In an oft-neglected chapter of his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith applies his economic arguments to the question of religious groups, arguing that a peaceable society is most efficiently secured not by state sponsorship of religion, but by an absence of support; in essence a free market of religious ideas. This article applies Smith's insights, and the wealth of supporting material from the intervening years, to the question of Islamic radicalisation in the UK. Contrary to current attempts to produce and support ‘moderate’ Islamic groups via state subsidy, I argue that such action actually runs the risk of fuelling extremism. The UK's Preventing Violent Extremism agenda is based on a mistaken assumption about why individuals join radical groups, as well as a false picture of how religious groups operate.
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