Este artículo aborda el problema de los orígenes de la capacidad de “teoría de la mente” en la infancia. Los autores discuten los resultados de una serie de 5 experimentos (4 realizados con bebés de 6 a 12 meses de edad con el método de habituación; el quinto realizado con niños de 3 años) que apoyan su teoría de que la teoría de la mente se desarrolla a partir de un sistema de interpretación más primitivo que los bebés emplean para comprender y predecir las conductas de objetos como acciones dirigidas a metas gobernadas por el principio de acción racional o actitud teleológica. Este sistema, cuyas características se analizan en detalle, tendría la peculiaridad de no requerir la representación de estados mentales ni estar restringido al dominio de los objetos animados con características externas humanas.
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