Assumptions of twentieth-century neuroscience: reductionist and computational paradigms

Abstract

The term neuroscience originated in the early 1960s, but the questions it asks date to antiquity. The nineteenth-century reticular view of the brain as a diffuse net-like synctium was negated by the neuron doctrine, but certain aspects (e.g. glial cells) are better described as a synctium. System views of the brain were popular in the first half of the twentieth century, but a reductionist focus has since dominated with the development of experimental tools that focus on components. This article will begin by considering twentieth-century views of both philosophers and scientists that highlight the tension between integrating in a field while retaining the ability to think critically. This will be illustrated by considering two common assumptions in neuroscience: that reductionist approaches will explain the brain; and the technological metaphor that sees the brain as a computer.