Logical versus Associative Performance on Transitive Reasoning Tasks by Children: Implications for the Status of Animals Performance

Abstract

Although monkeys, pigeons, rats and chimpanzees all appear to be able to draw transitive inferences, young children fail to do so in some situations. If we take successful performance to be indicative of rationality—as animal researchers sometimes do (Monkeys are rational!—McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992)—we have the paradox that animals are, on this criterion, more rational than are school-age children. It is possible, however, to complete 5-term transitive tasks by recruiting associative rather than logical processes; and, indeed, the tasks given to animals not only afford associative solutions but seem to require them (M&C tasks, after McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). We asked whether 5- to 6-year-old children find a task that naturally affords the application of a logical rule (a B&T task, after Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) easier to perform than an M&C task that does not. The children found the B&T task easier—a difference that could not be explained in terms of difference in memory for the premises. This leaves open the possibility that, although children are not restricted to associative strategies when completing 5-term series tasks, animals may be thus restricted.