that contextual conditions play an even more significant role in protest-counterprotest interactions situated in space and time than in ongoing movement-countermovement dynamics. A wide range of factors can have perceptual effects on activists and material effects on their capacities, thereby shaping the likelihood as well as the targets and tactics of counterprotest mobilization. Directly and indirectly, these contextual conditions also bear upon the outcomes of protest-counterprotest interactions.

Consequences

The special issue’s articles finally address the outcomes of protest-counterprotest interactions. In particular, Zhghenti (2025, this issue) investigates how violent confrontations between protesters and counterprotesters in post-Soviet Georgia bear upon bystanders’ appraisal of the LGBTQ movement. Such confrontations can both alter or reinforce existing attitudes, says the study based on 66 in-depth interviews. Bystanders who were initially indifferent to the movement may start empathizing with LGBTQ activists once they become victims of counterprotester violence, but they could also rationalize the violence by calling LGBTQ protests a “provocation.” Supporters of the movement may extend their enthusiasm for LGBTQ rights by considering the violence to undermine protesters’ freedom of expression; they could also scale back their advocacy if they view public demonstrations for LGBTQ rights in a skeptical social environment as unnecessary and unhelpful to begin with. Finally, violence could turn adversaries of the LGBTQ movement into allies, but it may also fail to shift the feelings of some detractors who view the protests as a form of propaganda.

Some other contributions also add to our understanding of the consequences of protest-counterprotest interactions. For example, Busher et al. (2025, this issue) demonstrate that the decisions of prominent actors during protest-counterprotest interactions can shape the broader trajectory of a protest wave. Strategic decisions—such as avoiding confrontation or mishandling enforcement in Charlottesville—had lasting effects on whether violence escalated or was curbed. Also, Drago and Sun (2025, this issue) show how interactions with counterprotests can have lasting effects on the strategic considerations of the original protesters—in their case, the strategies of White Supremacist groups.

These studies improve our understanding of the wider implications of situated interactions between protesters and counterprotesters. Violence itself is a key outcome of such interactions, and its likelihood may be amplified or ameliorated by the dynamics between protesters, counterprotesters, political and cultural allies, administration, and the public at large. But violent confrontations also affect the feelings and opinions that bystanders, allies, and members of the public hold toward protesters, counterprotesters, the issues they espouse, and the positions they represent. In turn, such consequences can become the context conditions implicating subsequent protest-counterprotest interactions and their mutual influences, constituting a virtuous circle of cause and effect.

Discussion and Conclusion

The articles of the special issue contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between protests and counterprotests, shedding light on their mutual influences, contextual conditions, and outcomes. Multiple studies in this special issue, draw attention to the asymmetrical nature of interactions between protests and counterprotests. While scholars often view the counterprotest to be a mirror image of the protest it opposes (Benford & Hunt, 2003; Inata, 2019; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996), these studies point out key dissimilarities in the issue framing and targets of a protest and a counterprotest. In doing so, they add to the scant literature that recognizes the heterogeneity of the two sides (e.g., Hager et al., 2022; Laschever & Meyer, 2021).

Uba et al. (2025, this issue) point to asymmetries in communication, showing that the anti-climate countermovement is much more preoccupied with the pro-climate movement than the other way round. Only about 4% of the pro-climate movement’s Twitter replies targeted countermovement actors. In contrast, nearly 28% of the countermovement’s replies were addressed to actors from the pro-climate movement.

The fact that four of the seven contributions address far-right and anti-far-right constellations is not a coincidence. Counterprotests are not evenly distributed across all protest issues. At least in Europe and in North America, they cluster heavily around protests of the far-right. Meier et al. (2025, this issue) show that this goes along with an issue asymmetry between protesters and counterprotesters. While protesters at trigger events espoused a range of issues, counterprotesters at response events mostly framed their counterprotest as anti-far-right. The importance of (perceived) far-right actors is corroborated by Rocchetti and Pilati’s (2025, this issue) contribution that highlights that counterprotests become more likely when far-right actors are present at a protest.

Zhghenti’s (2025, this issue) contribution addresses a different kind of asymmetry by examining how bystanders respond in varied—and sometimes opposing—ways to protest-counterprotest interactions, depending on their value orientations, emotional reactions, and perceived legitimacy of the actors and their tactics.

Another important contribution of this special issue is drawing attention to the ways in which digital platforms and online communication play a role in protest-counterprotest and movement-countermovement interactions—as well as how they can help us better understand the strategies and motivations of diverse stakeholders Drago and Sun (2025, this issue), for instance, use a dataset of 2 million leaked online chat messages to take a “behind-closed-doors view of a historically difficult-to-study movement” (p. XX)—namely, U.S. White Supremacist groups—to understand how they perceive and strategize against leftist countermovements. Uba et al. (2025, this issue), meanwhile, draw on publicly available Twitter posts to examine interactions between climate activists and their detractors. This study also reveals how some unique features of online communication—such as hashtags, mentions, and retweets—can serve (a) as a means for protesters and counterprotesters to participate in protests and interact with each other and (b) as a window for researchers to gain closer insights into protest-counterprotest dynamics. This is an opportunity but also a challenge for the field, as digital research can often require scholars to rely on novel computational methods of data collection and analysis. These papers contribute to the growing scholarship on digital activism and online movement-countermovement interactions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Gallager et al., 2018; Shahin, 2023).

Overall, the contributions provide novel insights into the relationships between protests and counterprotests. They show that in addition to interpreting counterprotests within broader movement dynamics, they should also be analyzed as results of more short-term situational dynamics that are often not embedded in a contestation between one movement and its countermovement. The conditions and consequences of interactions between protests and counterprotests warrant more scholarly attention, especially comparative studies across different regions and issue areas, as well as the online dynamics of such interactions. While the articles here focus on North America and Europe, future research should also look more closely into protests and counterprotests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Saif Shahin

Sebastian Haunss

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Saif Shahin is Assistant Professor of Digital Culture and Director of the Digital South Research Lab at Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg University. His research focuses on digital politics, social movements, critical data studies, and computational social science. His work has been published in journals such as New Media & Society, Social Science Computer Review, Policy & Internet, and Social Movement Studies. He also serves as Associate Editor of the Journal of Information Technology & Politics.

Priska Daphi is Professor of Sociology at Giessen University (Germany) and Editor-in-Chief of Social Movement Studies. Her research explores conflicts about globalization, migration, climate change and peace with a particular interest in protests, social movements, civil society, and collective memory.

Sebastian Haunss is Professor for Political Science and head of the research group ‘Social Conflicts’ at the Research Centre on Inequality and Social Policy (SOCIUM), University of Bremen. His research focusses on protests, social movements and computational social sciences.

Larissa Meier is an Assistant Professor in Conflict Sociology at Trinity College Dublin. Her main research areas are political conflict and social change, with a particular focus on political violence, social movements, civil society, and the far right.

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