This article investigates the collective action problem in the name, image, and likeness (NIL) era. By allowing college athletes to profit from their NIL through endorsements, sponsorships, and social media presence, athletes may now receive unlimited monetary benefits for their participation in college sports. But a collection action problem exists. Although all universities benefit from the NIL landscape, they do not have to disclose their NIL data. In addressing this problem, the article finds that, when athletic departments are selfish, defection from a position of cooperation exists as a dominant strategy. An emerging social norm of information disclosure is insufficient to provide an incentive for disclosure.
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