En la respuesta a los comentarios de nuestros colegas, desarrollamos con mayor detalle nuestras críticas a la hipótesis de una mente modular y un conocimiento innato (cuyo argumento básico es que no pueden surgir nuevas formas a partir de nada o deformas inferiores). Aclaramos también que nuestra objeción se dirige a la modularidad entendida como punto de partida del desarrollo y no como resultado de éste. Se discute la alternativa que ofrece el (neo)constructivismo para explicar la emergencia de nuevas formas mediante mecanismos evolutivos generales, probabilísticos y dinámicos.
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