Abstract
The twenty-first century has come with new security challenges, some of which are being played out very close to Europe's borders. One of the latest examples is Russia's growing aggression, which is challenging European political principles and core values. Russia appears to be testing the unity and strength of the Western world. For its part, Europe seems unable to wake up to the threat. But there is no time to lie back: our response must be immediate. Europe must acknowledge that it could face a military threat on its own territory–-war is not a ghost of the past but a present reality. Our goals should be the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and ensuring that Ukraine has full control over its borders. Serious efforts should also be made to bolster EU security through closer cooperation with NATO and increased defence budgets.
Keywords
Introduction
We have seen Russia occupy and annex Crimea. The number of regions in eastern Ukraine controlled by Russian forces and their sponsored guerrillas has grown. A plane was shot down over Ukrainian territory, killing all 298 passengers. With all these events occurring, it has become trendy in European political circles to speak of ‘a wake-up call’. Europe is again facing an external security challenge very close to its borders. The question is, are we really waking up now that the alarm has gone off, or are we turning over and going back to sleep?
My firm belief is that we are waking up too slowly: the alarm has rung repeatedly during the last decade. Why is this so? Is it the fear of reality or is it the inability to cope with it? Do our hesitation, passivity and gradual approach promote the resolution of the situation, or do they just make the situation worse? My argument in this paper is that it is dangerous to remain asleep since Europe's passive foreign and security policy only feeds our already deepening internal and external weaknesses. Both are interconnected and best seen through the prism of the latest security challenges caused by the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
The fragility of EU principles
The entire global and European security environment is changing rapidly in front of our eyes. The permanent Middle East crisis has been joined by the post-Arab Spring rise of militant extremism in Syria and elsewhere; the near collapse of Iraq, which is suffering attacks from the emergent Islamic State and the increased threat of home-grown European terrorists, who are apparently tired of Western comforts. In the Far East there is not only unprecedented economic growth, but increasing military assertiveness and attempts to change and challenge borders and influences. All are carefully observing the West's reaction to Russia's aggression in Ukraine since it will determine the world order for years to come. Russia is challenging this world order and European core principles in a way unprecedented in recent decades.
However, Europe is also being challenged from inside. During the financial crisis it became obvious that Europeans are exhibiting fatigue with enlargement, as well as apathy regarding the deeper internal integration which would strengthen the EU's integrity and international influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it was popular to talk about European soft power and its ability to attract countries formerly dominated by Soviet-style Communism. The European welfare system and individual freedoms and liberties were powerful driving forces for reform in these countries, provided that after successfully reforming they could enter the Union. In turn, hard power was provided by NATO and, increasingly, by the US.
Today one might argue that European soft power and leverage has diminished. Countries near the EU feel betrayed, as they have lost the chance to join the Union even if they do succeed in implementing European-style reforms. Europe's limited hard power has almost faded away under the policies of extensive European disarmament and the partial withdrawal of US forces from Europe. The EU is lacking solutions to a number of the needs and wishes of our citizens; it appears stagnant and unready to reform in depth or breadth. Strategic thinking and solutions are increasingly giving way to technical and tactical ones, while principle is traded for compromise. In this time of global challenges to identity and increasing social and international insecurity, fear is making many people turn inwards, towards nationalism and social conservatism. Europe is drifting in self-centred contemplation, which makes it both a good target for internal radical populist challenges and less relevant in international affairs. Europe is becoming more nationalistic and populist due to a lack of genuine leadership and the absence of a long-term vision. Radicals and nationalists offer old cures, picturing the world in black and white, abolishing compromise, speaking plainly, and appealing to known identities and fears. To some extent, the EU has become a scapegoat, like the Jews were in Nazi Germany. It seems that our political weakness is growing from our replacement of political principles with insularity and comfort.
However, one might argue that there is light at the end of the tunnel. Challenges can be seen as opportunities: Putin's Russia offers us one by requiring the EU to act. It is in our hands whether or not we choose to embrace this challenge.
Engagement policy or Russian roulette
The end of history visits us from time to time during our lives. When, in 1991, I started my Ph.D. in political science in Denmark, the predictions of Francis Fukuyama 1 were the best I could imagine after experiencing the reality of Soviet rule. A chance to think freely, exercise freedom of speech, travel without borders, shape one's own destiny, vote without fear of persecution, do business and get elected to lead a free nation, these were just some of the very important gains for millions of individuals after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
Francis Fukuyama is an American political scientist, political economist and author, best known for his book the end of history and the last man (1992).
Therefore, when I first heard President Putin call the collapse of the Soviet Union the biggest tragedy of the twentieth century I was shocked (Fox News 2005). However, it was scarcely a surprise to the many former captive nations of the Soviet Union that their former prison guards did not want them to be free. I was shocked by how many people in Europe disregarded this revelation by the Russian president.
After the collapse of the USSR, the West hoped that Russia was finally on its way to becoming a free liberal democracy, similar to those of Europe. Some initial reformist steps were taken in the early 1990s. However, the current leadership under Putin has clearly turned away from the idea of creating a free liberal democracy. Political commentators, such as Fareed Zakaria (2014), describe ‘Putinism’ as a system which is dominated by nationalism, religion, social conservatism, state capitalism and government domination of the media. The major goal of the current leadership is to ‘revive Russia's lost greatness’ at the expense of its neighbours and in accordance with zero-sum thinking. Since Russia has always been a militarised society and is becoming increasingly more so, the current Russian leadership has shown itself to be ready to engage, even in war, to reach these political and economic goals. Examples of this are the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the current warfare in Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has dramatically increased its military presence in the Baltic, creating new military bases and organising military exercises near the borders of the Baltic states and Poland, in contravention of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe instruments, and the Open Sky and Vienna documents. Similarly, its military presence is felt by other Baltic Sea neighbours, like Sweden and Finland, and also where the military is being built up near Japan and around the melting Arctic.
As Trenin (2014) rightly argues, Putin has been consistently seeking to build his country on the basis of Russian patriotism, or rather nationalism, which is squarely centred on the state. The dream of a liberal democracy in Russia is over and Europe should face this bitter reality.
Observing Russian affairs, one can see that the messages from the Russian leadership vary between perfectly smooth Western diplomatic language and shocking authoritarian expressions. Europe must take off its rose-tinted glasses, read between the lines and see the true message and intentions of the Kremlin. The messages mentioned below from Putin's speech at the Valdai Conference in 2013 should not be disregarded (Russian Presidential Press and Information Office 2013).
First, Russia's leader highlighted the integration of the ex-USSR into a single geopolitical unit as a key priority, which would recreate ‘Russian greatness’ equal to that of Europe and Asia. This is supported by Russia's military adventures in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2013-14, which were accompanied by massive disinformation campaigns aimed at both domestic and international audiences. This was an occasion when Europe misread Putin's message and failed to define a political response to it.
This political bluntness and recent war go hand in hand with the second point that Putin mentioned at Valdai, which was that Russians and Ukrainians are actually one people divided into two states. According to this logic, the separation of the two states can only be regarded as temporary. Therefore, what we are now experiencing is at least a partial ‘Anschluss of Ukraine’. It is very much our European responsibility to assist Ukraine to defend its right to independence, remembering from history that appeasement is not the answer.
Third, Putin also stated that Russia rejects the post-Christian (read: postmodern) values of Europe because Russian civilisation differs from that of the West. Russia was portrayed as a country which offers true Christian values instead of those of the failing, decadent West.
Wishful thinking or realpolitik?
Historically, Orthodox Christianity and Russian politics have never been separate from each other. Unlike Europe, Russia has not experienced religious wars and, consequently, has never integrated liberal values into its customs–-as happened in Europe in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, when they became the core principles of Europe's modern political existence. Moreover, Russia lacks any tradition of Roman law, which is fundamental to Western political systems. In other words, similar changes to those achieved by the Meiji reforms 2 in Japan and the Atatürk reforms 3 in Turkey never occurred in Russia.
A turning point in Japanese history occurred in 1868 when the last shogun was overthrown and the emperor assumed direct control over the nation. The following Meiji period (1868-1912) was marked by new openness to the West and the establishment of a strong, centralised government. This revolution brought about the modernisation and Westernisation of Japan.
A series of political, legal, cultural, social and economic policy changes that converted the new Republic of Turkey into a secular, modern nation-state.
To summarise, what some are seeing as a surprise in recent Russian politics is, in fact, the outcome of the carefully tailored policies of the current Russian leadership, which claims to draw its legitimacy from the special path of Russian development. This leadership does not want to follow the modernisation path of Atatürk or Meiji; rather their choice is associated with imperial revisionism at the expense of Russia's citizens and neighbours.
Unfortunately, one of the major Western mistakes in relations with Russia in the last two decades has been the wishful thinking that an engagement policy alone will make Russia become a decent liberal democracy similar to those in Europe. As we know, the first modern European political scientist and real politician Machiavelli (1997) considered wishful thinking and disregard of changing challenges as one of the gravest mistakes of statesmen. For a long time, many Western leaders have not been willing to see the bitter truth about the political and military development to the east. Instead, to successfully complete their political term at home, they have engaged in lucrative projects of economic cooperation with Russian oil, gas or other industries, neglecting warning signs from the region and Europe's long-term interests.
In the current circumstances it would be timely to admit that the very fundament of mainstream EU policies towards Russia under Putin was poorly chosen. Namely the idea that mutual economic interdependence would ultimately change the Russian leadership's mindset in favour of liberal democratic values and a liberal political system was wrong and has failed in practice. Since the Russian invasion and later annexation of Crimea, despite the Budapest Agreement of 1994, EU hesitation to impose meaningful and timely sanctions on Russia has been clearly motivated by economic interdependency, causing a split in which the weaker side has prevailed, at least in terms of decision-making. As a liberal democratic system, Europe is sensitive to public opinion about the influence of sanctions on its already pressured welfare systems, employment and growth, while authoritarian Russia, with its almost total control of the media, is not. Consequently, in the short term, mutual economic interdependence has given Russia more leverage over the EU than vice versa. Thus the Russian leadership assumes that the current sanctions are of a very temporary nature and will be lifted as soon as Europe faces economic losses itself. It would be a grave mistake by the West not to enforce the sanctions, both because the Russian losses are much larger and because European inconsistency will diminish its international status and undermine EU legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, as would further lukewarm policies.
Russia's open embrace of illiberal authoritarianism, coupled with European political indecisiveness, is feeding a number of radical European political movements, with their leaders from Hungary to France openly cheering Putin's success and advocating illiberal democracy and anti-EU sentiments and policies at home. The current leaders of Europe's mainstream parties are frequently hesitant, offering delayed partial solutions, while radicals are painting a populist, decisive vision in black and white, with easy choices and xenophobic and divisive solutions at the expense of the common EU good, cooperation and security. They also frequently attack the core liberal component of European political principles.
It must be remembered that Europe's democracy and political system would be an empty shell without its liberal centre. Democracy without its liberal component is a tyranny of the majority, lacking fundamental liberties such as the separation of religion and state, constitutionalism, human rights, gender equality and a genuine justice system based on respect for the individual. By abolishing the liberal component of democracy we would also turn our back on Western Christian tradition, which is the cradle of liberalism, even if sometimes these origins are lost or forgotten. When dealing with Russia, Europe has the chance to choose between its own rules and those of the Russian roulette imposed on us. Unfortunately, the policy of engagement has made us play according to the Russian terms of a zero-sum game.
The EU's choice: War or shame?
When debating European security, what comes to mind, albeit unwillingly, are Winston Churchill's speeches and texts from 1938-9 about the choice between shame and war (Churchill 1982). We are not facing such a choice yet, but the context in which political choices are being made is degrading our principles and the integrity of European politics. Until now, the EU has favoured humiliation over confrontation and, thus, it is letting the dangers of confrontation come nearer. This was exemplified during the months of increasing Russian assertiveness towards Ukraine, when European and American leaders were quick to stress that they could only see a diplomatic solution to the crisis, while Russia saw its solution in skilful diplomatic moves combined with military activity. Below I highlight the major reasons for European hesitation vis-a-vis Russia and, thus also, the EU's political weakness.
First, no individual wants to risk his or her peace and security when facing any kind of challenge. The same holds for countries. This is the understandable reaction of a continent that has experienced two devastating World Wars, the Holocaust and Communist tyranny. Simultaneously, after 60 years of peace and prosperity, there is a strong belief that war is something that is impossible in Europe. This lack of understanding is coupled with an unwillingness to maintain effective capabilities in the defence sector. Such investment is highly unpopular with the public, who would rather see the creation of new jobs and the stabilisation of the welfare system, and who are unaware that the defence sector can contribute to these goals in an effective way. Many European nations have difficulty imagining Russia threatening them directly.
Second, there is an unwillingness to see Russia as an adversary because it would demand a change in the political guidelines governing relations with this country, especially among the European left, but increasingly also among the far right. This would require the admission of mistakes, something which politicians are very reluctant to make.
Third, political decisions in European capitals are very much determined by economics. After the financial crisis, Russia's political and military challenge is something which requires serious resources to oppose. In the short term, it seems easier to abstain and wait, hoping that things will be resolved naturally.
Fourth, the EU continues to face a number of internal challenges which make it much more vulnerable to external challenges and threats. Its deeper internal integration has stopped, as has its external enlargement. Federalisation has become an almost taboo topic compared to 10 years ago. Now, EU discourse is increasingly dominated by the potential British exit and the challenge from internal power divisions in those EU countries that face the threat of fragmentation from separatist movements. In addition, there is the growing challenge of radical right movements that are openly hostile to the EU project.
Fifth, the EU-US relationship is not at its best. The withdrawal of US troops from an already almost disarmed continent feeds doubts about President Obama's interest in European affairs. Mutual trust has also been put to the test by the recent spying scandals. Polls show that the post-war generations are less convinced about the transatlantic partnership.
In short, the Russian security challenge to the EU and NATO, but primarily to Ukraine and its other near neighbours, has come at a time when Europe is weaker than before, busy with its own internal affairs, lacking genuine political leadership and contemplating its future development choices.
Europe and the US have been outmanoeuvred by their reluctance to sit down with Russia in a Reagan-style dialogue. Ironically, for a long time the West abstained from providing military assistance to Ukraine, while being unable to halt ongoing military cooperation projects, such as the sale of Mistral ships, with Russia. Germany took the brave step to arm Kurds against the growing Islamic State advance, but has silently drawn the line when it comes to sending military equipment to Ukraine. It seems that part of German society and its leadership are still haunted by the ghosts of the Second World War, making it difficult for them to assume political responsibility equal to Germany's size and influence when it comes to security policy or its relationship with Russia. Unfortunately, some fear that the German economic and political dominance in the EU is mirrored by other EU members, which does not help the EU and Germany to conduct assertive policies when needed.
These and other examples make Europe and the West look weak and indecisive in the eyes of its partners and opponents, but most importantly they reveal the EU's weakness as a global power.
Conclusion
The Russian challenge to Europe's fundamental principles and security environment, as well as the rise of anti-EU sentiment in Europe, can be successfully met. However, this will require leadership, courage and a vision of the future Europe which is frequently lacking in current European politics. The European political elite must follow Machiavelli's advice to rulers and acquire a leadership mentality instead of adopting a wait-and-see attitude.
Politically we must not be afraid of changing the world, but embrace these changes and lead our nations into the future, rather than following radicals paving a way to the past. We must offer European solutions to national problems. This means giving the EU the power to do so and equipping it with people and leaders who can exercise these powers efficiently and mindfully. Internally, the EU is losing to the ‘past’ (radicals), which offers ‘known values’, while the Union–-instead of a stable future–-is suggesting a continuation of today's insecurity. If the EU were to disappear tomorrow, the challenges would not disappear but become even greater.
At the policy level, it is important to change the dominant European paradigms and state of mind and acknowledge that European countries might face a military threat from revisionist Russia. The EU must also acknowledge that a military threat could not be countered by the declining European soft power or by diplomatic talks alone. Soft power, without convincing hard power, is hot air. Soft and hard power should be combined, just as in governance legitimacy should be coupled with power. One without the other can only survive for a limited time. There must be the political will and leadership to pool more power at the EU level.
Along with allocating more money to defence in national budgets, a common budget for multinational security cooperation in the EU should be considered. If such a budget were to exist, perhaps the French Mistral ships could be acquired for a common purpose instead of being traded with a country which violates international norms. Other capability projects could be encouraged as well.
Societies must be made aware that military spending helps to bolster economies, growth, employment, science and education, since most of the money remains within the EU's borders. Military industries have traditionally been interconnected with innovation and a number of other economic sectors that are currently in crisis. Moreover, supporting European security needs would reduce military exports to foes and regimes of a dubious nature. By increasing security cooperation between the EU and NATO we will be able to use the advantage of a union instead of being targeted individually by opponents.
Serious efforts should be made to bolster common EU security in such areas as cyber defence, the information space and border security, taking into account the current challenges on the EU's eastern borders, such as disinformation campaigns and military invasion. These areas are weak and the levels of development, cooperation and integration among countries is limited, thus giving any opponent a lot of opportunities to harm member countries one by one. The European Commission and national governments have to give this priority since our European values are being affected and they are one of the defining cornerstones of our community.
In this regard, it is very important that the European NATO allies actively provide additional security to the Eastern European members in the Baltic. Such assistance cannot be left in the hands of the US alone because this undermines European solidarity as well as its capabilities.
Recently, some European politicians have wrongly referred to the NATO-Russian agreement of 1997, arguing that the stationing of permanent troops in the Baltic would violate the agreement. 4 This agreement does not prevent such assistance, especially when Russia is currently in full violation of it.
On 27 May 1997 at the Paris NATO summit, Russia and NATO signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.
Moreover, EU leaders must also agree on how to answer Russia's economic counter-sanctions in a united way. Even if the EU is dependent on Russia in certain areas like energy, transport and trade, the EU is overwhelmingly economically stronger and capable of overcoming these difficulties if it stands united against a country whose share of world GDP is only 3 %. The EU must agree on an internal solidarity pact covering most of the economic damage done to individual member states.
Obviously, the EU's future, as well as that of NATO, and the security dimension are very much dependent on the response to the Ukrainian crisis. We must admit that diplomatic solutions alone are not enough to stop the Kremlin's aggressive behaviour.
We must be clear on what our goal is with regard to the Russo-Ukrainian war. It is clearly not just a ceasefire. It is ensuring a sovereign and free Ukraine and respect for its internationally recognised borders, and it is letting Ukraine choose its way of development freely. For that purpose we must provide Marshall Plan-type economic assistance to Ukraine and help it to start a reform process that, despite the ongoing war, targets corruption, energy and other issues. If required, the West must provide Ukraine with advanced military technologies and assistance to enable it to stop further aggression. It is regrettable that military assistance is being provided in Iraq but not in Ukraine. Russia, in turn, must be made aware that the choice between war and peace is in its hands.
The withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, the establishment of full Ukrainian control over its borders and the disarmament of the so-called separatists should be our goals. Free and fair local elections should be organised with the participation of international observers. We are witnessing the birth of a European nation which will never return to Russia after all it has been through. We have a chance to actively help this process.
If Ukraine falls, the next goal for the Kremlin may be other former members of the USSR, such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, but it could also be Baltic EU and NATO members or the wider Baltic Sea area. To be frank: Europe and the West have the choice of either facing the aggression head on and rejecting Russia's claim that might is right, or retreating from their own principles and values. What this choice comes to is nicely summed up by a statement that Benjamin Franklin made in the early days of the US: ‘We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately’ (Sparks 1840, 4). 5 For the sake of future generations, I strongly hope that the EU will emerge from these challenges stronger and more united. I also believe that the idealist and realpolitik approaches are mutually enriching and both demand proactive policies.
Franklin, one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, made this statement at the signing of the United States Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776.
Footnotes