In a two-choice situation with event-probabilities of 0.67 and 0.33, recency effects were studied as a function of (a) event-dependence and (b) fore-knowledge of event-probabilities. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) Belief in some kind of event-dependence is a necessary condition for the occurrence of negative recency; (2) Foreknowledge of the event-probabilities does not affect recency phenomena; (3) The behaviour of subjects in the two-choice situation, is less irrational than some writers have claimed.
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