Another Unification of Europe

Abstract

There have been several efforts to unite Europe over the centuries. Some of them have been attempted through royal marriages and diplomatic manoeuvring, but most of them have been tried through the use of swords and guns. The recent unification of Europe has been accomplished by the export of laws and administrative procedures: the famous, or infamous, acquis communautaire. The end result is impressive: the enormous space comprising 27 EU states is a zone of prosperity, democracy and peace. What lies behind this extraordinary success, and how can the momentum be sustained? This article argues that the prudent application of EU power and the ever-growing synergy of norms between different parts of the continent have been behind Europe's successes. However, enlargement has changed the European Union beyond recognition and it is therefore important for the Union to adjust to that change. The Union should not only endorse more liberal economic policies to stimulate growth and embark on novel foreign policies. It must also re-think the entire system of European governance and invent new ways of securing democratic legitimacy across the ever-larger European space.

There have been several efforts to unite Europe over the centuries. Some of them have been attempted through royal marriages and diplomatic manoeuvring, but most of them have been tried through the use of swords and guns. The recent unification of Europe has been accomplished by the export of laws and administrative procedures: the famous, or infamous, acquis communautaire. True, some states also had to reach into their pockets, but the financial cost of this historic project has been quite low in comparison with similar efforts (consider, for instance, the relatively high financial costs of German unification or of keeping together various parts of Bosnia).

The principal agent behind this recent unification of the continent has been the European Union; a very peculiar supranational polity that defies easy labelling. True, this unification could not have succeeded without the unique leadership of such individuals as Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev or Vaclav Havel. Nor is it possible to ignore the contribution of largely anonymous citizens allied in Poland's Solidarnosc or those rushing to the centre of Berlin to dismantle the wall separating the two parts of the city and the continent. The United States has also played its part, especially by extending over Europe its security umbrella in the most crucial period of transition. All things being equal, however, it is the role of the European Union that deserves the greatest credit for bringing the two parts of Europe together. By extending membership to ten post-communist states, the Union brought under its governance a Europe of unprecedented size. Charlemagne would have been impressed seeing this, one could imagine.

Those who question the historic importance of the EU's enlargement process should read analyses from the period just after the fall of the Berlin Wall. By then the entire post-communist space had been seen as pregnant with potentially violent conflicts either on economic, ethnic or political grounds. The atrocious war in the Balkans has only reinforced the simple truth that the collapse of communism does not necessarily result in peaceful coexistence. Developments in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia have shown that liberal democracy is not the ‘only game in town’ after the fall of the Soviet system. Today, the enormous space comprising 27 EU states represents an impressive zone of prosperity and peace. With nearly 500 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world's GNP and around 40% of global merchandise exports, and with a comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic and military instruments at its disposal, the EU is in a position to exercise significant influence in various parts of the world. People in its neighbouring countries are also benefiting from the success of EU enlargement. They trade with the enlarged EU as never before and receive various kinds of training and even direct financial aid. They know that embracing democracy, the rule of law and liberal market economics can bring them closer to this zone of prosperity and peace. The enlarged Union has become a magnet, attracting other countries, and has grown into a powerful force that deters adventurous politics.

The unification of Europe may well be a good thing, but it has also generated a number of new challenges. Moreover, we still do not really know what lies behind this extraordinary success and how to keep the momentum going. This article argues that the prudent application of EU power and the ever-growing synergy of norms between different parts of the continent have been behind Europe's successes. But Europe should not become complacent. Enlargement has changed the Union beyond recognition, and it is therefore important for the Union to adjust to that change. The Union should not only endorse more liberal economic policies to stimulate growth, and embark on novel foreign policies. It must also rethink the entire system of European governance and invent new ways of securing democratic legitimacy across the ever-expanding European space.

European power politics

Some view the recent unification of Europe exclusively in moral terms: the affluent western part of Europe had a moral obligation to embrace fellow European countries liberated from the Soviet yoke. Others view this enlargement as a purely technical operation. According to them, enlargement was about adopting some 80,000 EU laws and regulations that formed the core of the so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. Both of these aspects of enlargement were indeed important, but much more important were political considerations. Politics is primarily about power and interests, and seen from this angle enlargement was about asserting the EU's political and economic control over the unstable and impoverished eastern part of the continent through skilful use of conditionality. True, the post-communist countries were not ‘conquered’ but invited to join the EU, and they did so quite eagerly. Moreover, at the end of the accession process they were offered access to EU decision-making and resources. Nevertheless, the discrepancy of power between the EU and candidate States was enormous, and one wonders how much actual freedom the candidate States could ever have had in the accession negotiation process. In fact, the Union has from the start made it clear that the candidate countries must adopt the entire body of European law before entering the Union. This was power politics at its best, and not just a technical operation guided by moral considerations.

The fall of the Soviet empire produced a huge power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Although individual countries became formally independent, a vast political and economic space emerged that was open to contesting interests regarding ideas and profits. Even in relatively stable countries it was not clear which institutional solutions and regulatory frameworks would be adopted, who would conquer the emerging markets and what kind of military alliances would emerge. The promise of EU accession persuaded States in Central and Eastern Europe to adopt EU laws and regulations, to open their markets for EU goods and services and to settle internal and external disputes in a peaceful manner. The compliance of candidate States was largely voluntary, and based mostly on incentives rather than punishments. Moreover, the Union demanded from candidate States a host of noble things such as democracy, rule of law and friendly relations with their neighbours. That said, however, enlargement was largely about power and interests. As Robert Cooper once put it, it was about building a new type of ‘cooperative and voluntary empire’ in order to fill a power vacuum that emerged out of the ashes of the repressive Soviet system [1, p. 26].

There is nothing wrong in recognising the power aspect behind the unification of Europe. Although much evil has been committed with the use of power, it is difficult to do any good without power, either. In other words, there are various ways of conducting power politics. The Union has used its enormous leverage in a skilful and at times assertive manner, but the enlargement process has not been utterly selfish. It has led to empowerment of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and this is why they have been prepared to put up with the EU's tough conditions. Acceptance and implementation of these conditions has been possible because of the normative synergy between the two parts of Europe. This leads me to another crucial factor behind the successful unification of the continent.

Common norms and values

The EU has applied its enormous economic and political leverage towards a growing number of countries. However, it has been unable to replicate the profound impact such policies had in Central and Eastern Europe. True, none of the States falling under the so-called neighbourhood framework has been given a clear-cut membership perspective. Moreover, this group of ‘wider’ neighbours includes such diverse countries as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Nevertheless, the pattern of dealing with the neighbours is similar in each case. The EU tries to make these countries look more like the Union itself. Neighbours are asked to adopt European laws and administrative solutions in exchange for aid, liberalisation of mutual exchanges and integration. The process has a long time span; it is gradual and conditional. The more certain countries manage to become compatible with the Union, the more they are integrated in many (but not all) functional fields. EU involvement in the western Balkans is even greater. Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and probably also the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are de facto semi-protectorates governed by European officials under the formal auspices of the United Nations. European institutions and EU members are by far the largest donors to these countries. They have their peacekeepers and police forces on the ground there. Most of the laws and institutions in these countries are being set up and run under EU supervision. EU officials frequently intervene through the provision of detailed economic and fiscal plans. And yet, it is difficult to see any of these countries following the path of Central and Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future.

The reasons for this limited EU influence are complex and vary from case to case. But if one tries to find a pattern differentiating the case of Central and Eastern Europe from most of the other cases, one should look at values and norms. The World Values Survey clearly shows that values (in this case, survival, self-expression values) in ex-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe have been fairly close to the values of Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and Catholic Western Europe of the 1990s [3, p. 70]. The proportion of democrats as measured by the 1999 democracy–autocracy index was also much higher in Central and Eastern Europe than in countries such as Belarus or Russia [2, p. 150]. When we look at such declared attitudes as trust in others, acceptance of deviant behaviour or rejection of violence, Central and Eastern Europe also differ from the EU's ‘wider’ neighbours [4, p. 8]. Policies adopted in Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of communist rule also point to a synergy of norms and values with Western Europe. All ten countries that later became EU members managed to construct a fairly workable democratic system, introduced sound market reforms to their economies and settled border disputes with their neighbours.

Developments in the field of democracy are particularly revealing. The ten countries under consideration have not just introduced free and fair elections. They have also made sure that democracy is a matter of rules, procedures and institutions rather than of populist campaigns and top-down political manipulation. They have done this by introducing the balance-of-power principle and guaranteeing basic civic and human rights. Moreover, their newly adopted constitutions have imposed a tight set of rules on the citizenry, taking away some power from the people and putting it into the hands of constitutional framers and courts. This has not only constrained the power of the executive, but it has also made it difficult for the majority of the day to manipulate the democratic system to its own partisan advantage. In other words, the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe have endorsed the system of constitutional liberalism already practised in Western Europe.

Of course, it is important to avoid sweeping generalisations resulting in stereotypes, if not caricatures, of different regions or ‘civilisations’. The very term ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ is being contested, especially when contrasted with South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa or the Balkans. Grouping countries according to cultural or religious characteristics is even more controversial. The data on norms and values are fuzzy and they do not point to any sharp borders between ‘civilisations’. Each of the 27 EU Member States has its peculiar characteristics. It would be wrong to see the EU-27 as a homogeneous (and always virtuous) entity and sharply distinct from all its current neighbours. Nevertheless, it is fair to argue that the skilful use of power was not the only factor behind the successful unification of Europe. A relative synergy of norms and values has also been important in this endeavour. Central and Eastern European countries labelled their campaign for EU membership ‘return to Europe’. As we have tried to demonstrate, this was not an empty slogan, but an effort to emphasise the normative convergence between the two parts of Europe despite the decades of communist rule in the eastern part of the continent.

Challenges after unification

The unification of Europe may well have been an enormous success, but it has transformed Europe beyond recognition. The new and larger European Union will have to adjust to this change and such a process of adjustment is never easy. To start with, the EU-27 is a much more diverse economic and administrative entity than the EU-15. Compare, for instance, the GDP per capita of Denmark and Latvia. The ratio is 10:1. One-size-fits-all policies will not be appropriate for all of these different countries. Enlargement has also added to the complexity of the existing institutional structures of the EU. We now have many more Member States outside the Eurozone than before 2004, for instance. The Union would have to adopt more loose and flexible forms of economic and administrative governance to remain competitive and coherent. Soft rather than hard law would have to be the norm. The Union would have to rely on liberal economic policies stimulating growth rather than central redistribution from Brussels. Incentives and shaming would have to prevent free riding rather than sanctions and commands. More flexible modes of governance are likely to be resisted, partly because they will challenge existing institutional power structures and cognitive habits, and partly because their application has not always proved successful. Consider the rather mixed record of the open method of coordination, especially when it comes to enhancing the productivity of European firms. Nevertheless, hierarchical governance seems even less suited to the ever-expanding and more diversified European space, hence the need for innovation and experimentation.

Another challenge is likely to emerge in the field of democracy. As stated earlier, EU enlargement could take place only after the successful democratic consolidation of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. But the addition of several Member States to the Union has broadened the European democratic space. As a consequence, democratic decision making within the EU will have to accommodate a more diversified set of interests and cultural orientations. Moreover, enlargement has complicated democratic decision-making. It has reshaped the balance between large and small Member States and prompted controversial revisions of the vote weighting system. It has also prompted the union to reduce the scope of the rotating presidency, even though this presidency gave an important sense of ownership to individual Member States, especially the small ones. One can also expect that a parliamentary form of democracy will be even more difficult in the enlarged Union than previously. The powers of non-majoritarian institutions such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and various regulatory agencies are likely to be further enhanced to cope with the larger and more diversified European space. All this means that the Union will have to find new ways of ensuring citizen participation and representation at the European level. Under the new circumstances, the European Parliament might not be in the best position to offer that representation. This shows the seriousness of the challenge. The Union may have to invent novel ways to demonstrate the transparency, responsiveness and accountability of its institutions. All this is easier said than done.

Finally, unified Europe is likely to face several external challenges. Unification has enlarged the zone of peace and security. However, it has also brought the Union close to unstable regions. Most current EU neighbours have relatively backward economies, young, growing, but poor populations, and shaky political systems. The Union is already confronted with economic migrants and in some cases also criminals and terrorists coming from these countries.

The situation is particularly alarming in the EU's Mediterranean neighbourhood. Over the past several decades these countries have not only witnessed a surge in political violence, they have also experienced very poor growth rates. The economic situation in the EU's new Eastern neighbours is less gloomy, but difficult nevertheless. Countries such as Belarus, Moldova and even Ukraine can generate serious political, economic or even security shocks with spillover effects that will be difficult to contain on its borders. Part of the Balkan region remains conflict-prone, as demonstrated in the aftermath of Kosovo's declaration of independence.

Turkey is currently relatively stable and democratic, but it represents a formidable challenge for the Union nevertheless. So does Russia, although for very different reasons. Only Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein seem to be unproblematic EU neighbours (although the transparency of the banking system in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is a contentious issue).

All these different troublesome cases require individually tailored solutions. Nevertheless, the experience in Central and Eastern Europe suggests two lessons. First, Europe's leverage is most effective when EU membership is on the agenda. The opposite is also true; namely, it is very difficult for the Union to shape policies for various countries without a credible promise of EU accession. Therefore, much more work will have to be done to convince the European public about the virtues of further enlargement. This does not mean that all EU neighbours should be promised EU membership, but it does mean that the Union should negotiate in good faith with Turkey—a test case of EU intentions in this field. The Union may well make the accession process in individual cases longer and with a more demanding list of conditions. The important thing is to keep the door open not only for Turkey, but also for such countries as Serbia, Bosnia and Ukraine.

The second lesson arising from the Central and Eastern European experience concerns values and norms. Enlargement may well be a powerful policy tool, but its success depends on a certain degree of normative convergence. The Union has never attempted to spell out its religious or cultural acquis, and there is therefore no justification for keeping some countries outside the EU door on religious or ethnic grounds. However, the Union has always been a club of countries that observed the rule of law, respected certain political and economic rights (including the rights of different minorities) and renounced the use of force in solving their mutual disputes. Increasingly, the Union is also a club of countries with a distinct set of social preferences, i.e., observing certain labour, environment and food safety standards. There can be no compromise on these norms and values, regardless of various strategic considerations. A European foreign policy concerned about norms and values should also upgrade cultural and educational exchanges. So far, this policy is too heavily weighted towards technical and administrative aid. Moreover, this policy is too focused on bringing closer various government and regional officials and not focused enough on grass-roots societal exchanges. In other words, a traditional foreign policy in the style of Matternich and Bismark is ill suited to promoting European norms and values. But a genuine embrace of a policy driven by norms would demand a cultural revolution within Europe's diplomatic circles, hence the challenge.

Conclusions: Europe facing the world

Over the past few years the international environment has become increasingly volatile both in security and economic terms. Is the enlarged EU prepared to meet the challenge? Will the EU's internal problems, in part resulting from enlargement, prevent it from assuming global responsibilities? There is no doubt that internal reforms will continue to consume a lot of time and energy, but this does not need to lead to paralysis. The unified Europe is in a good position to cope with the pressures of modernisation and globalisation, because enlargement has forced it to embrace diversity and flexible modes of governance. This, in turn, enhances learning, innovation, experimentation and adjustment to local circumstance. Of course, effective governance must always be about the maintenance of collective order, but this order does not need to be hierarchical and structured as a pyramid. In fact, it is hard to imagine any effective governance that does not reflect and represent the basic types of variety found in the system to be governed. Collective goals should reflect shared aspirations and cooperative practices, and as such can hardly be dictated from a detached centre. The current governance system is not very effective, but enlargement is pushing Europe to adopt the necessary changes towards greater flexibility and diversification.

A larger, more flexible Europe operating in concentric circles might also be a strong foreign policy actor. Successful extension of liberal democratic order, environmental standards and peaceful coexistence into Central and Eastern Europe helps the Union to act as a model power in the global context. China, Russia, India or Brazil are not likely to change their policies because the EU threatens them with coercion. They are more likely to change policies when they see that EU solutions may also work for them. Enlargement has also strengthened rather than weakened more traditional forms of European foreign policy. The new members proved eager to take part in various European peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. Time and again they have also shown a better understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Iraq, Israel, Syria and even America than many old Member States. Unlike some of the old Member States, the new Member States are usually in favour of further enlargement and this, as argued earlier, is the most effective means of conflict prevention in Europe's unstable neighbourhood.

Adapting to change is never easy, but over the past five decades Europe has changed many times. This has had serious implications for the nature of European integration. The recent unification of Europe has probably buried the prospects for creating a European superstate. But it has created a new type of empire able to make a serious impact on the world.