La conciencia agente, o de control, es uno de los aspectos centrales de la experiencia consciente. En la Psicología Cognitiva esta dimensión se ha recogido bajo la denominación de “procesos controlados”, frente a los automáticos, y se ha propuesto un mecanismo de control, un ejecutivo o supervisor, para dar cuenta de ellos. Sin embargo, al no poder ofrecer una explicación funcional de tal mecanismo interno, se cae en el problema del homünculo.
En este trabajo propongo una manera alternativa, basado en los recientes desarrollos en el campo del control motor, para dar cuenta de esta dimensión agente, sin tener que postular un centro de control.
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