Reconceptualization of “Brain Drain”

Abstract

Traditional approach to the issue of “brain drain” and “brain gain” focuses on outflow and inflow of migration of academics and professionals between countries of origins and destinations. It is suggested that, in the international labor market, the developing countries have experienced the problem of brain drain while the developed countries have benefited from brain gain in the process of globalization and international mobility of talent. From this perspective, “brain drain” or “brain gain” is primarily measured by the number of talented people who have “moved in” or “moved out” of a country, but not the extent to which the “brain” has been utilized. This study redefines the notion of “brain drain” by focusing on the actual utilization of professional talents. Previous research findings show that despite attractive Canadian immigration policy and the increasing number of professional immigrants, Canada as a developed country has the problem of “brain waste” due to its systemic barriers such as the devaluation of foreign credentials and non-recognition of foreign work experience for professional Chinese immigrants. At the same time, China as a developing country has benefited from contributions made by highly educated professionals/students returning to their home country through its attractive and rewarding opportunities for those who have attained knowledge and skills from overseas. China has become a model of “brain gain” for developing countries by implementing a series of open and favorable policies to attract top-notch overseas Chinese and foreign talents to help promote the economic development and global competitiveness of the nation.

Most studies on the issue of “brain drain” and “brain gain” in the international context see the low level of economic and political development in the developing countries pushing professionals and skilled workers out, while the resources and benefits of the developed countries pull them in. The “pull” factors include professional and employment opportunities, living and working conditions, the presence of friends and family, as well as political and academic freedom. 1 These studies help us to understand the roots of the international mobility of talent within the structure of the global economy as well as the push-and pull-factors of the home and receiving countries. However, they do not capture the real meaning of “brain drain” and “brain gain” since these concepts are measured only by outflow and inflow of the migration of academics and professionals.

The traditional approach to “brain drain” assumes that the movement of professionals and talent must benefit on a country at the expense of another. However, this approach does not reflect the likelihood of migrants’ returning to their countries of origin or even moving back and forth in a more-or-less continual pattern. In recent years, some scholars have used “brain circulation” as an alternative concept to the notion of “brain drain.” 2 This is a situation where professional immigrants and talent return to their countries of origin for periods of time in order to establish academic or business relationships, conduct research and teaching activities, or to start new companies, all while maintaining their social and professional ties, citizenship, or their immigrant status in other countries. This paper suggests that “brain drain” or “brain gain” is not simply a phenomenon regarding the outflow or inflow of professional migrants, instead it has to do with the actual international transference and utilization of human capital and resources.

This paper shows that many recent Chinese professional immigrants have experienced downward mobility in Canada due to the devaluation of their foreign credentials and non-recognition of their foreign work experience. Therefore, Canada may not actually have “brain gain,” but rather “brain waste.” Although many Chinese professionals and students have immigrated to Canada from China and obtained Canadian citizenship, China has still been able to have “brain gain,” benefitting from contributions made by highly educated professionals and students returning to their home country through its practical strategies and the implementation of attractive policies. This paper first examines the issue of “brain waste” by analyzing the systemic factors of downward mobility regarding Chinese professional immigrants in Canada. It then discusses how Chinese students become targets as potential immigrants for Canada or returnees for China. The paper addresses different policy implications for both Canada and China in the process of globalization, the international mobility of talent, and analyzes China’s national strategies for talent competition which present them with positive outcomes.

“Brain Waste” and Downward Mobility of Professional Chinese Immigrants in Canada

“Brain Waste” (or “skill underutilization”) is a process of deskilling which occurs when highly-skilled workers and professionals emigrate to forms of employment that do not require them to apply as high a level of skills and experience as utilized in their previous work. 3 It implies the poor transfer and ineffective use of professional immigrants’ skills and education in the work place despite high professional qualifications. This occurs when professional immigrants are either unemployed or are working in jobs that are below their qualifications. The human capitals that professional immigrants brought over with them slowly degrades and the human capital investments made by both the country of origin and the migrants themselves are largely wasted. For example, it is estimated that approximately two million highly educated immigrants in the United States are underemployed. 4 The cost of this underemployment to these immigrants, their families, and the national economy is estimated at US$40 billion annually. 5 Canada experienced the similar situation. Without adequate data, it is difficult to assess fully either the extent or the underlying causes of brain waste in Canada, however previous empirical research findings have demonstrated that ‘brain waste’ has been a significant phenomenon among foreign-trained, visible minority, and skilled immigrants in Canada. 6

Mainland China is one of the largest immigration source countries for Canada. Since 2000, over 20,000 to 40,000 immigrants from mainland China have entered Canada each year. The majority of recent mainland Chinese immigrants are well-trained and experienced professionals who immigrate under the category of economic immigrant—those who are selected for their skills and ability to contribute to Canada’s economy. However, after entering the country, many of them found difficulties in obtaining the professional jobs they expected and consequently, they experienced downward occupational mobility.

According to a survey of 1,180 recent mainland Chinese professional immigrants conducted in the cities of Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton, and Saskatoon between 1997 and 1999, 79 percent of respondents reported having worked as professionals in China before immigrating to Canada. However, only 31 percent reported that they had worked or were working as professionals in Canada. Although about 6 percent of the respondents became proprietors, managers, supervisors, and administrators, 41 percent of the respondents had lower social status working in non-professional jobs, and 22 percent had never worked in Canada. About 75 percent of respondents reported that their occupations in their home country matched their professional qualifications well, while only 23 percent reported that their current (or last) occupation in Canada matched their professional qualifications. About 41 percent of respondents reported that they were overqualified for their current occupations in Canada, and 29 percent said they have not worked since their arrival in Canada. 7 Findings from a recent survey on highly educated professional Chinese immigrants in Calgary and Edmonton 8 show that about 77 percent respondents held jobs in natural and applied sciences, teaching, managerial occupations, or finance and business in China; after immigration, however, the number working in these occupations had dropped to 42 percent. On the other hand, there had been a 17 percent increase in people working as labourers in processing and manufacturing, and 11 percent of respondents were unemployed after immigration.

Many mainland Chinese immigrants perceived some structural barriers that affected their occupational attainment in Canada. The survey of 1997-1999 shows that 73 percent of respondents believed that they could not enter into professional occupations in which they were trained because there is unequal opportunity for visible minority immigrants. About 77 percent reported that it was difficult for them to find professional jobs because of a shortage of opening positions in the Canadian labour market. However, the major systemic barrier identified by respondents is that their foreign credentials and work experience were devalued by professional organizations, government evaluation agencies, and educational institutions. 9 The recent survey 10 also demonstrates that the origin of professional immigrants’ highest level of education significantly and negatively affects their current employment situation in Canada. About 54 percent respondents felt that employment situation in Canada was “worse” or “much worse” than it had been in China.

Many Chinese immigrants believed they could not enter professional occupations in which they were trained because their foreign credentials were devaluated. In the survey of 1997-1999, 69 percent respondents reported that they experienced difficulties having their foreign credentials recognized in Canada. Based on their own experience and observations, about 78 percent of respondents reported that “the difficulty in having their foreign qualifications or credentials recognized” was a major factor that seemed to affect their chances to practice in their chosen professions. 11 About 94 percent of Chinese professional immigrants reported that they had professional work experience in China before immigrating to Canada, 50 percent had five to ten years of professional work experience, and 21 percent had at least 10 years of professional work experience. Interestingly, Chinese professionals with more professional experience were more likely to experience downward mobility. About 47 percent of respondents do not believe that “the foreign work experience is compared to Canadian standards fairly.” 12 In his recent study, Guo conceptualizes “glass gate,” “glass door,” and “glass ceiling” as multiple institutional barriers 13 that can cause unemployment and underemployment, poor economic performance, and downward social mobility. The “triple glass effect” teases out the different layers of barriers facing their brain waste experience. 14 Guo’s study also confirms a racialization process which lead to the underutilization of Chinese professional immigrants’ knowledge and skills. 15

Chinese professional immigrants also encountered other difficult situations within the Canadian labour market. On the one hand, non-recognition of their foreign professional work experience disqualified their entry into professional jobs, leaving them with little chance to get Canadian work experience; on the other hand, emphasis on Canadian work experience is a requirement for professional employment, making it difficult for them to qualify for professional jobs. The problem of transferring educational equivalencies across national boundaries results in professional immigrants taking jobs for which they are over-trained, resulting in downward occupational mobility relative to the occupations they held in China before migration. Consequently, Canada is now experiencing a tremendous waste of human capital instead of simply the “net brain gain” observed when only looking at outflow and inflow of migration for professional and skilled workers.

During the 1990s, many professionals, especially in the software, aerospace, health care and entertainment industries, moved from Canada to the United States due to the perception of higher wages and lower income taxes in the us. Canadian engineers and scientists were also attracted by the greater diversity of jobs in the us and a perceived lack of research funding in Canada. Canada hedged against these losses by attracting more highly skilled workers from abroad. This allowed the country to realize a “net brain gain” as more professionals entered Canada than those who were leaving. For example, Canada receives more university graduates than it loses to the United States. For every university degree holder migrating from Canada to the United States, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, there are four university degree holders (including one master’s or Ph.D.) migrating from the rest of the world to Canada. 16 However, as research findings indicate, many well educated and well-trained professionals could not find professional jobs due to systemic barriers. The problem of transferring educational equivalencies and work experience across international boundaries results in Chinese professional immigrants taking jobs for which they are over-trained and over-qualified. Canada has been experiencing tremendous brain waste—continual wasting of human capital rather than simply brain gain.

Chinese Students and Immigration Policy Change in Canada

In the twenty-first century, student mobility in Canada has risen faster than ever before—the number of international students in Canada has increased approximately 2.1 times from 2000 to 2015. 17 In this context, international students began to be viewed as a candidate pool of skilled immigrants. Due to the size of the Chinese student population in Canada, the People’s Republic of China (prc) has been a primary contributor to this candidate pool. Table 1 shows that the total number of the Chinese student population reached 125,414 in 2015, 94.7% of whom came from mainland China. 18 Having been the top source country since 2001, the share of international students from the prc has dramatically increased from 6.6% to 33.6% from 1999 to 2015. According to the traditional “brain drain” perspective, if these Chinese students migrated to Canada permanently, the prc would lose these highly-educated talents to Canada and suffer from brain drain.

table 1

The populations of Chinese students by sources and international students present on Dec 1, 2000-2015

sources: data of was retrieved from facts and figures 2008, 2015, cic. 19

To turn international students into Canada’s brain gain and also avoid brain waste, the Canadian government began to change immigration policies in 2006. Firstly, the immigration selection system shifted from a focus on general educational and work experience to Canadian experience, while foreign education and foreign work experience have been further devalued. The Post-Graduation Work program extends the length of work permits for foreign graduates from one to three years and the Off-Campus Work Permit program allows international students to engage in off-campus employment for up to 20 hours a week. In 2008, the federal government suddenly reduced the number of eligible occupations for Federal Skilled Worker applicants, which declined from 351 before 2008 to 24 in 2013. The constantly decreasing number and limiting coverage of the Federal Skilled Worker Program eligible occupations lead to a sharp shrinking of oversea applications and also point to an extremely market-responsive and pragmatic immigration policy orientation. Meanwhile, special programs, such as the Canadian Experience Class (cec), were made to provide a fast-track to process immigrant applications from the applicants who have postgraduate work experience in Canada for a minimum of one year.

Secondly, a full economic integration upon immigration has been increasingly emphasized. The latest change in 2015 involves a new skilled immigration selection system, called Express Entry, which places ultimate emphasis on post-graduate employment. In other words, a full-time job offer of permanent employment related to the applicant’s field of study becomes almost necessary to be eligible for applying for permanent resident status as a skilled worker. That is to say, the Canadian government highly encourages a particular pattern of skilled immigration, which involves two phases: 1) the transition from a foreign student to a temporary foreign worker, and 2) the transition from a foreign worker to a permanent resident. However, as a foreign student it has been increasingly difficult to achieve the first transition, primarily due to the Canadian economic slowdown, as well as the requirement of a confirmation letter provided by an employer once the job is offered to a foreign worker which demonstrates a lack of domestic workers for the position discussed. Essentially, this two-phase pattern is shaped by the new policies which effectively prolong the temporary status of foreign students, devalue their pre-Canada and on-campus work experience, and ultimately emphasize postgraduate Canadian work experience and job offers related to their fields of study, ensuring that only the foreign students whose skillsets are in high demand in the labour market at present are eligible for permanent resident status.

In this context, for Chinese students and Chinese immigrants, there have been declines in both the population directly transitioning from foreign students to permanent residents, as well as in the population of Chinese immigrants entering Canada in recent years. There had been a constant increase of direct transitional population from foreign students to permanent residents between 2002 and 2008, but there has also been a sudden decline since 2009, right after the federal government launched an unexpected reduction of the number of eligible occupations of fswp applicants, as well as implementing the cec program in 2008. 20 In addition, the number of permanent residents from mainland China settling in Canada has significantly declined since 2012. 21

Along with economic growth slowing down and increasing resistant sentiment toward foreign workers among the Canadian public, the opportunities for Chinese students to stay permanently and work in Canada have been largely limited, especially in highly-skilled sectors of the job market. Nevertheless, for Chinese students who are not able or not willing to stay in Canada, returning to China has become a viable option. According to two studies conducted at the University of Saskatchewan, which has a large population of Chinese students, around half of the respondents are not sure about if they would apply for permanent residency in Canada, meaning they prefer to keep both options of stay and leave/return open. 22 More career opportunities and better personal development have been the top reasons for them to consider going back to China. As one of the fastest growing economies in the world, China is providing an increasing number of career opportunities to attract Chinese returnees with Western education and experiences. 23 It has recently been observed that reverse migration has been taking place between China, which traditionally suffered from brain drain for decades, and developed countries like Canada which benefitted from brain gain.

Chinese Returnees and Diaspora Option

In the midst of the competition for global talent, the People’s Republic of China is rising as a new competitor. Although it continues to be the largest source country for internationally mobile students, China is also emerging as a new destination for international talent. In terms of numbers, China has witnessed a dramatic increase in both the outflow and return of Chinese students, especially since the beginning of the 21st Century. The number of Chinese students who study abroad has increased by 14 times within the last two decades, from 38,989 in 2000 to 544,500 in 2016. 24 Meanwhile, the number of students returning to China after graduating from universities overseas has also increased from 12,243 in 2001 to 432,500 in 2016; accumulatively, China has received a total of 2.65 million returnees between 1978 and 2016. 25 Furthermore, increasing amounts of internationally-trained Chinese and non-Chinese professionals are moving to and working in China. Since China launched the “Thousand Talents Programme” (ttp) for recruiting top-tier global talent in 2008, more than 7,000 experts have been introduced and 53,900 high-level Chinese scientists and professionals have returned from overseas. 26

In terms of the utilization of this international talent, it has been demonstrated that many of the foreign PhD holders were trained with funds from foreign postsecondary institutions or organizations (e.g. scholarships, fellowships, teaching and research assistant allowance, and etc.) and returned with direct and indirect economic benefits to China. 27 According to a report, even “state-sponsored” (gong pai) students or scholars also partially relied on foreign supplied funds for their education and training overseas. 28 The same report has also demonstrated that compared to domestic PhD holders, returnees with foreign PhDs were more likely to get funding from outside the university, especially grants for “national-level research project” and foreign grants. They were also more likely to import foreign technology, foreign capital, foreign information and materials, as well as to develop international collaborative projects. 29

Furthermore, returnees generally hold a positive view about their utilization of foreign human capital back in China. According to the “Report on Employment and Entrepreneurship of Chinese Returnees 2017” released by the Center for China and Globalization (ccg), the majority of the returnees have been optimistic about the return on their investment in overseas education. 30 Although many returnees do not start with a high-paying job upon returning, they are very likely to get promotions and increases in income within 5 years of their return. Consequently, they tend to perform better economically than average domestic degree holders, primarily due to their international education, global vision, and international work experience. 31

In addition, since the Chinese government adopted the so-called “diaspora option” in the mid-1990s, many Chinese overseas have also utilized their professional knowledge and networks to contribute to China’s economic development without returning to China. 32 This diaspora option refers to a strategy used by developing countries who suffer from brain drain, to turn their loss of human capital into a positive force for development by encouraging their highly-educated diaspora overseas to help their home country. 33 By participating in a variety of programs created by the Chinese government, many overseas Chinese professionals who hold positions abroad have been encouraged to utilize the advantage of their professional knowledge in China, to engage in collaborative research in China and abroad, to visit China for teaching and conducting professional and academic exchanges, and to establish business in China. Many of these Chinese professionals had the experience of emigrating from China and later returning. Their experiences have been classified as “double diaspora”—a hybrid experience characterized by the duality as both a diaspora and a returnee, playing a double role as cultural and economic brokers between their current country of citizenship and China. 34 Many of them are also holding concurrent positions in China and abroad. 35

Thus, despite the dramatic growth of students moving out of China for international education, the increasing amounts of return migration, and the adoption of the diaspora option have allowed China to regain important human capital for national development. More importantly, such human capital has been upgraded through international educational and international experience.

Contextualizing Global Talent Attraction in China

Both international and domestic situations are the driving force behind the wave of Chinese overseas professionals returning to China especially since the beginning of the 21st century. Internationally, the global economic slowdown caused by financial crisis in 2008, along with the subsequent rise of the unemployment rate within many developed countries, as well as the increasingly tightened immigration policies within many countries as well, have all become pushing forces of the return migration. Meanwhile, China’s national strength and economy have been growing at a remarkable rate for almost three decades since its initial economic reforms and opening-up. In 2001, China became a member of World Trade Organization (wto), which has allowed China to further merge with the world’s globalized economy and become a strong competitor in global market. In recent years, China has maintained a gdp growth rate of higher than 6% against the background of the global economic downturn. These situations provide overseas professional with an optimistic vision regarding China’s development and the role they may play in China.

On the other hand, in the past three decades, China’s rapid economic growth primarily derived from its surplus workforce of domestic migrant workers. However, as global economic competition has become increasingly technological and knowledge driven, China’s domestic labour supply advantage has become less effective in maintaining economic growth. Industrial restructuring is needed to develop a more capital- and knowledge-intensive economy for China to maintain and enhance its global competitiveness. 36 However, the current domestic supply of highly-skilled workers cannot meet China’s demand for talent both in terms of the numbers and qualities required by the new economic development strategy, so the participation of high-level overseas professionals is desperately needed. Thus, numbers of policies and programs have been developed by the Chinese government to attract high-level professionals from abroad.

Attracting Global Talent to China: A National Development Strategy

The attempt to attract global talent to China started with the onset of economic reform. In 1983, Deng Xiaoping openly emphasized the necessity of designing and implementing international talent attraction polices in China. However, the flow of returnees stalled after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. In 1992, he once again called on Chinese students overseas to return to help the motherland and promised a more liberalized political climate for them if they avoided future anti-government activity. 37 However, the return rate was relatively low. The return-outflow ratio² was only 10-20% in the early 2000s. 38 In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, along with the increasing opportunities for private and foreign investment, employment opportunities, China’s entry to the World Trade Organization, as well as the accelerating economic growth and increasing demand of technological development, the government further recognized the urgent need to compete for global talent and considered talent attraction as an important part of their national development strategy. 39

Since the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century the exponentially growing populations of both students studying abroad and returnees has reflected China’s new development strategies. These have facilitated two interrelated processes: 1) encouraging studying abroad to accumulate more advanced human capital; 2) enticing the return of enhanced human capital to achieve transnational knowledge transfer and brain gain. The primary policy interest for this study focuses on the second process, regarding how to draw back the enhanced human capital and how to ensure returnees are able to contribute to the local development effectively.

Generally, four policy mechanisms are adopted to improve China’s attractiveness for Chinese students, professionals and scientists from overseas. Firstly, the government has designed programs to sponsor Chinese scholars and scientists overseas to return temporarily. These funded visits generally involve short periods of time in which they are engaged in cooperative projects or giving lectures. For example, in the 1990s the “Spring Light Project” (Chunhui Jihua) was launched and later enlarged by the Ministry of Education (moe) to provide financial support for foreign-based Chinese scientists to return for short-term visits in China. 40 In 1998, the Changjiang Scholar Programme was initiated to fund leading Chinese scientists overseas to return for one year working in strategic research areas. In 2000, a program was developed by the moe to encourage overseas scholars and scientists to work in China during their summer break and paid them as much as five times their overseas salaries. 41 These visits would allow overseas scholars to have a taste of the economic change and improved climate for talent in China, and possibly entice them to return permanently. Although these programs have successfully recruited a large number of Chinese scientists and scholars from overseas, there have been concerns about them spending most of their time abroad and exploiting these opportunities while contributing little to the research and education system in China. Some even argue that such an easy access to fully-sponsored or highly-paid temporary visits may actually reduce their incentive to stay permanently.

The second mechanism focuses on building Chinese diaspora networks. Since the 21st century, the Chinese government has begun to recognize the benefits of maintaining diaspora networks, especially in terms of encouraging potential returnees and attracting foreign investment. A number of government agencies play an active role in interacting with these Chinese diaspora communities. In 2002, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (ocao) developed a program which aimed to facilitate the interaction between the older communities of ethnic Chinese overseas and new Chinese immigrants. 42 Since the early 2000s, ocao, Chinese embassies and consulates, as well as Chinese politicians have been developing communication and collaboration with associations of Chinese professionals established in Western countries, and also actively engaging with the leaders of diaspora networks of students, scientists, and entrepreneurs. 43 In doing so, the government aims to foster stronger ties between the Chinese professionals overseas and China.

The third mechanism involves programs facilitating long-term or permanent return of Chinese professionals and scientists from overseas. Since the early 2000s, specific programs and incentives have been designed to target overseas talent at different levels, including the top-tier global elites, young research leaders, and foreign Ph.D. holders with research achievements and great potentials. At the end of 2008, the Chinese government launched the renowned national talent attraction programme, the “Thousand Talents Programme” (ttp), aiming at recruiting global elites to contribute to the fields of education, science, culture, and health. Furthermore, to build and cultivate young leaders for the development of science and technology, the central government added “Thousand Young Talents Programme” in 2011. This program focuses on recruiting foreign Ph.D. holders who are 40 years old or younger in the fields of natural science, engineering, and technology, and have obtained a minimum of three years of overseas research experience while holding a regular post of teaching or research in renowned universities, research institutions or enterprises. In addition, for non-Chinese professionals as well as Chinese professionals overseas who hold foreign citizenship, the “Thousand Foreign Expert Programme” was created as a sub-program of ttp. By the end of 2014, the total number of overseas talent who were recruited to China through the ttp has reached 4,128, and in 2015 alone, there was an increase of 1,028 overseas talent arriving China through ttp. 44 Another talent attraction program designed by the central government is the “Special Talent Zone,” which was implemented in 2011 to attract overseas talent specialized in the most needed fields in China. In addition to the incentives developed by the central government, by 2012 a total of 35 industries and 31 provinces and municipalities in China also initiated talent programs, attracting more than 20,000 high-level overseas talents. 45

Despite small variations, all these programs provide the recruits with a generous salary and a start-up research fund, while expecting them to actively engage in major research development or innovative projects. In addition, a number of universities and research institutes in China also implemented a variety of policies to recruit Chinese returnees with foreign Ph.Ds. who have recognizable research achievements or great potentials. Compared to the holders of domestic Ph.Ds., these foreign Ph.D. holders tend to receive a better salary package and greater amount of start-up research funds, but they also need to fulfill higher performance expectations and requirements. With these specified and concrete programs, the Chinese government expected to attract the most needed talent and provide feasible platforms for the professionals overseas to effectively utilize their human and economic capital, all while hoping that their success would entice them to settle permanently.

Apart from employment and career development, social adaptation and integration is also crucial for returnees’ transition and long-term settlement in China (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). Thus, China has been developing schemes to provide social integration support to overseas talent as well as their dependents. The ttp program is known for the benefits and employment services it has offered, including tax-saving for the first five years, medical care, suitable housing arrangement, and privilege to choose a settlement location based on personal preference. Support has also been offered to their dependents, such as an easy access to the public school system or international schools, assistance with finding employment for their spouse, and other services for easing the resettlement process. 46

Fourthly, China has recognized that an efficient and comprehensive immigration system is crucial for recruiting international talent who are foreign nationals, including the returnees who migrated and received foreign citizenships, the Chinese descendants who were born in foreign countries, as well as the non-Chinese foreign nationals. Chinese law does not formally allow dual citizenship. In order to facilitate the mobility of talent with foreign citizenship, the government started to simplify residency requirements and entry visas for overseas scholars with foreign citizenship. At first the Foreign Ministry gave them longer-term visas, and in 2003 the central government started to legalize permanent residence status for foreigners in China. In general, four categories of temporary migrants in China are eligible to apply for permanent residence: foreign investors, top-tier foreign professionals and experts, foreigners who have made a special contribution to China’s development, and immediate family members to a Chinese citizen or permanent resident in China. To be eligible, they all have to legally reside in China for at least five years. This policy is clearly targeting international talent with high qualifications. However, it sets too high a threshold and thereby excludes too many foreign talents. As of September 2005, there were about 260,000 foreigners holding stable jobs in China, but only 649 of them were granted the so-called Chinese “green card.” 47 From 2004 to 2008, less than 2500 foreigners received this card. 48

To improve the permanent residence policies, the central government proposed two major changes in 2012. Firstly, they highlighted a series of rights and benefits for the card holders, in order to transform the Chinese green card from a “long-term visa” to an official Chinese id with comprehensive functions. In April 2017, a breakthrough was made through the government’s formal announcement of “The Plan to Facilitate Reforms on Permanent Resident id for Foreigners” (Waiguoren Yongjiu Juliu Zhengjian Bianlihua Gaige Fangan). This new reform plan changed the name of the permanent residence card into a permanent residence id, which means the card will officially function and be administrated in a similar manner as the id card of Chinese citizens. According to these measures, other than the political responsibilities and rights strictly limited to Chinese citizens, Chinese green card holders are eligible for social and economic rights and benefits similar to those of Chinese citizens, such as an identification feature, entry and exit, employment, housing, and investment. The goal is to make foreign nationals’ resettlement and daily lives significantly easier in China.

Meanwhile, to further attract Chinese returnees, there has been an attempt to lower the green card application threshold for Huayi. 49 In the Zhongguancun high-tech zone of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, Huayi are able to apply for 5-year long-term resident permits, and they have also been given the privilege of applying for permanent residence in China with lower requirements than what is generally required in 2003 when China’s permanent residence policy was first initiated, mainly including a doctoral degree or working in the specialist area for 4 years, and living in China for no less than 6 months per year. 50

Due to the continuous reforms of the permanent residence policies, the number of Chinese green cards issued each year has been steadily increasing from 500-600 to 1200-1400 between 2004 and 2014, 51 and reaching 1576 in 2016. 52

Structural Challenges and Obstacles Faced by Chinese Returnees

Although Chinese returnees are generally optimistic about their development in China, challenges and obstacles also exist and may prevent them from fully utilizing their talent. Based on the existing literature, some obstacles and difficulties can be identified to critically suggest another aspect of China’s brain gain.

For scientist and scholar returnees, the high pressure to secure grants or receive rapid promotion require them to adapt to the local environment as quick as possible. However, the bureaucratic and hierarchical governance structures, local power relations, and the unhealthy academic culture became major barriers for their adaptation. Some researchers argued that the top university administrators hold substantive academic authority in universities and control important academic resources, while university faculty, especially entry-level or newly-recruited professors, have limited autonomy and influence. 53 Furthermore, the longstanding notions of hierarchy as well as blind respect for authority and seniority in Chinese society have also greatly limited the effective engagement of returned scholars in their academic development. 54 Essentially, hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative structures have been deeply shaping the allocation mechanism of academic resources, which make Chinese universities resemble a political bureaucracy rather than an academic organization. 55

In addition to structural constraints, the returned scholars reported difficulties with adjusting to the local institutional culture. For instance, Chinese society emphasizes guanxi (interpersonal relationship), and academic success may greatly depend upon who you are and whom you know rather than what you know. 56 This put returnees in a disadvantaged situation since many lost their guanxi or professional networks in China after staying an extended period of time abroad, especially during the early period of their return. Other challenges include the lack of intellectual communication in their workplace, 57 the observable tension between returnees and local scholars, 58 the lack of transparency in grant review processes, 59 as well as the overemphasis of the quantity of publications and research grants while overlooking the quality of research, especially for long term benefits, which may result in research misconduct. 60

For the returnees working outside the academic domain the challenges and obstacles are also considerable. For returnee entrepreneurs, a shortage of financial capital has been a major challenge. 61 Although they are provided with start-up funds from the government, their primary financial capital still comes from their savings from overseas or loans from family and friends. Because their businesses are in the private sector, it is extremely difficult for them to receive financial assistance from the state-owned banks. 62 Moreover, compared to the local private businesses, their businesses are still in a disadvantaged position, mainly due to the lack of familiarity of the local market as well as a shortage of business networks. Also, the career opportunities of returnees have been confined to non-political domains, especially for those who are self-funded for study abroad. 63 Although they might have studied in politics-related disciplines and intended to contribute by obtaining political positions in China, they may have to face barriers which are difficult to overcome within a short period of time, such as strong political networks and Communist Party membership.

Conclusion

Canada has traditionally been a brain gain country if we simply look at the net migration of professionals and skilled workers into the country. However, the empirical findings from previous studies have also shown that Canada as a developed country has been facing a problem of brain waste, especially among the foreign-trained visible minority skilled immigrants, primarily due to systematic barriers, such as lack of effective recognition of their foreign qualifications and foreign work experience. Meanwhile, the recent attempt to solve this problem through immigration policy reforms has been placing more restrictions on highly-skilled immigration to Canada, rather than facilitating and fully utilizing it.

Meanwhile, China as a developing country has witnessed dramatic increases in both outflow and inflow of skilled migrants. These trends have been reshaping the traditional dynamics of brain drain/gain. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China began to actively encourage both study abroad and return, through facilitating study abroad processes and providing funding for students’ foreign education, as well as implementing more favourable and efficient policies to attract skilled Chinese overseas. By doing so, China has the access to a highly-educated population who are able to upgrade their human capital through international education and work experience. Although some re-adjustments are needed, Chinese returnees still have a relatively easy time adapting to Chinese culture and society than non-Chinese talent, and the majority of them have been able to effectively utilize their education and skills within 5 years of their return. Thus, from a perspective of brain utilization, the dramatic increase of return migration to China and effective utilization of returnees’ talent have shown a reverse from the initial brain drain to brain gain. Meanwhile, some talent attraction policies in China also facilitate international “brain sharing” by allowing foreign scholars and professionals to have concurrent positions in China and abroad, as well as by developing increasingly open immigration policies, especially in terms of permanent residency.

Despite recognizing the success of China’s policies and economic development which have been attracting Chinese professionals overseas, this study also suggests that systematic reforms are needed to keep the talent and facilitate their social and cultural adaptation. For example, the government and recruiting organizations should provide more assistance and allow longer time for the international talent to acclimatize themselves to the new academic and cultural environment; the evaluation system should emphasize more the quality of research for long-term benefits rather than focusing on the quantity for short-term interests; the academic and research environment should be continuously improved to meet international standards; and the international talent should be provided with career opportunities in more diversified domains, in order to facilitate the internationalization process of Chinese economy and society.