Abstract
This article investigates emotionally based solidarity appeals in the Facebook posts from Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (Hungary) published in the first weeks of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, between February 24 and April 9, 2022. Our approach involves a qualitative thematic analysis to uncover the political strategies used to either foster or diminish a collective sense of sympathy. The findings reveal a striking disparity between the two countries. Prime Minister Morawiecki’s rhetoric strongly emphasizes sympathetic solidarity, establishing a close and emotional bond with Ukraine. He extends his support to the attacked country, including the provision of weapons and diplomatic services, while openly expressing hostility toward Russia. In contrast, Prime Minister Orbán’s posts, despite mentioning humanitarian efforts coordinated by his government, notably lack appeals for sympathy. Based on the comparison of the two countries, our study emphasizes the significance of nuanced moral language for political agenda in times of crisis.
Introduction
Sympathetic solidarity naturally emerges during times of catastrophe (Libal & Kashwan, 2020). The ongoing full-scale war in Ukraine has given rise to a significant humanitarian crisis and political instability across the Western Hemisphere. 1 In the initial 4 weeks of the Russian invasion, thousands of civilians lost their lives, and millions were forced to flee their homes. The world watched in horror the images of widespread executions of civilians and bombings of essential infrastructure, including healthcare facilities (Haque et al., 2022).
As witnesses to this catastrophe, Central European nations have expressed their solidarity and offered assistance to both refugees and those remaining in the war-torn areas (Handler, 2022). However, the level of concern varied from one nation to another. A survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations revealed a polarization of public opinion across European countries regarding their involvement in the conflict. This variation is often attributed to geopolitical factors, economic interests, historical ties, or hidden connections between the leadership of different countries. Poland stands out as a clear outlier, with the highest levels of support for Ukraine and hostility toward Russia in all of Europe (Krastev & Leonard, 2022).
Solidarity is commonly seen as an innate human quality but it is also recognized as a discursively constructed and, in part, an emotional phenomenon. In recent years, political science has reintroduced solidarity as an approach toward strangers facing difficulties, where there is a perceived commonality in specific characteristics, goals, group interests, and collective destiny (Heyd, 2015). In urgent situations demanding immediate and unequivocal solidarity actions, political leaders often leverage emotions through careful word choices, meaningful language, and examples that evoke emotional responses. Within solidarity discourses, sympathy is often considered the most suitable emotion to strategically convey the message (Nightingale et al., 2017; Salmela, 2015). However, to date, little attention has been paid to the rhetorical aspects of political actors’ appeals for sympathetic solidarity in times of crisis.
This study assumes the significance of moral cues provided by political elites. The publicly available performative moral claims of political leaders play a crucial role in informing and mobilizing sympathetic solidarity toward Ukraine and its people on a societal level. The moral cues may involve an emotional tone, such as “sympathy,” that aligns with the advocated actions in the message. Furthermore, recipients may simply agree with a message without any careful consideration of arguments because it comes from a perceived expert or trusted leader, activating a mental shortcut rooted in the belief that “experts or trusted leaders are generally right” (cf. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
However, there is a notable lack of knowledge regarding the modern rhetorical use of sympathy in political discourse. To address this void, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of emotionally charged solidarity appeals by examining a set of 387 Facebook posts authored by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki of Poland and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary in the context of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, from February 24 to April 9, 2022. The central question guiding this study is as follows: What are the main similarities and differences between the manifestations of sympathetic solidarity of P.M. Morawiecki and P.M. Orbán during the first six weeks of the Russian military invasion of Ukraine?
This study considers solidarity in a broad sense as a widely recognized phenomenon in which there is a collective sharing of risks, burdens, or potential dangers with the hope of better overcoming the difficulties or common threats (Baurmann, 1999; Davis, 2020; Genschel & Hemerijick, 2018). Such a complex sociodiscursive phenomenon includes affective and cognitive dimensions. It involves feelings of sympathy for and identification with the victims, as well as simultaneous expressions of negative sentiments toward the perpetrators. Solidarity is also a human evaluation of other people’s predicament that involves a commitment to act on behalf of them (Hooker, 2009, p. 30).
Using qualitative thematic analysis, we examine the emotionally tuned, solidarity-evoking Facebook posts of the prime ministers of two Central European countries, Poland and Hungary. Following the analytical framework of Ronge (2015), the empirical part of this article focuses on the unifying, supportive, and antagonistic dimensions of sympathetic solidarity communications.
Sympathy in Solidarity Communication
Solidarity is a polyvalent concept that is widely applied in different disciplines and intellectual currents (Breyer, 2020; Chouliaraki, 2013; Dawson & Verweij, 2012; Ray, 2018; Rippe, 1998). In the individualistic definition, it is understood as a person’s sense of togetherness and care, and the willingness to accept the consequences of sacrificing something for a group suffering from an adverse condition (Komter, 2010). Sociology emphasizes the bonds and cohesion that bind people together, as in Durkheim’s forms of social solidarity and collective conscience (Durkheim, 1973). Solidarity with the oppressed is central to the ideology of revolutionary socialism as a moral and political imperative (Mason, 1989). Solidarity is the “mode of responding to a situation emotionally” and with a willingness to act (Müller, 2020, p. 534). Finally, and more importantly for our article, Adam Smith’s legacy emphasizes the socialization process and communicative culture of moral sentiments, which can manifest as altruistic benevolence, expressions of a strong sense of care for the victim, and passionate condemnation of the perpetrator (Fleischacker, 2012; Ronge, 2015; Smith, 2011).
As a conceptual innovation, we merge different approaches to solidarity by integrating the emotional, collective, moral, and communicative aspects of the concept, with a particular focus on sympathy cues in the prime ministers’ social media messages. In our rhetorical perspective, talking about sympathy, caring, togetherness, and acting on behalf of those in need, etc, is also an illocutionary act of the political communicator who performs the rights, duties, and obligations (Austin, 1975). Consequently, moral claims are not only expressions of commitment to specific normative claims but also performative acts in which “the use of moral language reflects strategic choices” (Walter, 2020, p. 156). Although we do not measure the actual solidarity actions taken by the governments, the messages of sympathy, as performative speech acts, are not free from behavioral considerations. According to the “moral contagion” thesis, the moral-emotional language of political leaders robustly increases the virality of posts on social media sites (Brady et al., 2019). As such, it has the potential to induce solidarity dispositions to a large number of people which might subsequently contribute to their actual behavior.
Solidarity is a “mutual attachment” between entities that involves a perception of common ground and a moral obligation to help each other (Bayertz, 1999, p. 3). The definition has an emotional dimension: the feeling of sympathy should arise in the appreciation of ties, as well as motivate and/or justify solidarity actions (including costly actions and risk-taking). Most important, publicly expressed sympathy and claims of solidarity can create a sense of unity and greater collective acceptance of supporting others. In sum, solidarity can be energized through emotional appeals (Knab & Steffens, 2021).
Although previous studies on solidarity have paved the way for the study of public discourses within and beyond the nation-state (Billig, 1995; Nightingale et al., 2017), little attention has been paid to demonstrating how politicians use solidarity to justify or propagate political actions. This article provides a comparative analysis of solidarity-inducing cues in political leaders’ social media messages. Inspired by Adam Smith’s concept of “moral sentiments” (Haakonssen, 2002; Smith, 2011, 2002), we argue that collective solidarity is the result of a series of publicly available sympathetic cues and claims, often made by political elites, that inform citizens about why they should care and what should be done for the victim. Solidarity is an integral part of emotional politics (Frevert et al., 2022; Tava, 2023): it is based on affective responses to the misfortunes of those with whom one feels connected and is accompanied by a sense of moral imperative to act.
Adam Smith’s framework of solidarity is a promising tool for studying emotional tonality since his moral philosophy is largely based on the notion of sympathy. Contemporary moral theories are rediscovering 18th century Scottish philosophy: David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s observations about the role of emotions in moral life are helping to answer some pressing questions in modern politics (Brown, 1994; Harman, 2000; Raphael, 2007). Adam Smith developed an emotion-centered version of morality in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Fleischacker, 2013). Ronge’s (2015) modern critical account of Adam Smith argues that sympathy is the basis of solidarity: moral approval of other people’s behavior is mostly related to sympathetic and antipathetic feelings. Recent studies consider sympathy as one of the moral emotions that are “linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p. 76). Moral emotions are easily triggered by disinterested elicitors, that is, situations that do not directly harm or benefit the self, and function as an internalized social warning mechanism to the possibility of harmful situations or norm-violating behaviors (Tangney et al., 2007). Furthermore, the action tendencies of the emotion are socially embedded (Dasborough et al., 2020), that is, the disinterested event triggers an action that benefits others or the order.
Drawing on Smith, Ronge (2015) emphasizes that sympathy is not only an emotional correspondence (fellow feeling) between individuals who are in the same situation but also occurs between agents who are in different positions but participate in a communicatively constructed imaginary setting. Solidarity is the result of publicly visible sympathetic interactions, mostly propagated by members of the political elite who inform citizens why they should care about the issue and what should be done for the victim. While direct sympathy refers to sympathetic interactions between two agents, namely the spectator (S) and the person principally concerned (PPC), the concept of indirect sympathy involves sympathetic interactions between three agents: the PPC, the person principally acting (PPA), and the S (Ronge, 2015, p. 6).
Who Are the Participants?
Sympathetic solidarity requires the fulfillment of three main roles (Smith & Reeder, 1997). One is the “person principally concerned,” who is the agent to be sympathized with; the second participant is the “person principally acting,” who is responsible for the harm done to the PPC; and the third is the S, who is the most important participant in sympathetic solidarity interactions and requires a detailed description.
The spectator observes the actions of other agents (Sayre-McCord, 2010), performs cognitive evaluations, and manifests emotions by imagining himself in the place of the agent. If S’s imagination matches what the agent might feel and do, S is likely to sympathize with the agent. Accordingly, they are likely to act and speak in favor of the victim (Raphael, 2007, pp. 14–15). Spectators can vary according to their backgrounds, dispositions, and interests, and not all spectators are the same: some are more engaged, others less so.
Smith introduces different spectators in his book: some are impartial but most are not (Fleischacker, 2012). When impartiality is mentioned, it is not applied to a literal person but is referred to as an abstract ideal category (Mueller, 2016). Although S is not an emotionally neutral participant in the interactions, the emotional state associated with spectating is always less intense than that of the directly affected individuals. Spectators’ emotions can be intensified through the use of various discursive techniques (Ronge, 2015, p. 4). Thus, spectators are usually emotionally connected to other participants in sympathetic solidarity interactions. Spectators in politics are collectives, such as parties and governments, or individuals, such as prime ministers, although from a political perspective, the offices of prime ministers are personalized institutions of their countries, whose rhetoric aims to influence public opinion while representing the national, or at least a collective, political point of view (Uhr, 2001).
How Does It Work?
Sympathetic solidarity is the product of collective and circular meaning-making activity (Dupuy, 2008), including its verbal, visual, and gestural forms, among participants in interactions. Conceptually, S participates in two sympathetic interactions when they make a moral evaluation of the behavior of the principal actor. S expresses not only sympathy toward the PPC but also antipathy toward the PPA. At the political level, the prime minister’s public expressions of sympathy may also be perceived as attempts to increase collective sympathy.
When sympathetic communication is successful, sympathy is generated, and with this emotional correspondence, the moral approval of S increases (Berry, 2018). Similarly, in the negative case, the lack of emotional harmony between S and the PPC is likely to result in the former expressing disapproval or indifference. In Ronge’s prototypical situation of successful sympathetic interactions, PPA does something that PPC perceives as harmful, and therefore PPC expresses a desire to punish PPA for this behavior. S sympathizes with PPC, mimics the resentment toward PPA, and will act in favor of PPC and against PPA. Ronge concludes that a full-fledged sympathetic solidarity interaction involves the simultaneous manifestation of friendly and hostile communicative cues. In politics, the underlying sympathetic solidarity interaction is important because sympathy implies moral approval by S and motivates political action in favor of PPC and against PPA (Mallory, 2017).
Ronge significantly advances the operationalization of sympathetic solidarity interactions by distinguishing three distinct constitutive elements of solidarity: the unifying, supportive, and antagonistic dimensions. This article largely draws on the analytical framework of Ronge’s rethinking of Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism. However, as a methodological innovation, some modifications have been introduced to make the dimensions applicable to political communication. In Ronge’s work, the unifying dimension refers to the emotional correspondence between PPC and S that creates an emotional bond to facilitate harmonious action. However, fostering collective solidarity also requires creating emotional harmony, kinship, and closeness between PPC and S. Without strong and positive connections, S may not be motivated to take actions that support the well-being of PPC. Such emotional concordance is not discussed in detail by Ronge and is only mentioned under the umbrella of the supportive dimension. We suggest that the bond between S and PPC cannot be neglected when analyzing the sympathetic solidarity rhetoric of political leaders. We contend that the best way to study bonding language is to integrate kinship rhetoric into the dimension of unity.
Ronge proposes that solidarity involves disinterested, nonaltruistic support of others. Building on Ronge’s idea, this study treats the supportive dimension as the performative link between S and PPC, manifested in offering material and symbolic support to PPC. Silence can also be meaningful in the rhetoric of sympathetic solidarity; if political actors do not promise support or explicitly limit the scope of the support offered, then sympathy is absent or at least limited.
The antagonistic dimension of solidarity helps explain the aggressive tonality of solidarity discourse. Based on Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Ronge argues that people feel inclined to express solidarity with PPC against PPA only if they also disapprove of PPA’s behavior toward PPC and if they can generate a fellow feeling with regard to the resentment, hatred, anger, fear, or other negative emotions communicated by PPC. Ronge emphasizes that the antagonistic dimension functions to detach S from PPA. Detachment is crucial in sympathy appeals; if S and PPA remain connected, it may weaken solidarity with PPC because the possibility of S’s leaning toward PPA’s position remains open. The more PPA is denounced and condemned by S, the more disconnected S and PPA will be and, therefore, the lower the chances of jeopardizing sympathy for PPC. This study provides an empirical test of these dimensions. Before discussing our findings, we present the study methodology.
Method
By slightly modifying Ronge’s conceptualization of sympathetic interactions, this article focuses on the social media posts of Prime Ministers Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Viktor Orbán (Hungary) in response to the war in Ukraine. Our empirical corpus consists of 387 Facebook posts published between February 24 and April 9, 2022. We used the CrowdTangle by Meta to obtain the posts and metadata. In our study, the structural position of the spectator (S) in sympathetic solidarity is represented by the prime ministers of Poland and Hungary. PPC is Ukraine and its representatives, while PPA is Russia and its representatives. By sympathetic expressions, we refer to the publicly available communicative cues in Facebook messages that contain any unifying, supportive, and antagonistic dimensions.
Operationalization
Based on Ronge’s ideas about the different aspects of sympathy, we discuss their operationalization in the following sections. The unifying dimension measures whether and how the statements of the prime ministers encourage people to be interested or concerned about the situation in Ukraine. It also includes elements of a symmetrical relationship between Poland/Hungary and Ukraine (e.g. in metaphors of friendship, kinship, harmony, loyalty, brotherhood, and reciprocity). The more cues of caring, connectedness, and harmony, the greater the likelihood that the prime ministers want to evoke sympathy and increase the level of solidarity among their citizens. In contrast, signs of dissimilarity, distance, and disharmony between S and PPC are interpreted as an unwillingness to evoke sympathy and a reluctance to appeal to solidarity.
The supportive dimension aims to capture the rhetorical tools used to represent the operations and call for action on behalf of the person in need. It includes two coding categories: who should be supportive and what kind of support is promised/given (tangible or symbolic). The more often prime ministers post about support for Ukraine and the more support they call for, the stronger the rhetoric of sympathetic solidarity. We also registered negativity: when prime ministers express concern about potential support or explicitly deny help, we interpret this as a sign of moderate or lack of sympathetic solidarity appeals.
Finally, indicators of the antagonistic dimension are useful for interpreting communicative cues of rupture, in this case between Poland/Hungary and Russia. We code all mentions of dissimilarities, previous conflicts, condemnations, and denunciations. Furthermore, we consider the communication of negative emotions (toward Russia) by the prime ministers via social media as a sign of disconnection. Material disconnections, such as calls for sanctions, boycotts, and bans, and communicative disconnections, such as suspensions of diplomatic relations, bans, and suspensions of entry, are coded under the category of antagonism.
After compiling two corpora for each country, we conducted a qualitative thematic analysis of the collected material—a data processing method that involves reading through a dataset and identifying patterns in the data (V. Clarke et al., 2015). Our deductive analysis is guided by the structured coding categories of Ronge’s model of sympathy. The operationalization of the indicators of the sympathetic solidarity dimensions is the intellectual product of the authors, summarized in a codebook (including instructions, indicator words, and prototypical linguistic syntax). Due to the complex nature of emotional expressions and the difficulties in identifying sympathetic rhetoric, several training sessions were conducted to support the manual coding. The selected materials were carefully read and discussed in detail by both coders. In cases of ambiguity, the classification was carried out through joint coding activities until an agreement was reached.
Case Selection
In most different case study designs, countries A and B are considered similar, although they differ in two essential aspects: the focus of the analysis (sympathetic solidarity appeals/cues) and its outcome (countries’ policies). In this study, the prime ministers of Poland and Hungary are considered to have similar worldviews and political strategies. Both leaders share ideological backgrounds (nativist-conservative right-wing populism), occupy the same political positions within the European Union (EU; sovereignism and Euroscepticism), and have long been political allies of the European Commission; however, they have reacted differently to the war in Ukraine. While Morawiecki has become one of Kyiv’s most vocal advocates, calling for tougher sanctions against Russia and increased military backing for Ukraine, Orbán has refrained from any diplomatic and military support, instead focusing only on humanitarian aid and propagating peace talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Poland and Russia have a long history of conflict. Attempts to improve relations with Russia were very short-lived, and they deteriorated sharply after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Poland perceives Ukraine as an important partner in stabilizing the post-Soviet space and serving as a geopolitical buffer against Russia, strengthened by its strong ties to the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; Szeptycki, 2022).
Hungary’s relationship with Russia and Ukraine has changed significantly over the past decades. Until the mid-2000s, it was limited and cautious, probably due to the memory of the Soviet occupation between 1945 and 1990. By 2014, the ruling political elite had shed its reservations about Russia. Today, energy accounts for the dominant share of Hungary’s imports, revealing its vulnerable dependence on Russia for gas, oil, and nuclear fuel (Csernus, 2023). In contrast, Hungary’s relationship with Ukraine, especially in recent years, has been conflictual, marked by clashes over the rights of Hungarian-speaking minorities in Transcarpathia.
Facebook is the most popular social media site in both countries (Newman et al., 2021). Politicians use Facebook extensively to disseminate information about their agendas, policies, and positions. Unlike Twitter, Facebook allows for detailed argumentation, which is a rich source of empirical data for communication scholars.
Because measuring causal relationships is beyond the scope of this study, we are unable to test whether the quantity and quality of sympathetic appeals explain the divergent paths of the two countries. Instead, we offer a nuanced comparison of the prime ministers’ rhetoric between February 24, 2022 (the start of the Russian military invasion) and April 9, 2022 (7 days after the Bucha massacre became known to the international public). Since sympathy arises from a heightened awareness of the suffering of others, we believe that the first 7 weeks of the war, during which shocking news was broadcast and thousands of refugees entered the borders, are ideal for our analysis.
Results
This study sampled 156 posts on P.M. Morawiecki’s Facebook page and 231 posts on Viktor Orbán’s Facebook page. After thematic examination, 225 posts were selected for analysis: 106 and 119 for the Hungarian and Polish cases, respectively. About 45% of Orbán’s messages referred to the war in Ukraine, which is significantly less than in the case of the Polish P.M.
The overall figures, which are representative of the social media agenda of political leaders, show that prime ministers have different levels of interest in the war. As evidenced by the lower salience of the topic, the situation in Ukraine was the main focus of Morawiecki, according to whom the war has a great global and historical significance: the “Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the geopolitical reality of Europe and the world,” 2 [it is] “a turning point in history,” 3 “This morning, February 24, 2022, will go down in history as the day Russia chose war. This decision changes everything.” 4 Morawiecki presents the war in Ukraine as a shocking experience that requires radically different approaches from those used in the past. In contrast, Orbán sees little reason to discuss the military actions and their consequences in such a serious way. The differences in the visibility and contextualization of the issue predict the variance between the two leaders’ sympathetic appeals for solidarity.
To further narrow the database, we searched for indicators of verbal, textual, and gestural manifestations of sympathetic responses in the prime ministers’ Facebook messages. This dataset of Orbán’s posts consists of 57 items, compared to 119 by Morawiecki. The high prevalence of sympathetic cues suggests that the Polish leader plays an active role in promoting solidarity ties and cooperation through sympathetic appeals. The Hungarian prime minister, on the other hand, keeps his emotional cues much lower, although sympathetic reactions are not completely absent from Orbán’s Facebook communication.
The timing of the sympathetic messages is also quite revealing. The Hungarian prime minister’s messages are dense between February 29 and March 6, and March 17 and 22. The first peak (March 3–6) corresponds to the time when asylum seekers began to enter the country’s territory, while the second (March 17–18) and third (March 22) cover the week of the first coordinated government action to support the refugees. In the case of Hungary, there was a steady decline after March 25, which indicates a diminishing intention to display and thus elicit sympathy. In contrast, Morawiecki kept the issue on his social media agenda throughout the sampled period with some peaks, one of them occurring just after his visit to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian political leaders. In the Hungarian sample, the peaks are mostly related to the diplomatic meetings of EU leaders. Similarly, in Poland, besides a trip to Kyiv, the peaks were related to bilateral discussions and official visits of foreign political leaders to Poland. The discrepancy in the number of sympathetic messages between two samples after the Bucha massacre was revealed and is striking (see Figure 1).
Number of Facebook posts containing some elements of sympathy.
After reporting the general findings of the thematic analysis, we present the results of the dimensional investigation of sympathy appeals.
Unifying Dimension
The prime ministers use the unifying dimension to express their concern for the needs of the Ukrainian people and to increase the sympathy of their supporters with the victims of the war. The bond between the spectator countries (Hungary and Poland) and the principally concerned country (Ukraine) is considered stronger when, in addition to communicating care, acknowledging, confirming, and fostering, a friendship/kinship-type symmetric relationship is also part of the rhetoric.
Bonded by Humanity
The bonds between Poland and the attacked Ukraine are demonstrated by Morawiecki’s call for humanism—the urge to be moved by the pain of the victims in Ukraine: “no one can remain indifferent to what is happening in Mariupol or Kharkiv,” 5 “hell on earth.” 6 Similarly, Orbán’s Facebook messages contain elements of manifest sadness when talking about Ukraine.
Both leaders depict the suffering of the victims with images of women and children, which were particularly prevalent in the days after the news of the war 7 and the Bucha massacre 8 broke. In Morawiecki’s posts, Ukrainian politicians also appear as positive agents who demand recognition and Ukrainian people as heroic characters. 9 The object of the sympathy expressed by the Hungarian prime minister is clearly not the country’s political leaders but the individuals affected by the war. 10 According to Orbán, the link between the Ukrainian and Hungarian people is based only on Christian humanism and the moral-legal obligation to help those in need of asylum. The main message is that Hungary cares 11 but economic necessities and the interests of the country limit its sympathy and restrict the scope of solidarity actions. 12
Characteristically, Morawiecki’s bonding statements occasionally take the form of blaming other European countries for their reluctance to connect with the principally concerned Ukraine. Morawiecki also denounces the moral attitude of other spectator countries, stating that “the comfort of Western Europe is not more important than the blood of Ukrainian children.” 13
Bonded by Fate
Unity is also proclaimed by the Polish Prime Minister’s statements such as “the future of Poland, Europe and the world is now being decided in Ukraine.” 14 Occasionally, historical analogies, with particular reference to World War II, between the S’s and the PPC’s past are mentioned to simplify and interpret the information about the events and to attribute hero, victim, and villain status to the main characters. References to World War II imply that the potential consequences of Russian aggression are similar to this historical event; therefore, the audience should understand that there is a strong positive connection between PPC and S. The leader of the Polish government expands the circle of S by naming other countries, such as Finland, Romania, and the Baltic states, as well as Europe as a whole, which are also connected to the fate of Ukraine. 15 As Morawiecki commented on the 23rd anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO: “Had it not been for the great historical opportunity we seized many years ago—joining the North Atlantic Alliance and, a few years later, the EU—our history could have been very different, and Russia might have attacked us as it attacked Ukraine.” 16 The bond between Poland and Ukraine is also highlighted by the parallel invocation of national anthems: “Our anthem begins with the words <<Poland is not yet lost>> and their anthem <<Ukraine has not yet perished>>. The Poles really did everything so that Poland would not die. Now Ukraine is facing this enormous test. I know it will come out victorious.” 17
Such arguments are entirely missing in the Hungarian P.M.’s posts.
Bonded by Togetherness
In some of the Polish leader’s contributions, the unifying intentions of expressive calls for care are so strong that they blur the line between S and PPC. Morawiecki’s compassionate rhetoric suggests that today’s spectators are tomorrow’s concerned agents. It suggests a symmetrical and even intimate relationship between Poland and Ukraine. The “our friends” and “our neighbors” are two of the most common nominations used to represent Ukraine and Ukrainians in the studied social media posts. The possessive adjective “our” further strengthens the intimacy between the two nations. 18 The harmony between S and PCC is based on the rhetorical inclusion of Ukraine in the Western community. This value-based inclusion legitimizes Morawiecki’s criticism of the EU states and his pressure for Ukraine’s closer integration into the EU.
The prime minister goes even further, claiming that Ukraine should become a member of the EU because it “represents and defends European values.” The next sentence is a declaration: “We will never leave you alone, because we know that you are fighting not only for your own freedom and security but also for us.” 19 Morawiecki argues that solidarity should not be limited to humanitarian aid. The situation should be addressed by recognizing the unity between the EU and Ukraine because both actors value freedom and democracy above all else. The political standards, rules, and goals of the EU and the PPC country are the same, which deeply unites them: “Kyiv stands today on the front line of defending freedom, independence, the individual’s freedom to choose life or democracy—aren’t these the greatest values?” 20
Manifestations of visual harmony are also noteworthy. In the Polish sample, the colors of the Polish and Ukrainian flags are most often combined, or hearts are painted in blue and yellow. 21 In the Hungarian sample, a video report of Orbán’s visit to refugee centers shows children’s drawings of flags. 22 Orbán’s gestural unity cues are shown only by shaking hands with refugees. 23 On the other hand, when Morawiecki has met with President Zelensky in Kyiv or the Ukrainian refugees in Poland, he is portrayed as paying attention to displaying attentive and symmetrical body language: keeping direct eye contact without taking his gaze away, hugging children, shaking hands, and moving vertically to everyone’s level to physically demonstrate intimacy. 24
In contrast, the Hungarian political leader, instead of demonstrating the togetherness of the S to the PPC, maintains emotional distance by saying “Ukraine has its own interests, and I see the Hungarian ones” 25 and “It is not our war.” 26 To widen the gap, Orbán mentions current and past rifts and tensions between Ukraine and Hungary in 11 posts. They mostly remind the supporters of the negative economic consequences of the sanctions against Russia 27 and the bitter indignation over the minority policy in Ukraine, which is presented as creating unfavorable conditions for the performance of the collective identity of ethnic Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian region. 28
The kinship type of rhetorical devices is mostly absent from the Hungarian sample. Instead, the Hungarian case illustrates a relational asymmetry, even though Orbán manifests care: he hints at his compassion for the victims with expressions such as “Alas!” and “poor Ukrainians,” and portrays the refugees as a passive group of people, mostly consisting of women and children who lack agency and are completely dependent on caregivers. 29 Verbal formulations include “they are given,” “they are taken,” and “they are sent.” 30
Supportive Dimension
Appeals for sympathy are often accompanied by exhortations to do something for the principally concerned country. This dimension of sympathy rhetoric focuses on identifying the symbolic and material support demanded, given, and promised by the prime ministers.
The Polish and Hungarian cases differ significantly in their scope of action. In 38 social media posts, Orbán conveys the message that “Hungary helps.” He focuses primarily on providing humanitarian aid to those crossing the Ukrainian-Hungarian border: logistics, housing, health care, education, and legal assistance. Emergency medical and food supplies to Transcarpathia are also regularly mentioned. In addition to the government, representatives of local councils in the border regions and volunteers from charitable organizations and religious groups are portrayed as caregivers but the EU is not mentioned at all, suggesting that the prime minister does not want the EU’s institutions to become deeply involved in the conflict. Orbán’s focus is mainly on providing material and logistical support to the refugees. He also calls for financial donations. 31
Morawiecki, on the other hand, offers and demands a wide range of activities to support the principally concerned country. The generally supportive expressions present in the majority of the analyzed posts are often coupled with information about more specific assistance that has already been provided or promised to the Ukrainians. Although humanitarian aid is promised in the first entry of the sampled Facebook posts, Morawiecki also declares: “I also want to assure all Ukrainians: We will not leave you in your time of need. We are with you. Poland was one of the first countries to help Ukraine. We will take in refugees, treat the wounded and provide all support in the field of humanitarian action.” 32 Poland is portrayed as the “great humanitarian hub” doing the best for refugees and those in war zones, providing food, shelter, medical care, and hygiene products. 33 The Polish are praised as heartfelt donors and dedicated providers. 34
While Hungary’s prime minister wants to localize aid efforts, Poland’s political leader is calling for much more than humanitarian aid from country to country: Morawiecki is positioning himself as Ukraine’s chief advocate, lobbying for EU and NATO membership, further sanctions, and military assistance. Moreover, Morawiecki declares that “a convoy of ammunition, weapons, mortars and drones” had been donated to Ukraine. 35 On the other hand, Orbán repeatedly (in 24 posts) states what kind of support will not be given to Ukraine: weapons and armed forces, as well as sanctions on energy-related products and materials from Russia.
The Polish prime minister puts the Ukraine case on the EU agenda and encourages EU countries to do more in material terms but he also recognizes the significance and necessity of symbolic support. Accordingly, Morawiecki praises the courage and heroic actions of the president and people of Ukraine to keep Ukrainians’ morale up: “We are helping our Ukrainian neighbors not only physically and materially but also by lifting their spirits.” 36 Moreover, after his visit to Kyiv on March 15, Morawiecki urges Western politicians, especially British, German, French, and American leaders, to follow his steps and expresses his disappointment at the alleged failure to support Ukraine sufficiently. 37
The heroism of the people is also positively mentioned by Orbán but symbolic support is scarce in the Hungarian case. When Orbán visits families arriving from Ukraine, he wishes them “good luck” and cheers up a refugee child by saying “heads up.” 38
Antagonistic Dimension
This dimension identifies the rhetorical disjunction between the spectator and the principally acting country, in this case, Russia. In the Facebook posts of the Hungarian P.M., he repeats the EU’s statement condemning the Russian invasion but only one post mentions Hungary’s agreement with the Russia-EU disconnect. 39 Implicit criticism of the Russian government’s military action is manifested in Orbán’s speech on March 15, when he argued against the war. In addition, he made a slight distinction between Russia’s and Hungary’s interests. 40 The evidence in Orbán’s social media messages suggests a reluctance to express emotional, moral, or symbolic denunciations of Russia, suggesting weaknesses of antagonism in the Hungarian sample.
The Polish case tells a very different story, with very emotionally charged and hostile language and rhetorical disconnection. Widespread, vehement, and frequent condemnations of Russia and the complete severing of any possible relations between Poland and Russia typically characterize Morawiecki’s social media communication. An extremely negative assessment of the Russian aggression in Ukraine is the recurring theme in almost all of his posts. The principally acting country is usually condemned through an explicit lexical evaluation that is unambiguous in its negative assessment of Russia and its policies.
The most important rhetorical device, especially in the first days of the war, was the attribution of guilt, which implied Putin’s individual responsibility for the military aggression. PPA is Vladimir Putin, to whom are ascribed additional negative qualities and a tendency to commit evil acts. In Morawiecki’s Facebook entries, Putin is described as a “terrorist” or an “aggressor” who understands only the language of force, 41 a “genocidist who has acted and continues to act in a painfully methodical way” 42 or a “cruel tyrant.” 43
The principally acting agent is both a person and a collective. In addition to President Putin, the “Russians” and the “Russian armed forces” as a collective entity are also associated with negativity: “The crimes committed by the Russians against nearly 300 residents of Bucha and other towns around Kyiv must be called genocide.” 44 Negative assessments are also linked to Russia, which is conceived as “the evil empire.” 45 Condemnation is also expressed with adjectives such as “bestial,” “bloody,” and “totalitarian-fascist.” The war in Ukraine is defined as exceptional: “We are in a situation where one country illegally invades another, it is not a conflict, it is an armed attack, it is the murder of civilians, the murder of children, of women.” 46 Such phrases stand in contradiction to Orbán’s narrative, which favors seeing the situation as a symmetrical, ordinary conflict with two parties promoting their legitimate interests.
The reactions to the war are based on the strong division between Poland and Russia, which is always unfavorable for Russia: “When Russia opens fire on the Ukrainians—the Poles open their border and their hearts to them!” 47 This emphasizes not only the cruelty of Russia but also the moral-cultural divisions: Poland’s actions are morally good, while Russia’s actions are barbaric. 48
Morawiecki proposes cutting all ties with Russia and criticizes those who want to continue diplomatic talks and trade with the Putin-led Russian government. 49 Accordingly, the Polish Prime Minister relentlessly calls for sanctions to isolate Russia as much as possible. The emotional disconnect, reflecting anger, moral shock, and outrage over Russia’s war atrocities and calls to suspend all diplomatic relations, is coupled with repeated exhortations to the EU and other powers to impose “heavy,” “crushing,” and “substantial” sanctions that will “cut off the oxygen” from the Russian economy and prevent it from continuing its aggression. 50 Finally, a symbolic break is communicated: Morawiecki supports the decision announced by the head of the Polish Football Association and the heads of the Polish representation not to play in the upcoming World Cup qualifying playoff semifinal against Russia. 51
Conclusion
This study aims to unpack the sympathetic appeals to solidarity in the political rhetoric of Poland and Hungary. Our concept is in line with the literature, which argues that solidarity is a “willingness to share resources with others by personal contribution to those in struggle or in need” (Stjernø, 2004, p. 2), which has emotional underpinnings (S. Clarke et al., 2006), including sympathy.
Especially in a collective setting, sympathy and solidarity can be increased by publicly available communication from those who witness the harm done to the victims. Sympathetic communication usually has unifying, supportive, and antagonistic dimensions and involves three characters, namely the spectators and the principally concerned and principally acting entities (Ronge, 2015). To scrutinize this idea, this article aims to analyze whether and how political leaders evoke and suppress sympathy to justify a country’s policy of solidarity with Ukraine or the lack of such a policy.
Ronge’s refined model finds notable differences between the emotionally grounded rhetoric of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (Hungary) in relation to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. The three dimensions of manifested sympathy are registered in both cases but the extent and characteristics of the means of communication are surprisingly different. In short, the Polish case demonstrates the full range of emotionally charged appeals, while the Hungarian case shows how a politician can rhetorically limit sympathy and solidarity. In the Polish case, the unifying and supportive dimensions show strong and unconditional sympathy and solidarity with the Ukrainians. In Orbán’s discourse, sympathy is limited by economic constraints and national interests. The greatest difference was found in the antagonistic dimension with Morawiecki’s vehement criticism of Russia and Orbán’s evasive communication.
The differences in sympathetic claims support the need for a detailed, context-sensitive study of the contingent articulations of ideas and material interests and their mutual constitutiveness. In theory, the two Central European states should share views on such an important geopolitical issue: both have a negative experience of Soviet occupation, are in close proximity to Russia, and have traditionally enjoyed a very close friendship with each other, deeply rooted in a history of shared cultures, struggles, and beliefs. Orbán and Morawiecki are known as right-wing populist political allies who have influenced EU policies on several issues, including migration, LGBTQIA+ issues, rule of law, and EU funding allocations. This study shows that EU political leaders, who are usually considered very similar in ideology, political behavior, and rhetoric, can exhibit strikingly distinct ways of communication and interpretation of their geopolitical and material constraints.
Sympathy is political in the sense that it is always based on the selection of specific causes that, unlike other causes, create solidarity among actors. These mechanisms are clear in the messages of the Polish prime minister. His appeals for solidarity are not limited to mere sympathy stemming from universal humanitarian values but are attributed to the Ukrainian attachment to European values of freedom and democracy. Schmitt and Clark emphasize the number of principles that regulate the formation of sympathy between the parties involved and the expression of sympathy. As they claim, “sympathy-worthy plight is typically the result of bad luck,” understood as forces beyond the control and responsibility of the party being sympathized with (Schmitt & Clark, 2006, p. 469). Such reasons for sympathetic solidarity can be found in Morawiecki’s posts, where Ukraine is presented as sharing the same historical fate with Poland as a result of geopolitical positions.
In the case of Hungary, it is not a matter of sharing an identity with the principally concerned entity but rather the feeling of sadness and pity of the spectator. This is a good example of how conditional sympathy manifests itself in real political situations. The data suggest that Orbán acknowledged the horrific situation in Ukraine and recognized Ukrainians’ feelings, yet he did not want sympathy to be prominent in his social media messages. Adam Smith (2011) observes and deals with these cases by introducing the notion of “conditional sympathy.” Ronge (2015) calls this “pseudo-sympathy,” which implies a rather weak manifestation of emotion and is merely an imaginative projection of one’s own sorrows into another’s situation (Lanzoni, 2009), from which a strong authentic feeling is very unlikely to emerge.
We are aware of the limitations of our analysis. The first limitation concerns selection bias: if we had chosen another issue with a different timeframe (e.g. migration in 2015), the analysis would most likely have yielded slightly different results: perhaps a lower level of sympathetic solidarity in the Polish sample. This leads to the second limitation, namely the need to closely examine the relationship between the material and ideational dimensions as constitutive for the formation of foreign policy. The third limitation concerns our method, which does not allow us to assess the actual intentions behind the communicated feelings but only to register publicly displayed emotions. Finally, our study does not examine the reception and actual social impact of the sympathy appeals disseminated by political actors.
Further quantitative analysis is needed to assess how the elite’s communicative efforts affect the public’s opinion and their emotional state.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The data collection and analysis on Hungary was supported by National Research Development and Innovation Office under agreement No. 131990 (Political Communication in the Age of Expressivity).