Abstract
In the responses to the original article, the necessity of adopting an embodied approach in the study of the mind instead of the traditional symbolic approach in classical cognitive psychology is assumed. However, as soon as the nature of that embodied mind and its relationship to explicit representations mediated by semiotic cultural devices is delved into, that consensus gives way to significant criticism and discrepancies. Without wishing to end the debate, but rather open or ignite it, this article seeks to respond to some these observations, grouping them into four sections: (1) the acceptance of the body as a representational device; (2) the risk of incurring a new dualism when differentiating an embodied and implicit mind from a symbolic and explicit one; (3) the transformation processes of mental representations and functions in development as well as in instruction; and (4) the implications of these reflections on the relationships among mind, brain and culture.
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