Abstract
This paper is based on the view that since social science is concerned with the generation of codified knowledge of the social world its impact should be seen as principally upon other sets of ideas. It suggests that social policy may thus be conceptualized as an evolving sequence of concepts, theories and problems comparable with the cognitive development of science. At any time a variety of such 'paradigms' will be in competition. Embodiment of these 'paradigms' in practical programmes constitutes a process of 'testing' through the medium of feedback/intelligence processes. Dem onstrated discordance between programmes and problems evinces responses understandable on the basis of an analogy with science. Under certain conditions major insights may be sought from outside. Thus the opportunities for social science vis-à-vis policy depend fundamentally on the extent of policy-makers' dissatisfaction with current 'paradigms'.
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