Abstract
France and Morocco have long maintained close relations. These relations have historically led them to be stable allies in defending their respective interests in Africa. However, this relationship has undergone profound changes over the past twenty years. While France was experiencing a period of slowdown in its African policy, Morocco, on the contrary, was part of an emerging dynamic leading it to rediscover its potential footprint and influence on the continent. The intersection of these two geopolitical representations has thus significantly modified both French and Moroccan African policy and their respective relations. This article analyses the evolution of the mutual perception of these two countries through the conduct of their foreign policies in Africa.
Introduction
Relations between Morocco and France, long characterised by colonial and postcolonial ties, have been engaged in a process of reconfiguration for many years. However, contemporary relations between the two countries, particularly the redefinition of their postcolonial diplomatic relations, are virtually absent from academic literature. The colonial period accounts for many scholarly works on Franco–Moroccan relations. These works are primarily drawn from the historical sciences and focus, among other things, on France's colonial conquest of Morocco and the establishment of the Protectorate (Ayache, 1996; Courcelle-Labrousse and Marmié-Maniglier, 2020; Moha, 1995; Rivet, 1988a, 1999; Schiavon, 2021). Other works, mainly from sociology and anthropology, focus more specifically on specific phenomena, such as migratory and cultural relations between the two countries (Beaman, 2017; Berrada-Bousta, 2012; Gilliéron, 2023; Laffort, 2009; Thomas, 2013).
On the other hand, political and diplomatic relations between the two countries over the last two decades have received very little coverage in academic research (Durand, 1997; Essemlali, 2011; Lentz, 2008; Moha, 1995), even though the balance of these relations has undergone significant transformations since then. Such is the central aim of this article, which proposes to analyze the evolution of Moroccan and French foreign policy (Barre, 2019; Charillon, 2011; Fernandez-Molina, 2016; Kessler, 1999; Rachid, 2003) in Africa in the light of their historical and postcolonial relationship, while showing how this relationship today illustrates the affirmation of African agency within international relations. This angle of analysis is justified by the fact that, since this period, France and Morocco seem to be developing progressively divergent African policies that affect their relations and, above all, the perception of their respective “role identities” on the continent. Indeed, while Morocco is working towards its continental emergence with a proactive economic policy and diplomacy, France is adopting a reactive posture, subject to increasing challenges. This situation marked a break in Franco–Moroccan relations, particularly in Africa, where the Kingdom of Morocco (or the Kingdom) traditionally associated itself with the postcolonial policy pursued by Paris on the continent.
We hypothesise that while Morocco is increasingly asserting itself as an autonomous emerging power, multiplying initiatives to achieve continental integration (Abourabi, 2020), France has pursued a policy of preserving its postcolonial influence, disregarding the fact that it now stands as one partner among others on the continent, for several African countries. The evolution of the relationship between Morocco and France bears witness to this situation, where the historical postcolonial link no longer constitutes a shared language through which Morocco's and France's role identities are naturally aligned within their African policies (Bat, 2012; Durand de Sanctis, 2018). This hypothesis leads us to question the state of the relationship between Morocco and France, based on the Kingdom's African policy and the role identity (Wendt, 2010: 201–203) it embodies, and its perception concerning France's policy over the same period. 1 One could contend that there is a growing dissimilarity within Morocco's African policy relative to France's perception of the Kingdom's role identity, not only on the continent but also vis-à-vis France's African policy.
We propose to examine this problem by focusing on an approach to Morocco's role identity in Africa in the light of its relationship with France and from a greater consideration of the cognitive dimension that shapes this identity in its expression as public policy (Jobert, 1992; Jobert and Muller, 1987; Sabatier and Schlager, 2000).
Public policy shows that these policies “are more than the aggregation of interests and that they produce frameworks, references, mediations and so on. They start from the premise that values and principles define a vision of the world” (Gardon et al., 2021: 51). This cognitive approach to foreign policy can also be associated with social constructivism, which describes how institutions construct a specific representation of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 2012). As Houghton notes, “the cognitive approach to foreign analysis (CFPA) in particular is increasingly being associated with one particularly prominent approach today: social constructivism” (Houghton, 2007: 26). Applying the constructivist paradigm to the study of foreign policy makes it possible to value the role of ideas, norms, and representations in shaping the construction and framework of action (Henning et al., 2001; Hopf, 2002; Houghton, 2007; Kubalkova, 2001).
Our methodology relies primarily on a comparative approach, analysing Morocco's foreign policy in Africa alongside that of France. This approach focuses on both the external factors affecting states’ foreign policies (characteristics of the international system and agent-structure relationships) and domestic factors (institutions and national interests) (Lantis and Beasley, 2017). We draw on factual examples of the practices conducted at the heart of the two countries’ African policies while also highlighting the normative and discursive transformations affecting the orientation of these policies. We draw on official sources (public discourse and institutional data) and academic sources relating to the foreign policies of Morocco and France, as well as their historical and contemporary political relations. Our analyses are also based on our knowledge of the field and our observations in Morocco, having lived and worked there since 2013. In this context, we have been able to interview many military, political, and diplomatic decision-makers in France and Morocco. We had around fifty meetings, leading to informal discussions on relations between the two countries and their respective African policies. These encounters occurred as part of observation missions, field surveys, or following workshops and conferences we delivered to certain state and public actors.
These meetings gave us a good overview of both countries’ representations of their international role, particularly in Africa. Given the sensitivity of the subject and our interlocutors’ obligation to maintain confidentiality, we could not conduct formal interviews. Nevertheless, these informal interviews were instructive and enabled us to exchange views freely and in-depth. Consequently, we chose to use them as a basis for understanding the subject of this study without necessarily naming individuals or reporting specific statements.
Our article is structured in four parts. First, on a critical and theoretical scale, we introduce the postcolonial (Smouts, 2007) characteristic of France's African policy to highlight the cognitive framework and discursive regime that have long structured its relationship to the continent's formerly colonised countries. In the second part, we will more specifically situate the starting point of Morocco's postcolonial relationship with France and how this relationship historically conditioned the Kingdom's African policy during the second half of the twentieth century. Third, we show how this identity deeply changed in the 2000s, as Morocco developed an African policy that was increasingly out of sync with that of France. Fourth, we examine the consequences of this misalignment in the role identity sought by both countries on the continent. While Morocco pursues an independent African policy grounded in a form of African agency, France's role and identity on the continent are increasingly contested, compelling France to adapt. Finally, the study of the Franco–Moroccan case, in the context of France's policy in Africa, will provide an example of the influence of postcolonial relations on the definition and evolution of foreign policy practices.
On French Postcolonial Domination in Africa: Cognitive Framework and Discursive Regime
France's long-term African policy is a historical institution that continues to condition its relationship with the continent. The identity of this policy was initially colonial (and therefore understood within the French imperial possessions) before becoming, strictly speaking, foreign at the time of the independence of its former possessions. This dimension consequently induces a historical relationship of domination with the territories it administered between 1830 and 1962, and it has continued, in terms of identity, in a postcolonial relationship in many cases. Works that take a postcolonial perspective to highlight this relationship address various characteristics. Some point to the French postcolonial heritage in the geopolitical representation of the continent (Profant, 2010). Others highlight the development of this heritage in France's cultural relationship with Africa (Thomas, 2013). Meanwhile, others demonstrate how, on a military scale, contemporary French military doctrine in Africa is genealogically inscribed in the tradition of the colonial wars that metropolitan France waged for over a century (Olsson, 2012).
For many researchers, this state of affairs was built primarily under the influence of Gaullist policy, which saw Africa as a significant asset for France's international power (Bayart, 2011; Châtaigner, 2006; Gounin, 2009). During the 1960s, just as the leading countries of French-speaking Africa were gaining independence, the French presidency set up a system to preserve France's political, economic and military influence in what was then colloquially referred to as the pré-carré (Bat, 2010, 2012; Durand de Sanctis, 2018). Within this system, France's African policy maintained a form of domination over the regal functions of the young African states. As such, the foreign policy of the various countries of the pré-carré is strongly aligned with the interests of Paris. This domination was first expressed through the establishment of the Community regime following the 1958 referendum. This regime ended four years later, but Paris retained its ability to influence the foreign policies of most of its former colonies through bilateral agreements (notably on defence). In the midst of the Cold War, France was determined to preserve its influence in Africa from any interference, particularly from communism, by maintaining a form of postcolonial domination. As Stephen W. Smith says “For decades, a French general managed a latticework of defence agreements, which were all similar in writing, with France guaranteeing the territorial integrity of each former colony and pledging to train the local army in exchange for the free right to station in the African country, or transition through it, any number of soldiers” (Smith, 2013: 164).
More profoundly, this postcolonial domination was structurally exerted at several levels of governmentality of independent African states, deeply penetrating their political practices. We hypothesise that it was established, more or less homogeneously depending on the country, on the following four dimensions: political, military, economic, cultural and symbolic.
Politically, the decolonisation of French-speaking Africa was accompanied by France's continued institutional and political involvement in the central bodies of the decolonised states. Through the Community regime 2 and the then Ministry of Cooperation, France was able to continue to influence the national will of most African states. This was achieved by maintaining close ties with heads of state and politically monitoring any form of internal destabilisation of regimes associated with France (Bat, 2010: 43–44). On an institutional level, the French presidency has an African unit that centralises all information and direct political action vis-à-vis the various states. The African republics that emerged from the former French colonial empire initially had very little room for manoeuvre in their foreign policies. At the time of independence, the Community regime placed the conduct of these states’ foreign policy under French control under Article 78 of the Constitution of 1958 (République Française, 1958). Even after this regime was abandoned, the practice persisted in many cases (Bat, 2010, 2012: 213–269).
Militarily, the decolonisation of French-speaking Africa was accompanied by the maintenance of the French presence, notably through the establishment of defence agreements, which often had two fundamental dimensions: a mutual defence clause in the event of aggression (in reality, a legal right of military intervention by France in the countries concerned); military and technical assistance agreements which above all enabled France to maintain its domination over French-speaking African armies (Mertillo, 1988).
Secondly, France preserved a significant economic presence after independence, mainly to control public and private investment in the countries of the pré-carré (Bouamama, 2021). Hugon notes, “[a]t independence, the postcolonial state took over from the French administration and assumed a growing role in controlling capital. This was financed by natural resources, foreign trade and financial transfers, and African capital played a minimal role. French aid seemed necessary to drive public and private investment” (2007: 4). This situation enabled France not only to make a significant contribution to its balance of trade surplus over several decades (as recently as 2004, the African continent contributed 3.2 billion euros to France's trade surplus [Hugon, 2007: 56]), but also to benefit from a prime position in capturing strategic natural resources, such as oil. 3
Finally, this state of postcolonial domination 4 was expressed culturally and symbolically in several ways. First and foremost, it implied the construction of a historical dependence of French-speaking African countries on the French imprint. This dependence was based on a range of factors, including language, religion, and the organisation of the state and public institutions. On a deeper level, for some researchers, this domination involved a process of acculturation of colonial origin, which was then perpetuated through the historical evolutions encountered by the dominant peoples, even after the independence of the former French colonial possessions in Africa.
By way of example, Mohamed Ben Larbi, based on his study of French colonisation of the Maghreb, considers that there are three historical phases of domination: the first involves the repressive use of military and police force; the second refers to the dilution of the dominated within the colonial system that will manage them; the third, finally, “represents the transfer of power and the integration of the dominated into the process of their domination” (1986). This third phase corresponds to the cultural and symbolic domination after African independence. It constitutes, to use Gramsci's concept, a “historical block” (Gramsci, 1978: 299–300) within which a form of hegemony of the former coloniser is structurally perpetuated among societies initially directly dominated by colonial power and reinvesting the cognitive framework that had once been imposed on them. As General De Gaulle himself remarked in his Memoirs, “by bringing them our civilization we had instituted in each of the territories, instead of the anarchic divisions of the past, a centralized system prefiguring a national state, and trained elites imbued with our principles of human rights and liberty and eager to replace us throughout the hierarchies” (De Gaulle, 2000: 911).
Morocco Through the Prism of France's Historical Policy in Africa: The State of a Postcolonial Relationship
We will not explore all the features of Morocco's colonial relationship with France here. It is interesting to highlight the influence that this colonial heritage may have had on the foreign policies of the two states in the postcolonial period. Our hypothesis is based on the idea that independent Morocco was, in the second half of the twentieth century, a privileged ally and partner of France's African policy because it shared a common postcolonial cognitive framework, influencing the orientation of its original foreign policy, while at the same time fully inserting itself into the continent's affairs as an African power.
The Franco–Moroccan relationship is a direct legacy of this context. The Cherifian Kingdom was added to France's African empire following the 1912 Treaty of Fes, which made Morocco a protectorate (Rivet, 1988b). This history is part of a relationship of colonial and then postcolonial domination that has manifested itself at every level. It culminated in the single administrative system put in place at the time of the protectorate. This administrative system was tailor-made by Marshal Lyautey and had a lasting impact on how Morocco was organised. It enabled a colonial state to be superimposed on the historical foundations of the Moroccan sultanic regime, the Makhzen. So, rather than dismantling the Makhzen, Lyautey reinvested it fully and thus supported a strategy of legitimising French colonisation of Morocco (Ben Mlih, 1990: 143). The result was a unique political relationship in which the French colonial system became deeply embedded in the institutions and superstructures of Moroccan society, whether at the state level, laws or social and religious traditions and customs.
This closeness of colonial origin continued after Morocco's independence. The young Hassan II did not fail to maintain close ties with French leaders while steering clear of a possible rapprochement with Nasser's pan-Arab Egypt and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Abourabi, 2020: 82). Monarchical power itself was inspired by the Gaullist model and the exceptional power conferred on the head of the executive, which coincided with Hassan II's representation of royalty (Sehimi, 1990: 120). This privileged relationship with the French state was particularly visible in Africa. In the wake of Paris's policy in its former colonial area, Morocco developed bilateral and personal relations with the main French-speaking and Francophile African leaders. Between 1960 and 1987, nearly 120 cooperation agreements were signed between Morocco and West African countries (Barre, 1996: 25).
However, this association with France's African policy was to be even more decisive on a security scale: fiercely anti-Communist, Hassan II supported Paris's fight against the indirect strategies of influence of Moscow and its allies on the continent during the Cold War (Bat, 2012: 400). The two countries thus shared a common geopolitical representation of the continent, even though Morocco was involved in pan-Africanist and unitarian demands from the outset, notably at the 1961 Casablanca conference (Essemlali, 2011: 87). It succeeded in remaining an African power in terms of identity and ideology while retaining the freedom of its alliances, particularly with France. This shared vision was openly expressed from the 1970s onwards, particularly regarding military cooperation and intelligence services. The Royal Armed Forces were regularly associated with French military operations or operations coinciding with French interests in Africa (such as the “Verveine” operation in Zaire in 1977 (Durand de Sanctis, 2018: 263–264) or when Hassan II planned to restore the Libyan monarchy in 1972 with the support of the French secret services (Bat, 2012: 331), while Moroccan secret services regularly collaborated with French, American, Saudi, Iranian and Egyptian services in what was then colloquially known as the “safari club” (Durand de Sanctis, 2018: 246).
The development of a Franco–Moroccan community of opinion in Africa in the second half of the twentieth century can be explained, from a realist point of view, by the mutual gains derived from this association. For Paris, benefiting from Morocco's support meant that French policy and influence on the continent could be supported by an African country, more easily diluting the direct imprint of the Republic's postcolonial policy on the continent. For its part, Morocco benefited from French support in Africa, whether to deepen its diplomatic and economic relations with the countries of its pré-carré, to obtain substantial support for the Western Sahara question, or to benefit from French technical and financial cooperation to build a modern independent state. However, this shared vision was not exclusive in every respect. Hassan II developed an African policy outside the exclusive French framework, acting as a mediator with several countries on the continent (Abourabi, 2020: 89–90). Dissensions between Paris and Rabat also arose on several occasions during this period.
On the other hand, this exceptional relationship between the two countries can also be explained by a shared identity stemming from the colonial period, which Morocco resolutely decided to assume as soon as it became independent under the influence of Hassan II. Independence did not mean a break with the former coloniser. On the contrary, the preservation of a common political culture between Morocco and France represented, for the Cherifian monarch, an opportunity to deepen his national as well as international policy, particularly in Africa, by building on the historical edifice bequeathed by the former colonial power on the continent. Once dominated by France's colonial policy in Africa, Morocco intended to become a dominant power in Africa through France's intermediary.
Morocco's African Policy Beyond French Influence
In the second half of the twentieth century, Franco–Moroccan relations underwent both rapprochement and estrangement periods. In short, the emergence of divergence in diplomatic relations and foreign policy between the two countries is not recent. However, from the 2000s onwards, this divergence gradually came to the fore because of the development of an independent Moroccan African policy, the repercussions of which were fully reflected in the French position. 5 As we shall see, Morocco now has an independent postcolonial African policy based on a role identity no longer ontologically associated with France's role on the continent. However, this postcolonial emancipation should not be seen as a rejection. Morocco is taking advantage of its shared heritage with France to develop, paradoxically, its agency in continental affairs. Three salient dimensions support this hypothesis: the development of a new Moroccan state diplomacy in independent Africa; Morocco's position regarding the Common Foreign and Security policy developed by the European Union; and Morocco's commitment to the francophonie (global community of French speakers) as a tool of influence among African countries where French influence was once predominant.
Firstly, Morocco's recent African policy has been underpinned by a high level of state diplomacy. The Kingdom has negotiated many agreements during royal visits for over fifteen years. Mohammed VI has voluntarily developed a policy of proximity with his counterparts, multiplying official visits (Gaymard, 2019: 44). In addition to its economic commitment to the continent, Morocco has also invested in several other areas of cooperation: development aid (notably with the expansion of the objectives of the Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation), cultural and religious diplomacy (Regragui, 2013), cooperation in education, and the financing of scholarships for young Africans (Mahamadou Louali and Meyer, 2012). The Kingdom has gradually developed its ancient and contemporary ties with the continent's countries to support its diplomatic action. Commercial, religious, and, more broadly, political and cultural ties have always existed there and have enabled Rabat to enhance a shared heritage and historical narrative that goes far beyond France's recent and problematic colonial past with the countries of the region.
Furthermore, in recent history, the reappropriation of the French-speaking African space was made possible by the important cooperation that developed between France and Morocco in the second half of the twentieth century, as noted earlier. Drawing on the francophile diplomatic and political network, Hassan II forged numerous relationships with the main heads of state in French-speaking Africa, building up a valuable political and collaborative network that Mohammed VI inherited. This “top-down” political socialisation, particularly at the level of African executive powers, is a French-inspired diplomatic method in Africa. Morocco has used it to nurture its bilateral relations and consolidate its contemporary sphere of influence without mechanically associating itself with French interests within that same sphere. It has favoured the signing of agreements between Morocco and its African partners and its indirect involvement in West African regional affairs, even though the country is not a member of the Economic Community of West African States.
Secondly, this situation led Paris to evolve its foreign policy towards Morocco, desynchronising the Kingdom's role identity in Africa with that of France on the continent. As a result, the gradual expansion of Morocco's African policy has led France to no longer perceive the country as a partner in implementing its own African policy without being seen as a rival. In this respect, an analysis of the position of the two countries vis-à-vis the European Common Security Policy in the 1990s provides a revealing example of this situation (Brimmer, 2008). Under the influence of this policy, France was to rebuild its relations with Morocco over the period 1990–2000 from a Euro-Mediterranean, rather than a Euro-African, perspective. In this spirit, France joined the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, which envisaged a partnership between countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean around security and economic and human development issues. Gradually, this initiative was extended, and the European Union (EU) integrated it into its European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 (Gillespie, 1997). At the heart of this process, Morocco has been particularly active in its diplomatic efforts to obtain advanced status with the EU, giving it access, in due course, to a series of agreements on economic, trade, security, migration and climate issues (Fakir, 2019).
This situation aroused France's greed due to its concern about its declining role in a process it helped to launch (Jaïdi and Abouyoub, 2008: 22). This is why, in 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy launched the Union for the Mediterranean, which at the same time set the Barcelona Process back. It is interesting to note that while this project was met with numerous objections and criticisms in several countries, Morocco expressed its full support for the initiative. For the Kingdom, supporting the French project was in no way incompatible with pursuing negotiations for advanced status with the EU. On the contrary, it raised the independent Moroccan foreign policy profile by increasing the number of interlocutors. In addition, the country could increasingly assert its role as a bridge between Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean and, above all, between Europe and the rest of Africa. For France, on the other hand, this increasingly meant the idea that Morocco was, first and foremost, a Mediterranean rather than an African ally.
The idea of remaining Europe's privileged interlocutor on African issues remains a decisive element of French strategy on Africa today. The problem is that the EU and several of its member countries have found in Morocco an interlocutor able to integrate its interests in Africa on several issues (security, migration, trade, legal integration, human rights) while at the same time being a geographically more legitimate player than France. An opportunity that the Kingdom has seised and which now enables it to reinvest, on the scale of a power policy, the space of African strategic depth that France has long jealously guarded.
As an African country with an administrative and entrepreneurial culture strongly influenced by the French model, Morocco has been able to use this heritage not only intended for the north and developed countries but also for the south, where many projects remained to be built within French-speaking Africa. The reappropriation of this area, historically dominated by France, was first evident on the economic front in 2000–2010. On the other hand, during the same period, Paris questioned the priority of its African policy, starting with the disappearance of the Ministry of Cooperation in 1999 (Kessler, 1999: 108).
Thirdly, Morocco's strategy of influence in French-speaking Africa is based on what has traditionally been at the heart of this cultural Community in the eyes of France, which underpins a significant part of its legitimacy: the francophonie and its values. As an Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie member since 1981, Morocco's Francophone activism took off in the 2000s, precisely when it was redeploying to Africa. Over the past two decades, the country has hosted several of the institution's events, such as the Francophonie Ministerial Conference on the Information Society in 2003 and the second Congress of the Francophone Association of National Human Rights Commissions in 2007. Involvement in the French-speaking world has enabled Rabat to relay French influence, particularly in human rights, democracy and education. Secondly, it has made it possible to take advantage of the important diplomatic channel of influence offered by such an institution on an international scale, particularly in Africa (Abourabi, 2019: 33).
This Moroccan projection into French-speaking Africa is not, however, specifically and openly directed against France. Rather than manifesting as overt rivalry or aggressive competition, this approach reflects Morocco's intention to leverage its inherited legacy to consolidate its presence in Africa. It does so through a foreign policy strategy that deliberately eschews polarisation and sectarian alignments. By promoting official and informal francophone diplomacy in Africa, Morocco is assuming its postcolonial heritage and turning what could have been perceived as a historical wound into a geopolitical advantage. As a result, the contemporary role identity of Morocco's African policy is nourished precisely in part by the historical continuity of its relationship with France, without submitting to the French approach.
Two African Policies Serving Two Distinct Power Identities
The gradual divergence of Morocco's African policy from that pursued by France expresses, at a deeper level, a change in the power identity of the two countries on the continent. This power identity refers to a divergent cognitive and discursive framework. It could be argued that while Morocco has relied on a new identity as an emerging African power, France has mainly developed a strategy of reacting and tightening its presence according to its means but also, and above all, its contrasting aspirations (Vaïsse, 2017: 88). This distancing is linked to the position the two countries occupy within their respective national foreign policies; Morocco is an emerging power that conceives its projection on the continent with the legitimacy of an African country freed from its historical colonial dependence. On the other hand, France is a significant international power and a former colonial power whose identity and role on the continent are now being structurally challenged. Consequently, while part of the role identity of Morocco's African policy may once have been based on that developed by France, as shown above, this is no longer the case. The national interests of the Kingdom's foreign policy are now part of the legitimate continuity of continental affairs, whereas the national interests of French foreign policy in Africa are increasingly contested.
We will approach this divergence by showing how, on the one hand, Morocco was able to reinvest its African identity in the service of a power policy on the continent, particularly within the French-speaking world. On the other hand, we will see how the discursive framework of Morocco's African policy tended to diverge in the long term from that which France was striving to maintain, gradually relegating it to the identity of a reactive power, relying mainly on its military tool.
On the Moroccan side, the growing awareness of the imperative to reorient foreign policy towards the Global South has been articulated through a discursive posture grounded in the notion of a natural historical destiny in Africa. In 2016, in his speech marking the sixty-third anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People, Mohammed VI asserted that “for Morocco, Africa is much more than a geographical belonging and historical ties. In truth, it evokes sincere feelings of affection, consideration, and deep human and spiritual ties. It is, after all, Morocco's natural extension and strategic depth” (Mohammed VI, n.d.). The reassessment of Morocco's past and present links with the continent helps to establish an identity based discursively on moderation and a claim to encourage dialogue in conflict resolution. On this point, the defence of religious diplomacy in Africa is based on the promotion of the “Islam of the golden mean” (Baylocq and Hlaoua, 2016). Moreover, the revaluation of the Sufi roots of Moroccan Islam and its brotherhoods, which weave an important transnational network on the continent, has played a decisive role. Rabat's policy to combat violent extremism in Africa is based on dialogue and mediation rather than the coercive use of force alone. This strategy is made possible by three characteristics in which Morocco's “locality” plays a decisive role: historical and cultural legitimacy, particularly from an Islamic point of view; the fact that most of the institutions used for this policy were not created for it, but are part of the country's tradition; and the economic relations that Morocco maintains throughout the region (Wainscott, 2018).
The discursive framework legitimising Morocco's African policy is also part of a sustained claim to a new role for the continent in global affairs. For example, at the twenty-seventh summit of the African Union, held in Kigali on 17 July 2016, Mohammed VI said of Africa that “the era when it was just an object in international relations is over. It is asserting itself, making progress, and assuming its role on the international stage. It now presents itself as an active and respected interlocutor in the debate on global governance” (Mohammed VI, n.d.). Indeed, Morocco defends African solutions to Africa's problems, an orientation increasingly present in African political forums. This position has helped justify key orientations in Morocco's African foreign policy. These include South–South cooperation (Aidoub Benchekroun and Slaoui, 2018), mediation in crises and major conflicts on the continent (e.g. in Mali and Libya 6 ) and, above all, the pursuit of a collective settlement to the Western Sahara issue. On this last point, Moroccan diplomacy distinguished itself in July 2016 by obtaining a motion tabled by twenty-eight African states calling for the exclusion of the SADR from the African Union (Hernando de Larramendi and Tomé-Alonso, 2017: 253). Although the motion failed, it was an opportunity for Morocco to mark its entry into the African Union after withdrawing from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, in 1984 over the acceptance of the SADR as a member state.
This development of the country's African policy was carried out without France's direct influence or support. It is the expression of an independent foreign policy. Far from signifying a loss of power, France's distancing itself from its historic partner marks, on the contrary, the choice of a diplomacy that can only be centred on the continent, i.e. on common regional perspectives. Any other attitude would simply have been inaudible. This also explains the importance of Moroccan investment in migration diplomacy, starting with the two waves of regularisation of sub-Saharan migrants in 2013–2014 and 2016–2017 (e.g. Fernandez-Molina, 2016; Ferrié, 2020). The access granted to Africans on Moroccan territory cannot be equated with the restrictions imposed on African mobility within European spaces. Having common perspectives and being integrated into the continent implies allowing populations to circulate within it and therefore moving away from a public migration policy transactionally oriented towards Europe, and developed from 2000 to 2007, to reorient it, at least in part towards Africa.
In such a context, France's African policy suddenly seemed foreign to the Moroccan discursive framework. First and foremost, because the former colonial power remains attached to a role identity that carries with it a fundamental contradiction and is regularly challenged by the international political Community, mainly the African one: if France intervenes in the continent's affairs, it is accused of interference and neo-colonialism; if it does not intervene, it is relegated to its historical responsibility towards Africa. Its very withdrawal can be accompanied by virulent criticism, such as when former Malian Prime Minister Choguel K. Maïga accused France, at the United Nations, of abandoning Mali “in mid-flight” (Le Mali reproche à la France un « abandon en plein vol » dans la lutte contre les djihadistes au Sahel, n.d.). These embarrassing situations have been recurring since the 1990s, despite repeated announcements of a break with past practices, initiated by President Mitterrand's speech at La Baule in June 1990. In it, he expressed his desire to end France's role as guardian of Africa (Mitterrand, 1990), while recalling the continuity of the link between the former colonial power and the continent.
This contradiction remains firmly entrenched in the discourse of French leaders. For example Jacques Chirac emphasised the need for special treatment for Africa (Claude, 2007). 7 More recently Emmanuel Macron claimed that that “France has a part of Africa in her” (elysee.fr, 2020), the “La Baule syndrome” has continued to repeat itself, conditioning France's relationship with African states on one primary characteristic: as long as these states tacitly respect the framework of Paris's foreign policy on their continent, they remain partners in that policy. It is clear that, from speech to speech, France is struggling to break out of the role bequeathed to it by colonisation, not least because its capacity for military projection in Africa is probably the most tangible remnant of its status as a power, even if this dimension is also now severely weakened.
In other words, France today tends to base its status as a major power primarily on its presence and role in Africa. Yet, it is precisely this role that is being challenged in terms of its legitimacy and locality. This intrinsic lack of legitimacy is increasingly blurring France's image on the continent. As a result, France's African foreign policy today is based on a geopolitical representation that is first and foremost reactive and defensive. France must remain in Africa if it is to be a significant power. However, maintaining this presence implies a complete redefinition of its relationship with the various African countries (including non-French-speaking countries), by breaking with the traditional asymmetry that characterised its African policy within the framework of Françafrique. Hence the importance of the place given, or at least the emphasis placed, on the continent's security approach within current French political discourse, which focuses as much on the theme of Sahelian Islamist terrorism (Perouse de Montclos, 2019: 138) as on that of clandestine migration as a threat at Europe's gates (Gabrielli, 2007).
This geopolitical vision of Africa contrasts with the Moroccan approach. While Morocco is far from underestimating the security threats that can affect the continent, particularly the Sahel, its foreign policy is informed by a different geopolitical outlook. Strengthening Morocco's position in Africa involves advancing new, less coercive solutions that are fully integrated into the continent. These include a regionalised approach to migratory security (Cherti and Collyer, 2015); religious diplomacy that combats extremism at its ideological roots rather than solely through military means; and the establishment of a conference of Atlantic-bordering states to address maritime threats (Mouline, 2016). This last initiative has led to the Royal Initiative in Atlantic Africa and projects such as the Morocco–Nigeria gas pipeline.
While these policies do not always produce the expected results – and sometimes still encounter limits and obstacles – they serve a foreign policy that is part of a multi-level African geopolitical framework. This framework informs Morocco's diplomatic engagement with African partners at both bilateral and multilateral levels. It also broadens the instruments and channels through which Morocco exercises its influence, which is conceived as multi-sectoral, spanning areas such as economic cooperation, technical assistance, agriculture, and environmental initiatives. In short, the geopolitical framework reflects an emerging African power with everything to gain by multiplying strategies enabling it to extend an influence it wishes to acquire and not simply retain.
Therefore, the contrast with France is particularly marked since Moroccan policy has implemented a “horizontal” influence, whereas the French approach has remained resolutely “vertical.” The Kingdom has favoured an African policy based on parity, reflecting the country's cultural and historical proximity to the continent. This dynamic has been expressed both in the discourse of official royal communications and through the implementation of an inclusive, multilateral foreign policy based on the joint development of tools for intra-African cooperation. This dynamic has gradually altered the mutual perception of France and Morocco as African geopolitical players. As a result, the French foreign policy has finally had to acknowledge this transformation by realigning its position regarding Morocco. Since 2024, this realignment has mainly been expressed on the Western Sahara issue. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Mohammed VI's reign, Emmanuel Macron addressed a letter to the sovereign in which he affirmed that “the present and future of Western Sahara lie within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty” (Le Desk, 2024). This statement, accompanied a few months later by a memorable state visit by the French president to Rabat, clearly illustrated the extent to which French foreign policy has considered Morocco's new position as a bilateral and continental partner. More specifically, this realignment illustrates that Morocco is reversing a traditional, postcolonial balance of power that France once exercised over the Kingdom and, more broadly, its African allies. Morocco's national and international agenda prevails here. In contrast, France's support for this agenda enables it to redefine its role identity in Africa by associating itself with an African power that is now increasingly respected.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Morocco's African policy starkly contrasts with France's on the continent in several respects. On a strictly diplomatic level, the Kingdom has renewed all its relations with Africa, adding many new agreements in several fields (economic, migration, energy, security, and cultural) without going through French intermediation. At the geopolitical level, Morocco wishes to initiate new cooperation or integration projects, which, as we have seen, no longer involve an essential French intermediary.
This divergence is not contextual but structural and affects the role identity underpinning this new policy developed since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Morocco intends to free itself from its postcolonial ties of dependence, reborn as an independent African power. This does not mean it wishes to break off its relations with France but is redefining them in the light of this new identity, in which it is no longer a mechanical ally of France but rather an equal partner. On the French side, this restructuring of Morocco's role identity was presented as the premise of the new conditions under which the former colonial power would henceforth shape its African policy: no longer an asymmetrical Franco–African community of destiny, but rather a necessary consideration of the national and international interests of its African partners, treated as peers. Ultimately, and perhaps more polemically, France can decolonise 8 its African policy is at stake here, which affects, beyond the Moroccan case, the future of its relationship with the continent.
In fact, while a full exploration of possible scenarios lies beyond the scope of this article, the evolution of France's and Morocco's African policies highlights a new phase in the continent's international relations with the wider world. African countries are increasingly asserting their own roles on the continent, moving beyond the era when Northern powers sought to standardise and control their affairs. This move away from a logic of external governance, partly postcolonial in origin, is now forcing Western countries to take account of the reality of African agency. Here, we take up Andreasson's proposed definition of the concept of agency, which refers to “the ability of states as the primary actors in the international system, to generate and deploy a range of capabilities (hard and soft) in the pursuit of their national interest” (Andreasson, 2013: 149). There are also other particularly interesting works on African Agency, such as (Karbo and Muriti, 2018; Makinda et al., 2016; Yusuf and Ouguergouz, 2012). African agency refers to the ability of African actors “to negotiate and bargain with external actors in a manner that benefits Africans themselves” (Coffie and Tiky, 2021). Indeed, African countries are increasingly relying on a challenge to the dominant Western representation of international relations to enhance their ability to defend their national interests and build an endogenous continental agenda.
In this respect, the evolution of relations between France and Morocco, through the prism of their African policies, fully illustrates this decisive change in the order of international relations. France is no longer able to impose its African agenda on Morocco. On the contrary, it must now consider Morocco's agenda, or risk being sidelined from continental issues. In this respect, the recent alignment of the French position with the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Sahara, as other northern countries have before, confirms this hypothesis.
