Time plays the central role in any developmental system. Its irreversibility contrasts with the functioning of the psychological realm that attempts to stabilize the real flow by means of perception/action constancies and signs. Efforts of apprehending the possible events of the next moment in ordinary life are paralleled by the focus on prediction in psychology as science. Signs operate as tools for reduction of the uncertainty of the immediate future. The notion of ontopotentiality of signs is introduced—it is the set of possibilities for creating quasi-stable meanings that would direct the flow of personal experiencing (in time) in a specific direction. This perspective advances further the notion of presentation (Vorstellung) that was worked through within the Brentano-Meinong tradition in philosophy and psychology. Narratives—and their corresponding notion of narrating—constitute macro-level stabilizing devices for individuals coping with uncertainty.
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