Europe: The Worth of a Values-Based Community

Abstract

European values, based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, have helped to foster democratisation in many states on the continent. Countries like Russia and Turkey are an indivisible part of the European continent but have been excluded from a widening Europe, mainly because they are seen as not sharing our common values when, in fact, their values are the same. The effects of this miscalculation are being seen in Europe today. If we treat Turkey and Russia differently, considering them more like intruders than partners, we will feed their distrust. We have to make a bigger effort to bind Russia and Turkey with Europe in a way that allows them to become part of a widening sphere of cooperation, based on shared values and democratic advances. Furthermore, the Council of Europe should extend its objectives so that, going beyond the defence of human rights, it becomes a consultative organisation that brings together all the countries on the continent.

Introduction

Europe is a work of law, its frontiers are democracy, and its values liberty and fundamental freedoms. When we talk about the values of Europe, we start with some important principles: representative democracy, civil pacts, a society where justice works, respect for human rights, the rights of minorities, accountable government, and guarantees and individual freedoms.

But these are values that we will not necessarily find in states without a democratic history. It is necessary to have collective international support when making the effort to place the pillars of democracy. No one can expect that these will appear overnight.

However, the application of Western democracy by imposition or arrogance, through the exclusion of societies without experience of political openness, may end in a rejection of Western values, with this latter attitude being as dangerous as the original situation that it was intended to change.

There is no doubt in my mind that, following the ‘constructivist’ approach pioneered by Wendt (1992), an organisation like the Council of Europe can contribute to ‘socialising’ its members to encourage them to adopt norms and values as the result of a sense of total belonging, with absolute equality, to a community organisation. All aspects that imply living together, sharing things and working in the same building are good. From 10 founding members in 1949, the Council has grown to 47 as a result of common sense and the efforts of new members to adapt to the new situation.

However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe has lacked a long-term strategic vision, which could have been useful to avoid some of the challenges that we face today. This strategy should have been contemplated by Europe without reference to its natural barriers or religious factors.

The acceleration of European integration over the past 15 years has left Russia and Turkey out of the European family of states. In my view, however, this decades-long rejection has been a strategic miscalculation by Europe, and one whose effects are being seen in Europe today. We have made mistakes and have missed opportunities. After the events in Ukraine and the Middle East, it would be prudent to open a new era of engagement to deal with the problems at their source. What can European leaders learn from the mistakes made during the last 10 years in order to re-engage with Russia and Turkey? How can European institutions, such as the Council of Europe, actively promote a climate and culture of trust?

We need to realise that Vladivostok is as European as Reykjavik, Ankara and Lisbon. The four cities are characterised as having societies that share the common values explained above and a historical-cultural patrimony, as well as similar lifestyles and habits.

The case of Russia

After the end of the Cold War, around 20 countries that used to be in the orbit of the Soviet Union, or indeed were part of it, proceeded to progressively become associates of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe was the body that facilitated full membership of the EU for many of the Central and Eastern European countries. This is also true of the situation in the Western Balkans, where the Council of Europe contributed to burying the nationalist and xenophobic ghost of war in the former Yugoslavia, leading to two of the integrated parts (Slovenia and Croatia) joining the EU. A clear majority of citizens in the former Communist states agree that their countries have made progress towards prosperity and development since their respective incorporations into the EU in 2004 and 2007 (European Commission 2008).

Likewise, in my contacts with members of the Russian elite who have studied in European universities or travelled to Western countries, or who are entrepreneurs with links and interests in Europe, there is recognition of the need to gravitate towards Western Europe through modernisation and adoption of the rule of law.

Over the past year, Russia has transgressed the fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence between states, where frontiers and international laws are inviolable. Ukraine is as key to the Russians as it is to us. Russia feels that it is too big be ignored and wants a relevant role in an enlarged Europe.

In Russia, the concept of power for current political leaders is still related to extensive geography, natural resources and spheres of influence. However, this idea has evolved a lot, even if the Russian government cannot admit that this is an old concept in the twenty-first century.

I have always been in favour of maintaining a constant dialogue to ensure that Russia feels encouraged to be part of the EU and accepts that in the current Europe there is no place for spheres of influence. Why can we not integrate our regional entities into a single one that could stretch from Lisbon to Vladivostok instead of talking about two separate bodies?

Although we are at a critical juncture with Russia–-provoked by the war in Ukraine, in which rebels have been encouraged, financed and armed by Russia–-there is no alternative to a strong relationship. The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the need for the EU to work with the Russians on all aspects of our relationship with the former Soviet states. The EU must show understanding for Russia's concerns, but be strong in defending issues of principle concerning these countries.

To reconcile with Russia we should look beyond the commercial opportunities. If Europe does not promote more internal unity, as Brzezinski (2012) states, historical resentments and conflicts of interests could awaken, and Russia would be able to continue to feed its imperialist ambitions. The UK would pivot to the US, convinced that they can, in fact, do better without the EU; the economic relationship between Germany and Russia could awaken misgivings in France and the UK; and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland and the Baltic States, would look to the US to provide security.

The case of Turkey

Turkey has a 50-year-long history of relations with the EU. Geographically, the major part of Turkey belongs to the Asian continent. Islam is the predominant religion and there are some that maintain that this is what differentiates them from the Christian identity of Europe. But neither of these two factors justifies the blocking of Turkey from closer integration with Europe, politically or culturally.

Religion itself cannot be the determinant factor for belonging to a regional identity such as the European one. Nobody doubts that the predominantly Muslim country of Bosnia-Herzegovina is firmly part of the European family. Turkey followed the path to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria as required by the EU accession negotiations. However, the result was its exclusion from the EU. Being in Europe means writing one's own laws but defending the values shared by all as they are set out in the treaties.

Europe served as a model for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, leader of the ‘Young Turks’, who, in 1921, transformed the dismembered Ottoman Empire into a European-style, modern secular state that was renamed Turkey. During the twentieth century, Turkey faced some dramatic and important changes with success. Atatürk abolished the caliphate, replaced Islamic law with occidental legislation, introduced the Latin alphabet, and gave women the right to vote and work in any profession.

Turkey put all of its energy into the modernisation of its society and not into nostalgia for the lost empire. The opening up of Turkey meant the acceptance of democracy as a way of life and considerable support from its citizens for entering the EU. If we had helped Turkey to pursue its way to integration with Europe and to build a model of Western democracy, the ascent of political Islam and the nationalist exaltation that now exists there could have been avoided, and we could be more protected against the threat of jihadism from the Middle East.

Almost nine decades after the beginning of the modernisation efforts and cultural transformation based on the European example, the Turks are resentful of the country's permanent exclusion and rejection by Europe. And there is nothing more dangerous for Europe than an assertive Turkey with its Islamism and nationalism–-a twist of fate could ruin all the achievements of recent decades.

As a result of the lack of support from the countries of the EU, the political leaders of Turkey are now proclaiming that the country should embrace its imperial past and use its strategic geographical location to expand its influence through the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. This attitude represents a departure point from its agenda with the West.

Currently various European countries are proclaiming that Turkey has become an irresponsible regional power because it is permitting the transit through its frontiers and territory of radical foreigners that are going to fight in Syria for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Helm and Chulov 2014).

Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoǧlu rejects the secular heritage of the ‘New Turkey’ and believes that more religious conservatism will allow the expansion of the country's influence over similar states. The complicit glances between the religious conservative movements and the Turkish state are a cause for concern.

The case of Turkey should make us understand that regional identities are not anchored to paper and can evolve with time. They are the result of political, economic and cultural changes on a great scale, and can be reversible.

Reconciliation: the added value of Europe

Thanks to institutions like the Council of Europe, the members of the respective parliaments of Russia and Turkey have shared the same mentality and the same world outlook as the rest of Europe. Nonetheless, there is still a lot to be done.

In the case of Turkey, first, we cannot be successful if we do not win the hearts and minds of those who are not convinced of Turkey's European destiny. Second, if the situation in Turkey were ever to become like that of Iraq, the unrest would affect all of us. Therefore we should clearly demonstrate that Turkey is a vital power in the region and a contributor to European security.

Equally, Europe, especially France and Germany, should play a fundamental role in the reconciliation between Russia and the Eastern European countries, including Poland, the Baltic States and Ukraine. This support will allow Poland to feel more confident and will ensure that Russia understands that the process of European integration is moving forwards every day. The reconciliation between Poland and Russia is not only necessary but also possible, as it was between Germany and France in the 1950s and 1960s.

If Europe creates an alliance against Russia, it will only feed mutual resentment. Europe could not have developed without the Franco-German reconciliation and now we will not achieve stability if the Russian-Polish reconciliation, which began in 1989 but has become weaker in the last few years, does not occur.

For that process to be feasible, political leaders should speak to civil society to convince the citizens, as the French and German leaders did before resolving their historical problems. Without this, the result can only be the division of the West. A Europe without a union will never be a globally relevant actor; in contrast, with a union it will always be in a better position to compete peacefully with other states.

Conclusion

Europe and European democracy are the result of real, sustained efforts made every day by those who believe in the values of our community. It is true, however, that we could have achieved more if we had had a more efficient way to develop relationships with Russia and Turkey 20 years ago. An ethnocentric attitude that makes us believe that the use of punishment is more effective than rewards will only lead us to commit new mistakes.

In view of these circumstances, I think that we were wrong to exclude Turkey and Russia from our European project. Today we are seeing the consequences. From my experience as an observer of countries transitioning to democracy, I can conclude that exclusion only leads to resentment and scepticism.

If we treat Turkey and Russia in an asymmetrical way, considering them more like intruders than partners, we will feed their distrust. They are very controlled societies at the moment, but they also share Western values. It is not good when countries feel uncomfortable in their relationships with the majority of their neighbours. I am not suggesting an appeasement policy from Europe, rather the promotion and guarantee of unity, as balancers and conciliators between the states.

The difference resides in the fact that countries such as Russia and Turkey share our values, but that this is not always fully reflected by their political leadership. At the same time we all have different perceptions of how events are unfolding throughout the world.

Gone are the days when a selected and restricted circle headed by the US, the UK or France could arrange the distribution of global power. We need a new architecture for a new Europe that has the necessary audacity and intelligence to develop new relationships in which Russia and Turkey do not feel excluded from the continental mainstream.

The world needs an economically vital, socially attractive and responsible Europe, with a strategic vision that is internationally respected and truly open to integration. The expansion of the European project would allow the EU to become a fundamental actor on the international scene. This could offer an attractive political and economic alternative that, sharing values and principles, would better position Europe to confront the margins that proclaim religious intolerance, political fanaticism and nationalism.

We have to make a bigger effort to bind Russia and Turkey with Europe in a way that allows them to become part of a widening sphere of cooperation, based on shared values and democratic advances. The realisation of this enlarged vision will present an attractive alternative to other cultures and will encourage other states to implement their own democratic cultures.

The Council of Europe could go beyond defending human rights and become a consultative organisation that brings together all the countries on the continent. It must promote democratic values, freedom and the rule of law, but without coercive or harsh measures, such as international shaming and punishment, which will always fail. Turks and Russians should not see the Council as an instrument that denounces them and marks them out politically because then they will feel that the situation is unbalanced.

Europe can improve its situation and redefine its place in the world in the new objective and subjective conditions of the twenty-first century. To accomplish this, it is very important to educate Europeans to preserve the values shared by us and to preserve freedom of speech in accordance with the law. The promotion of democracy will require cooperation and common efforts, not isolation.