Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: The Autocratic Subversion of Brazil’s Fourth Estate

Abstract

This article investigates the strategies modern-day autocrats use to delegitimate the press as a means of consolidating power, including in democratic states. Using content analysis and Brazil as a case study, I examine Bolsonaro’s online discourse on X and YouTube, during the second half of his administration (January 2021–December 2022). I argue that Bolsonaro endeavors to promote an image of the press that centers on three elements: unreliability, obsolescence, and being an enemy to the people. The delegitimation of the press through discursive, insidious means suggests a change in the way autocrats exercise power. Rather than deploying the repressive tactics of old, modern autocrats are updating their toolbox to monopolize power while enjoying the legitimacy normally granted by democratic norms. These findings raise questions about the dispersion of authoritarian practices in supposed democracies.

Introduction

The emergence of populism and the radical right over the last decade has shown that authoritarianism, far from reserved to the confines of history or the supposed geographical fringes, is a present, and thriving, force in global politics. Yet, the practices of authoritarianism seem to have shifted away from the military tanks and public book burnings of old. Modern autocrats still strive to capture and wield power, but they no longer see killing and imprisoning the opposition as the most reliable tools in their arsenals. Instead, they are distancing themselves from the totalitarian figures of the 20th century and adopting nominally democratic institutions (Guriev & Treisman, 2022; Ottaway, 2003). Far from promoting the gradual democratization of these regimes, this strategic approach allows autocrats to consolidate their power in subtler ways while escaping domestic and international mechanisms of authoritarian control (Brancati, 2014).

This fine-tuning of authoritarian strategy is not restricted to established autocrats. Would-be authoritarians in democratic states are taking these lessons and incorporating covert autocratic practices into their governance (Varol, 2015). The transformation in authoritarianism since the end of the Cold War has allowed emerging authoritarians to expand their repertoire for amassing power and entrenching themselves in office. This expanded repertoire allows them to mask their autocratic designs behind a democratic veneer, thus avoiding the costs historically associated with violent or overt state repression (Varol, 2015).

Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are among the most recent examples of democratically elected presidents who repeatedly blurred the lines between democracy and authoritarianism. Though their behavior alone may not be sufficient to characterize a shift to a hybrid or semi-authoritarian regime (Ottaway, 2003), it does highlight how changing autocratic strategies may permeate democracies across various parts of the world.

The burgeoning literature on modern authoritarianism has investigated some of these changing strategies, including autocrats’ use of legalism (Khalil, 2024; Scheppele, 2018; Varol, 2015), election manipulation (Guriev & Treisman, 2022), and patronage (Svolik, 2012) to secure power. Yet, the relationship between emerging authoritarians and the press remains comparatively undertheorized. Given the historical interest of authoritarian regimes in controlling information flow and shaping public opinion through the media, this relative dearth is significant. Without completely abandoning them, autocrats have moved away from traditional methods of control like censorship and media ownership, which are costly and expose the regime to more direct opposition (Guriev & Treisman, 2022). As their toolkit of power expands and becomes more underhanded, what strategies do aspiring autocrats pursue in relationship to the press?

Using Brazil as a case study, this article examines the strategies modern-day autocrats use to delegitimate the press as a means of consolidating power. I analyze Bolsonaro’s discourse on X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube and find that the former president propagated three key narratives to attempt to delegitimate the press. The first, “the press as unreliable,” is perhaps the one more commonly identified with modern-day autocrats and their penchant for disinformation. The second narrative, “the press as obsolete,” pertains to changing political communication tactics and the uncertain role of the press in the age of social media. Finally, the third narrative, “the press as an enemy of the people,” reveals the insidious ways in which autocrats attempt to subvert the relationship between the press and democracy and to create, instead, the image of an immoral, antagonistic press.

Bolsonaro’s strategies are far from unique: Donald Trump, Giorgia Meloni, and Javier Milei, for example, all weaponize the press in similar ways. Thus, while using Brazil as a case study, this article spotlights a phenomenon that spans national borders and, in so doing, addresses an undertheorized area of the literature to understand how modern-day autocrats capture and exercise power through the press. Specifically, I identify two crucial political strategies contemporary authoritarians employ: the delegitimization of the traditional press, and the establishment of direct, unregulated communication channels between political leaders and their constituents. These findings are part of a larger puzzle about the mechanisms behind democratic backsliding and the corresponding strategies to combat them.

Second, the article adds to a broader body of literature that examines how modern authoritarians cultivate a democratic façade while subverting democratic norms and institutions. This includes would-be autocrats who adopt modern authoritarian tactics to push for illiberal measures and entrench power in democracies. Unveiling the evolving tactics of authoritarianism is critical because, as these practices become more sophisticated and insidious, they have the potential of producing a more durable and persistent type of authoritarianism. Stated differently, modern authoritarian practices may become more difficult to detect and oppose, unless appropriate mechanisms of control and accountability are developed.

Authoritarianism in the 21st Century

While authoritarianism is a common subject of inquiry among scholars of 20th-century history, it figures less prominently in studies of contemporary democracy. The return of authoritarian rule around the globe, however, indicates that authoritarianism remains as relevant a political phenomenon as ever. As a style of governance, authoritarianism seeks to “circumvent the rule of law and democratic norms in favor of centralized authority and limited political freedom” (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 190). This is usually accomplished through a variety of repressive measures: the “stick” in the carrot-and-stick approach to how most autocrats exert control over society (Arendt, 1970). Traditional tools of coercion include surveillance, harassment, restricted civil liberties, arrests, censorship, torture, disappearances, and mass killings, whereas the specific methods and the scale to which they are implemented vary across autocracies (Almeida, 2008; Davenport, 2007).

Though repression has indeed been efficient in allowing authoritarian rulers to accrue and exercise power, it is also a costly and risky endeavor. It requires significant state investments and may invite backlash or rebellion (Davenport & Inman, 2012). Recent scholarship increasingly points to the importance of political discourse in the survival of authoritarian regimes (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017; Schneider & Maerz, 2017). Violence, in fact, may be on its way to becoming an increasingly dispensable, and even counterproductive, strategy in the autocrat’s toolbox.

Rather than relying on brutal repression, modern authoritarians are increasingly looking to acquire social control through subjective means. As information and communication technologies continue to spread around the world, autocrats have learned to harness this new infrastructural power (Mann, 1993) to serve their own interests and grant stability to their regimes. They manipulate information to reshape citizens’ views of the world and gain their compliance or even their fervent support (Guriev & Treisman, 2022).

Although this approach is not entirely unprecedented, the extent to which it is now being embraced by authoritarian rulers across the world does point to a shift in the autocratic model of social control (Guriev & Treisman, 2022). However, rather than a path toward democratization, this shift may point to a more surreptitious type of authoritarianism that is more difficult to recognize and resist.

Emerging theories on modern authoritarianism not only invite us to rethink the components of the dictator’s toolbox, but they also illuminate threats in current democracies. After all, the global rise of authoritarianism (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022) has occurred alongside the emergence of the radical right. Nationalist and populist discourses have nurtured a series of political cleavages, mobilizing ethno-nationalist identities and anti-establishment sentiments to lend legitimacy to radical right campaigns (Bonikowski, 2017). The result is a growing “politics of resentment” (Cramer, 2016), whereby aggrieved citizens harbor feelings of distrust toward elites, experts, and representative institutions. In response, they then support candidates who appear to violate institutional norms and “speak truth to power,” as this behavior is thought to signal a truer commitment to the people’s will (Hahl et al., 2018; Mudde, 2004). Although nationalism and populism are not strictly tied to authoritarianism, in the context of the politics of resentment, they pave the way for democratic backsliding by undermining well-established norms of political discourse and behavior (Bonikowski, 2017).

In Brazil, the fusing of populist frames with radical right politics is the foundation of bolsonarismo. Though a democratically elected president, Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) engaged in distinctly authoritarian behavior both before and during his time in office. Among the most widely reported examples of this behavior are his efforts to undermine the system of checks and balances—in particular the judiciary—threats against the electoral system, and instigation of violence among his supporters. In fact, much of his conduct while in office passes Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018, p. 21) “litmus test” to identify an authoritarian leader, which includes actions like rejecting the democratic rules of the game and inciting violence.

This new authoritarian model, combined with the rise of the radical right, may contribute to the unchecked advance of authoritarianism within democratic societies. The case of Bolsonaro suggests that potential demagogues, including those who are democratically elected, are learning from evolving authoritarian methods and adopting similar techniques to blur the distinction between democracy and autocracy. In fact, they may be pushing their societies toward “semi-authoritarianism,” systems that formally democratic but that preserve authoritarian traits (Ottaway, 2003). These systems are not “democracies in progress” or a totalitarian regime nearing its end, but a deliberately constructed blend of democratic and autocratic elements. The ambiguous and stealth nature of these regimes means they often evade mechanisms of accountability (Varol, 2015). It is crucial, therefore, that scholars pinpoint the tools political leaders may employ to foster authoritarianism in the twenty-first century, including within democratic settings.

The Press and Democracy

By the end of the twentieth century, the importance of the press to the democratic process had become widely apparent (Stier, 2015). In addition to its “homogenizing” role, by which it grants meaning to the social world (Bourdieu, 1991), the press is constitutive to the public sphere—a sphere separate from state or church that provides citizens with the “communicative space” to debate and refine democratic practices (Berezin, 1997; Habermas, 1989).

More recent scholarship has confirmed the relationship between a free and independent press and higher levels of democratization (Norris, 2008), economic development (Roll & Talbott, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002), reduced corruption (Djankov et al., 2002), and increased political participation (Leeson, 2008). The press’ watchdog role in democracy is therefore generally understood within the context of the checks and balances that keep government accountable—the so-called “fourth estate”—despite the distinct commercial nature of the news media.

Of course, political and economic interests often impede the ideal of a free and independent press from being actualized. Government censorship, propaganda, bribery, and intimidation can dictate news coverage and manipulate the media, as seen in Berlusconi’s Italy or Orban’s Hungary. Given the press’ relationship to representative democracy and the obstacles in materializing the ideal of a free, trusted press, media criticism plays a crucial democratic role. Just as the press should hold social structures accountable, media criticism serves as an accountability mechanism in the journalistic field and “evaluates how the press fulfills its democratic functions” (Egelhofer et al., 2021, p. 654). It is not a form of censorship or formal regulation; rather, it brings attention to cases that violate journalistic norms and aspires to a more informative, unbiased journalism (Carlson, 2009; Wyatt, 2019).

The last decade has seen an increase in media criticism, alongside the emergence of social media. However, despite the potential democratization of information and media spaces often predicted, these changes have led to climbing distrust in and hostility toward the press (Egelhofer et al., 2021). In addition to an increase in online attacks against journalists, social media has also contributed to a “disinfodemia,” a term used to describe the rampant dissemination of spurious information on digital platforms (Posetti & Bontcheva, 2023). Though scholarship in the area is only beginning to emerge, studies already show that online misinformation is linked to lower trust in the news media (Van Duyn & Collier, 2018).

Autocrats and populist rulers have taken advantage of the new communication opportunities offered by digital media to disseminate false or out-of-context data. Mass-self-communication (Castells, 2009) enables internet users to produce and disseminate information to an unprecedented degree. If, on one hand, it presents a vehicle for popular mobilization, on the other, it has also been exploited by politicians looking to exercise greater control over the communication process (Jenkins, 2006). Figures like Bolsonaro and Trump emotional and moral discourses to spread their message and stir resentment toward professional elites (Bonikowski, 2017; Gidron & Hall, 2017). This includes journalists and other media professionals, who may call into question or debunk the fabrications autocrats seek to present as truths.

The press’ watchdog role poses a direct challenge to political leaders who endeavor to mobilize the public through confusion and disinformation. An independent and trusted press not only jeopardizes their status as conveyors of the “truth,” but it also threatens to reveal the gap between the autocrats’ “front stage” and “backstage” identities (Goffman, 1956; Hahl, 2016). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that authoritarian regimes in the past have invested so heavily in controlling and manipulating the press to their advantage.

Methodology

To study Bolsonaro’s efforts at delegitimating the press, I conducted a discursive analysis of his published tweets and YouTube videos between January 2021 and December 2022. The dates correspond to the second half of Bolsonaro’s presidential term. Although Bolsonaro’s online behavior during his first presidential campaign and first 2 years in office has been more widely documented (Cioccari & Persichetti, 2018; Coimbra et al., 2021), the period between 2021 and 2022 remains underexamined. The two periods exhibit similar patterns of attacks against the press and misinformation. However, it is worth noting that Bolsonaro employed more violent rhetoric and direct attacks against journalists during the first half of his administration (Nicoletti & Flores, 2022). One possible explanation for his apparent constraint in the latter half is the maturation of a political strategy that emphasizes polished, democratic discourse and favors more covert means of subverting press credibility.

In total, I analyzed 4,237 data points: all 4,114 of Bolsonaro’s published tweets in the 2-year period (1,778 in 2021 and 2,336 in 2022) and 123 YouTube videos. The latter comprised 33 interviews and 90 YouTube lives and close to 98 hours of recorded material. Although examining the data, I considered recurrent themes, the language and style, intended targets, and purpose or function. In particular, I sought to pinpoint the narratives with which Bolsonaro framed the Brazilian press and chart the relationship between his media criticism and broader political aims. Triangulating his social media communications with news reports and sociopolitical developments enabled me to assess the validity of his claims more critically. That said, a discursive analysis of Bolsonaro’s social media cannot speak to the reception of his narratives about the press, which is beyond the scope of this study.

Though Bolsonaro is active on various digital platforms, I focus on X and YouTube because, after his 2018 election campaign, he made the two his primary means of digital communication. ¹ In addition to posting between five and six times a day on X, Bolsonaro also hosted regular 1-hour long YouTube lives for his supporters, during which he shared government news, rebutted criticism, addressed “hot topics” (selected by himself), and invited ministers or cabinet members to share their opinions as supposed experts. During most of Bolsonaro’s presidency, the YouTube lives took place weekly. Starting in mid-2022, however, they happened almost daily. With more than 152 million social media users, or over 70% of the population, Brazil is the third biggest consumer of social media in the world, surpassed only by India and Indonesia (Comscore, 2023). YouTube is at the top of the most popular social media platforms in Brazil with 142 million users, second only to WhatsApp, while X reports 24 million users in Brazil, its third largest base in the world (Kemp, 2023). The far-reaching grip of social media in Brazilian society renders it an immensely potent political communication tool with direct, uninterrupted access to large sectors of the population.

My conceptualization of discursive frames draws on the work of Benford and Snow (2000), which recognizes that the social world is partly constructed through public discourse. Frames, then, constitute meaning-making processes through which phenomena are seen, perceived, and remembered—meanings and interpretations that are used to mobilize action (Snow & Benford, 1998). Although frame analysis is traditionally associated with the social movement literature, here, I apply it to the study of autocratic political leaders to decipher how modern demagogues attempt to amass and legitimate power while sustaining the pretense of the democratic game.

Delegitimizing the Media as a Modern Authoritarian Strategy

The Press as Unreliable

The first narrative that composes Bolsonaro’s strategy to monopolize power and undermine democratic processes through the press centers around reliability. Much has been written about the deluge of false stories and the effect of misinformation in the era of new authoritarians as Bolsonaro, Trump, and Erdogan (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Lee & Hosam, 2020; Polletta & Callahan, 2017). The “fake news” that has become commonplace in our political patois usually refers to verifiably false information that has been disseminated through media channels. The other side of this coin, however, is to turn the accusation of “fake news” away from political leaders and toward the press. The term then becomes “evaluative” and seeks to discredit specific media channels, journalists, and the press more broadly (Lee & Hosam, 2020).

For Bolsonaro, “fake news” captures the idea that established media channels are unreliable. They either fabricate information, deliberately misconstrue his words, or otherwise fail to report vital news to the public. “The misinformation carried out by the media hinders the future of our Brazil. There are lying news in the big media all the time,” he said during an interview ² in November 2021. He frequently accused the press of propagating “narratives,” whereas he wanted to present the population with “facts.” ³ On June 8, 2022, he accused the press of distorting his words after he referred to the media as a “factory of fake news” during an event. He tweeted: “LIE! It was precisely the contrary. I defended that if I were to imprison and punish someone for something as subjective as ‘fake news,’ WHICH I AM AGAINST AND EVERYBODY KNOWS IT, I would start with the press itself, which so frequently publishes lies and distorted information, such as this.” ⁴ The declaration is, in fact, aligned with the information reported in the article to which Bolsonaro is responding.

There are two elements of Bolsonaro’s “unreliable” strategy that merit special attention. First, he reaffirms his commitment to freedom of the press as a core democratic principle, but laments the fact that journalism in Brazil has become biased and unprofessional. Such criticism focuses on the notion that the press is incompetent or deceitful, not concerned with broadcasting the truth, and intentionally guided by left-wing ideology. A particularly illustrative interview with Rádio Cultura captures the essence of this strategy:

Try to find out what is happening. Don’t be stuck in the big traditional media. There is good press out there, but the majority of the big media only misinforms us [. . .] If you are still watching the 8:30 p.m. news, you will be uninformed. You will be poisoned. You will have fights at home [. . .] Go to social media, go to some radio or television that really give you the truth. You can be free and truly help Brazil become a great nation in the future. ⁵

The hollowness of Bolsonaro’s concern for truth becomes evident when we examine who are the exceptions to the former president’s reproof. As we see above, he denounces media institutions that are critical of his actions or his government’s performance as unreliable and prone to “poison” their audiences. But these accusations stand in direct contrast to Bolsonaro’s treatment of journalists or media channels that are openly supportive of him. In this case, he praises what he considers to be their fairness and impartiality. This is the type of journalism, he claims, that is truly concerned with facticity. During a YouTube live in December 2021, he entreated his viewers to watch Joven Pan News, one of Bolsonaro’s most vocally supportive radio stations. “No Globo, CNN. Joven Pan News. All right, everyone? Let’s support the impartial press, the press that is serious and really does the kind of journalism you want. Not the press that provides you with opinions.” ⁶

The second element of Bolsonaro’s “unreliable” strategy worthy of special note is his victimization story. Bolsonaro regularly accuses journalists of needlessly criticizing him and his family, further bolstering the image of a partisan and undemocratic press. He claims to be “beaten up every day” ⁷ and “persecuted” ⁸ by the press. Speaking about gas prices during a YouTube live, he said: “Every time I get into this subject, the world falls on my head [. . .] The press creates stories against me, creates lies, beats me up and calls me corrupt.” ⁹ By positioning himself as a victim of the “big media,” Bolsonaro is able to garner the sympathy of the public at the same time as he discredits any objections the press may raise about his governance. His narrative is that the press does not report critically on the government because it is doing its job, but because it wants to “hurt” ¹⁰ him.

Bolsonaro therefore builds on accusations of misinformation and omission against the press by portraying himself as a committed democrat who is needlessly harassed by the press. The “unreliable” narrative is first layer of his overarching strategy to delegitimize the press and, as we will see below, it underpins the claims that compose the remaining two narratives.

The Press as Obsolete

The second narrative that sustains Bolsonaro’s political strategy to delegitimize the press is the claim of obsolescence. Bolsonaro promotes the following logic: if journalists are unreliable and citizens are better off with no information at all than with the false stories supposedly spread by “big media,” then there is no reason to consume traditional news at all. Rather, social media can perform the informational and democratic role the press should perform but which its partisanship renders impossible. This strategy builds on the notion that, thanks to technological advances, there is no longer a need for a traditional press that intermediates the relationship between state and citizens. Social media’s wide reach and the broad accessibility of smart phones enable state communications to reach citizens directly, and more quickly.

During a YouTube live on June 24 2021, Bolsonaro told viewers: “Don’t waste your time watching Jornal Nacional ¹¹ . . .These people don’t want your wellbeing, they don’t want you to be an enlightened person, someone who can really be useful to society.” A few months earlier, Bolsonaro had similarly stated that the press’ insistence on spreading fake news about him was responsible for its looming demise. “That’s why magazines are shutting down, isn’t it? This month, Época is closing. It won’t exist anymore. The press is completely unbelievable, because of the terrible quality of journalists. Because a large part of the media became a political party.” ¹² Bolsonaro thus extends his claims about the press’ unreliability beyond a discourse of “fake news” or accusations of persecutory behavior. Within indictments of unprofessionalism and partiality, he weaves in the notion of an obsolete press, one which responsible citizens would do well to castoff. The closing of a magazine or low audience numbers of a news show serve as evidence that this obsolescence is already in motion, and that others recognize it too.

These two narratives—the press as unreliable and the press as unnecessary—are thus mutually reinforcing. This relationship is clearly exemplified during another YouTube live, during which Bolsonaro introduced the “unreliability” claims by referring to Fantástico, a weekly television news program that has aired since 1973, as a “fantastical factory of fake news.” ¹³ He then shared that it had been more than a year since he cancelled subscriptions to all newspapers and magazines. He went on to list a number of well-established news channels and newspapers in Brazil to which he no longer subscribed. We can see here how Bolsonaro models the type of behavior he hopes his supporters will emulate. His comments imply that it is not enough to criticize the press or rebuff the type of news it disseminates—we should altogether ignore it.

But if citizens should not rely on the press for unbiased information, where should they get their news? A key aspect of Bolsonaro’s strategy to paint the press as unnecessary is to push for more direct communications between the state and its constituents. Bolsonaro’s weekly and, starting in the second semester of 2022, daily YouTube lives are a telling example of his strategy to bypass the press and establish more direct communications with the public. In addition, more than a third of all his press-related tweets between 2021 and 2022 promoted his social media channels as a source of important, accurate news. Many of these tweets simply encouraged followers to join the government’s online communities on Telegram or Gettr for daily updates and more up-to-date information. If seen in isolation, this behavior might not seem to suggest any underlying political strategy. Yet, when examined alongside Bolsonaro’s repeated criticisms of the press and suggestions that citizens should not “waste [their] time” with the traditional media, this behavior reveals a deliberate attempt to redefine what citizens recognize as acceptable, reliable sources of information.

Indeed, in several cases, the president’s social media channels were presented as direct alternatives to the “lying big media.” One tweet read, “Subscribe to our Telegram channel and get access to the actions they want to hide from you at all costs.” ¹⁴ He describes the information shared on Telegram and YouTube as containing “the truth,” as well as “actions of national interest,” but which are “regrettably omitted by many.” ¹⁵ Bolsonaro and his team went so far as to create a separate app (plainly named “Bolsonaro TV”). On February 12, 2022, he tweeted: “Download our app and get a lot more information, which most of the media omits daily and intentionally.” ¹⁶

These examples point to the sheer breadth of Bolsonaro’s online presence, with channels on X, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, Gettr, and Bolsonaro TV. ¹⁷ The resulting constant flux of information not only reinforces the notion that the press has become irrelevant, but it also creates a false sense of accountability. As a response to the press’ supposed crime of omission, Bolsonaro promises to keep citizens informed through other means. Social media, he vows, will fill the information gap left by mainstream media by providing more frequent and accurate news updates.

This strategy creates an illusory culture of governmental transparency and accountability, while simultaneously discrediting the press and undermining democratic processes. Moreover, it produces a need for—and legitimates—a space of unregulated, one-sided information sharing. Under the semblance of transparency and self-defense, Bolsonaro makes use of the speed, convenience, and largely unchecked nature of social media to spread misinformation and dominate the public debate (at least where his supporters are concerned). Unsurprisingly, during the 2-year period under analysis, Bolsonaro exhibits an increasing preference for less regulated social media channels, including Telegram and Bolsonaro TV.

The examples above showcase how Bolsonaro weaves a narrative of unreliable journalism that is inutile and easily replaced by social media. Adding claims of obsolescence to his accusations of untrustworthiness, Bolsonaro thus strives to make the press appear irrelevant in today’s world. The third narrative of his strategy to discredit the press, discussed below, goes further. It promotes the notion that the press is not only unnecessary and inaccurate but a hostile adversary against Brazilian society.

The Press as an Enemy of People

The last narrative that sustains Bolsonaro’s political strategy to delegitimate the press is an inversion on the very critiques he receives from media institutions. In response to reports that he engages in antidemocratic behavior, Bolsonaro accuses the press of being corrupt and elitist instead. He accomplishes this by depicting the press as an enemy of the people, and himself as a truth-teller standing up to a criminal political establishment.

The portrayal of an enemy press builds on the corruption scandal that spurred the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and temporary imprisonment of former president Lula da Silva (a conviction which was later overthrown). Bolsonaro discredited any negative stories about his administration by claiming they were fabrications of an unethical press seeking payback for lost benefits. During a YouTube live in May 2021, he told viewers, “I won’t tolerate calling Globo trash because trash is recyclable. This miscreant press abuses me because I ended their perks of 3 billion [reais]. Their playtime is over.” ¹⁸ The implication behind many similar comments is that the press benefited from corrupt governments and has a financial interest in ousting Bolsonaro from office in order to reinstate inflated political advertising spending.

When corruption charges were not enough, Bolsonaro also directed the blame for the prolongation of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil to the press. These allegations constituted a larger effort to frame the traditional press as an enemy of the people. Bolsonaro repeatedly accused the media of “disrupting Brazil” and affirmed their type of journalism was “shameful.” ¹⁹ It was this journalism, he posited, that led to “distortions” during the pandemic and “causes fear, anguish, uncertainty of what is happening.” ²⁰ His strategy is to present the interests of the press and those of the people as diametrically opposed. On July 6, 2022, he wrote: “If nothing were to be done to alleviate the impact [of lockdown policies] on Brazilians, the left and the press would complain of omission. As we are doing something about it, they complain I’m only doing it for the votes. It’s simple: the worst it is for the people, the better it is for their own promotion.” ²¹ Bolsonaro promotes a tale of “doomed if I do, doomed if I don’t,” which simultaneously ingratiates him to his supporters and shields him from accountability. Accusations of press unreliability thus act as a smokescreen to conceal a host of government failures, from unfulfilled promises and ineffective economic policies to irresponsible pandemic responses and corruption schemes.

Such comments cultivate an us-versus-them narrative about the press and advances the idea that the media deliberately “inflames people” against Bolsonaro, “feed[ing] on yet another tragedy” for political gain with the hopes of acquiring “fat advertising budgets” ²² once more. Bolsonaro cultivates this intended antagonism between the press and his supporters by using outwardly hostile language. Among the many insults he has handed out to specific journalists and the press more broadly, Bolsonaro has accused journalists of asking “idiotic questions,” ²³ declared that only “imbeciles” could produce the type of news seen in Brazil, ²⁴ and compared prominent reporters to “donkeys.” ²⁵

In contrast to the allegedly corrupt press, Bolsonaro positions himself as a truth-teller protecting the people from profiteering institutions. He responded to media reports that he had neglected pandemic restrictions, including lockdown rules, by saying, “As the chief executive, placed here by the hand of God, I have to expose myself. I cannot be stuck inside Alvorada [the presidential residence] . . . and leave the people on the outside to get by on their own.” ²⁶ This is a common populist strategy pursued by Bolsonaro and his advisors, by which they depict him as the only one concerned with the welfare of the common people. In so doing, he seeks to define the press not only as enemy of the public interest, but also as an enemy of democracy itself.

The press falsely accuses him of authoritarian tendencies, he claims, because he wants to end corruption and change the political system in Brazil: “Anytime we set fire to a rat’s nest, a lot of people with money turn against us. [These are people] who buy part of the press, who lie. . . You see how many times they call me a dictator.” ²⁷ The narrative Bolsonaro attempts to advance through such comments is that he is exposing the lies and profiteering that characterize Brazilian political system and that is being maligned in the process. According to him, Brazil lives in “a world of appearances, anesthetized by a false sense of peace and harmony promoted by the media, where politicians. . . conspired against their very people.” ²⁸ The press is allegedly an accomplice to a corrupt political system, and it is his job to rid the country of such schemes.

Nowhere was the “press as the enemy” strategy clearer than in Bolsonaro’s comments about the 2022 elections. During an interview with Radio 93 FM on August 5, 2021, he said, “I want clean, transparent elections, audited elections, a public counting of votes. What I see in the media is that there is already a plan—it’s in the media—to make me ineligible next year. If that happens, then the president will be Lula.” He later posted that it was “understandable for Rede Globo to. . .work for the return of the Thief [Lula]. It is the people who are robbed, not [Globo], and [Globo] is who profits, not the people. . .Their concern is not with democracy, but with $$$.” ²⁹ Again, Bolsonaro references the cuts in political advertising spending to explain why his government receives negative press. He further accuses the media of supporting Lula in the 2022 elections so that they may continue to profit to the detriment of democracy.

As the examples discussed above indicate, in feeding a narrative about an enemy press, Bolsonaro capsizes the belief that the press acts as “the fourth state.” Instead, he frames the media as a deteriorating and antidemocratic institution. This process corroborates his assertions, discussed in the previous two sections, about an unreliable and obsolete press by presenting his government as the only institution truly concerned with the ordinary people. Further, this strategy legitimates Bolsonaro’s position as an information provider and gives him more tools to shape the public debate.

Discussion

The findings in this study suggest that the new generation of authoritarians use their relationship to the press to nurture a veneer of legitimacy while they sabotage democratic institutions. These modern authoritarians establish direct communication between their government and supporter base, seeking to strike a sympathetic image, and stealthily redefining what citizens recognize as reliable information sources. In doing so, they can subvert the press’ watchdog role and promote unregulated means of communication.

Stated differently, modern authoritarians undermine democracy by exploiting some of its central pillars. Bolsonaro uses the very democratic ideals that should sustain trust in the press—that of an informed citizenry—to persuade more and more people to abandon traditional news sources in favor of his social media accounts. His frequent declarations about the press’ important role in democracy stand in clear juxtaposition to his equally frequent attacks against said press. They also run counter to the behavior generally associated with authoritarian rulers, who historically have sought to control and censor the press more directly. Bolsonaro, conversely, denounces media bias and laments what he sees as the deteriorated state of Brazilian journalism. Why choose to undercut press legitimacy through gradual and discursive means rather than apply surefire tactics of repression?

The most likely explanation, not only in Brazil but across the world, is that the repressive methods of old have become less appealing and effective for modern authoritarians. There are, after all, significant financial costs involved in enforcing censorship laws, shutting down newspapers, pursuing libel suits, and persecuting journalists. There are also political costs to these methods, as they may invite domestic and international backlash. Instead, Bolsonaro chooses to present himself as a defender of the press, an advocate for better, fairer journalism. By adopting the international parlance of democracy, he maintains plausible deniability even while disseminating narratives that threaten to topple democratic values and institutions in Brazil. He chips away at the credibility of the press but acts within the boundaries of legality and, therefore, is able to evade accountability. He is, in fact, praised for his behavior, thanks to his constructed antagonism of press versus people.

The case of Bolsonaro teaches us is that, not only are modern autocrats adapting their repertoire to avoid the costs associated with openly repressive tactics, but they are also teaching aspiring autocrats in democracies how to effectively clad themselves in sheep’s clothing. These findings complicate our understanding of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century. After all, Bolsonaro was a democratically elected president and his use of democratic language should not astound us. Yet, the way he reappropriates said language to reframe and legitimate his own illiberal measures, including endeavors to invalidate the press, highlights the insidious tactics modern would-be authoritarians adopt to monopolize power and push democracies toward (semi-)authoritarianism. Because persuasion is rarely recognized a form of state repression, it offers a low-risk, effective process for weakening democratic institutions while preserving an appearance of democratic legitimacy. This appearance is not only a protection for tyrants; it also renders authoritarianism more difficult to detect and combat. Concealing authoritarian strategies with democratic language, modern autocrats seek to play the part of committed democrats. In so doing, they renegotiate the terms of democracy, allowing a subtler, more insidious form of authoritarianism to take root.

Conclusion

The last decade has seen the return of authoritarianism and the emergence of the radical right around the world. However, rather than deploying the repressive tactics of old, modern autocrats are updating their toolbox to monopolize power while maintaining plausible deniability. Seeking domestic and international legitimacy, they manipulate information and camouflage their violent or authoritarian practices with democratic parlance. In so doing, they are able to nurture a democratic façade while consolidating political control more effectively and insidiously than ever. The result is increasingly blurred lines between democracy and autocracy, which muddy popular perceptions of democracy and make authoritarianism more difficult to identify and resist. Demagogues can then rule, all while avoiding accountability and enjoying the legitimacy normally granted by democratic norms.

Using Bolsonaro’s Brazil as a case study, this article investigates how changes to the autocrat’s toolbox may create the conditions for authoritarianism to thrive, including within democratic institutions. In particular, the paper identifies the delegitimation of the press, and the establishment of a direct, unregulated communication channel between political leaders and their constituencies, as a crucial political strategy of contemporary authoritarianism. These insidious, legal tactics enable modern autocrats to amass power though appearing to play the democratic game.

In that case, what should we make of Bolsonaro’s defeat in the 2022 elections? With a loss margin of less than 2% of the votes, Bolsonaro only narrowly lost on a second term and was far from repudiated by the public. Despite the 19% drop in the total number of attacks against journalists since he left office, 3,000 attacks still take place every day on social media, many spurred by the former president himself (Azevedo, 2023). The vitriol was especially prevalent in the months following the January 8 anti-democratic riots, the Brazilian equivalent of the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol (Azevedo, 2023). Although it may be too soon to make assertions about the effects of Bolsonaro’s press strategy in Brazilian democracy, these early indicators suggest they may endure past Bolsonaro’s formal claim to power.

As authoritarian learning and resource-sharing networks expand, we can expect to see a growing number of autocrats and would-be authoritarians take a page from this book. Indeed, we can observe similar strategies being employed by the likes of Trump, López Obrador, and more recently, Milei. But while emerging autocrats emulate and respond to their counterparts in other countries, to assume their practices—and the response they evoke—are the same risks overlooking important contextual differences (Garrido, 2024). More case-specific studies, such as the present study, are needed to scrutinize the local mechanisms that contribute to the entrenchment of authoritarian power.

This article therefore contributes to the scholarship on state power and democratic backsliding. It adds to the undertheorized field of modern autocratic tools by examining how demagogues instrumentalize new communication technologies, like social media, to wield power. Nonetheless, scope and methodology of this paper cannot offer insights into civil resistance or the popular reception of emerging authoritarian strategies. Future research can address this limitation by investigating the resonance of Bolsonaro’s claims about the press with the general populace.