Abstract
It is time for Europe to undertake a major strategic rethink in the field of security and defence. The article looks at why this is the case and makes recommendations and conclusions on three key elements for EU consideration: the new challenges and the complex nature of security threats faced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, the new policy environment and legal framework after 2009, and the need for a new or an updated European security strategy. The paper also shows the relevance of those recommendations and conclusions to the Ukrainian crisis.
Keywords
Introduction
The year 2013 was charged with expectations for the European security strategy (ESS), 10 years after its creation, and after 3 enlargements and with 8 new EU member states. The strategy needed to be revised and updated, taking into account the changes in the strategic environment, the types of challenges, the resource deficit, the integration processes, and the attitudes of European citizens and decision-makers in Europe and the US. What happened in practice, however, can be summarised as ‘defence matters’. A decision on the ESS (2003) was not reached, nor was the project of a European Global Strategy 1 considered. Now more than ever, a strategic rethink of the security environment is needed. Having in mind that the current dynamics on the international stage will determine the framework for EU development in the next decade, the EU should seriously consider three key elements: the new challenges and the complex nature of security threats, the new policy environment and legal framework after the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the New NATO Strategic Concept (2010), and the need for a new ESS or an update of the existing one.
The European Global Strategy is a project of think tanks from Poland, Italy, Spain and Sweden aiming to generate ideas and discussion on a possible new European strategy in the field of security. More information on the project for a European Global Strategy 2013 is available at http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/.
The current paper examines these three elements and offers conclusions and recommendations which could also be useful in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the Eastern Partnership.
The new challenges and the complex nature of security threats
The challenges can be categorised into five basic clusters. The first cluster relates to the lack of consensus among member states on the prioritisation of threats and challenges. It also concerns the lack of sufficient political will and trust among member states, whether in the context of the whole EU or of the 22 EU countries that are also NATO members.
Within the EU, the strategic differences among member states, related to their geographical locations, traditional partnerships and historically defined threats, make consensus building a difficult exercise.
The lack of sufficient political will is a challenge to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), both in respect to the use of military means by the EU and the strengthening of common structures and organisations. Concrete examples are the unused battle groups and the still not very confident position of the European Defence Agency (EDA).
The low level of cooperation among member states in turn creates obstacles for the implementation of CSDP. Initiatives such as Pooling and Sharing require a high level of interdependence and therefore can be realised only when there is a high level of trust with no concerns about sharing capabilities and, especially, classified and intelligence information.
The lack of trust between some members of NATO and the EU also creates challenges for bilateral cooperation and the practical utilisation of the Berlin Plus mechanism for EU access to NATO's capabilities. Overcoming the trust deficit is of critical importance when it comes to finding a solution to the problem between Cyprus and Turkey, for example.
The need for more political and military integration in the EU is clear, especially in the context of the recent events in North Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine, but integration requires greater political will as a result of increased trust.
The second challenge includes the fragmentation of defence capabilities and the lack of a common vision on complementarity and a comprehensive approach. The level of EU ambition in this area should be increased so that it need not rely mainly on the US and NATO as the main contributors to Euro-Atlantic defence. EU missions show a lack of key capabilities such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, intelligence and surveillance. Cooperation among member states should be strengthened so that those expensive capabilities can be built; they are unattainable for an individual country on its own. It is a plus that the Council, in its Conclusions of 20 December 2013 (European Council 2013), committed itself to developing crucial capabilities and to addressing the capability gap with concrete projects by member states and the EDA on remotely piloted aircraft systems, air-to-air refuelling capacity, satellite communication and cyber defence.
With the boundaries between internal and external security becoming increasingly blurred, the classical understanding of defence should be altered and the EU should acquire the capability to defend its strategic interests on the global stage. Otherwise it will become an anaemic actor of merely regional importance. Europe needs to develop the full range of autonomous capabilities if it wishes to remain capable of both acting in a manner that is commensurate with its interests and reacting rapidly to new geostrategic realities.
The third challenge concerns the trend of decreasing defence spending in the EU. This tendency stems from the global economic and financial crisis and the inclination of member states to decrease the percentage committed to defence in their national budgets (currently below 1.3 % of GDP).
In the EU there is a generation, which, along with its children, remembers the destruction of war, and another generation, composed of their grandchildren, which grew up in peace and take it for granted. The second attitude now predominates, and in the absence of a concrete military threat, it is increasingly difficult to argue for bigger national defence budgets. Europe spends on defence less than 50 % of what the US spends. On average 50 % of member states’ defence spending goes to personnel, 30 % to maintenance and missions, and 20 % to procurement. In comparison, NATO's recommended targets are 50 % for personnel, 25 % for maintenance and missions, and 25 % for procurement. As a result of the fragmentation of defence systems and capabilities, a huge part of the armament resources in the EU are spent nationally. At the same time, Russia, China and India are significantly increasing their defence spending.
Unfortunately, the December European Council (2013) did not address the subject of decreasing defence budgets. In the future it would be advisable to provide guidance for member states’ defence budgets similar to that set by NATO (2 % of GDP). The European External Action Service and the EDA could also create a ‘European semester for defence’, using the existing mechanism of the European Commission as a blueprint. This would guarantee a rational and productive use of resources with the European circumstance in mind.
The December European Council (2013) produced a positive, concrete approach for adapting to decreased resources and retaining expertise in important industrial fields. It called for an integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base to create and maintain capabilities. That base should be strengthened to maintain operational effectiveness and a viable supply chain; be globally competitive; and stimulate job creation, innovation and growth in the EU.
The fourth challenge relates to the perceptions of citizens and decision-makers in Europe and the US on CSDP's importance and added value. In a survey (German Marshall Fund and Campagnia di San Paolo 2011), which asked whether war is a possible and fair instrument for delivering justice, only 28 % of citizens and 45 % of politicians in the EU responded positively, in comparison with more than 75 % of citizens and politicians in the US. After the destructive consequences of two world wars, Europeans instinctively reject military conflict as a legitimate instrument for solving problems.
Fifth, a group of challenges emerges both for states and the international community, consisting of four trends:
the increase in the so-called new wars (Gotchev 2011), internal conflicts which generate substantial threats for regional and international security;
the increasing number of victims of domestic crises and conflicts, as well as the cases of mass migration and international crises;
the lack of preparedness of the international community to take effective action in cases of internal conflicts, resulting from the blurring line between respect for state sovereignty and the need to intervene in response to illegitimate use of force and the violation of human rights; and
the emergence of weak states after the Cold War, related to instability, competing institutions and internal conflicts that result from state failure.
Failed states are identified as a threat both in NATO's New Strategic Concept (2010) and in the European Global Strategy project. Examining the threats identified in the two documents, one notices considerable overlap but different approaches for addressing them. The approach and degree of commitment of the majority of the decision-makers among the 22 NATO members in the 28 EU member states vary according to the different formats of the two organisations.
Given the complex, multidimensional and asymmetrical character of security threats, as scrutinised from the perspectives of the World Economic Forum (2013), NATO and the European Global Strategy project, the risks to the security environment of the twenty-first century could be briefly presented as follows:
from an economic perspective, the key risk scenario is a major systemic financial failure;
from an ecological one, failure of climate change adaptation;
from a geopolitical point of view, global-governance failure;
from a social perspective, a water-supply crisis, severe income disparities, gaps in population growth and ageing; and
from a technological point of view, a critical breakdown of systems and the unforeseen consequences of new technologies for life science.
In terms of threats, NATO's New Strategic Concept lists terrorism, failed states, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks and natural disasters. The European Global Strategy project mentions military aggression, failed states, regional conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime and natural threats.
What is characteristic of current threats is that they do not recognise borders, their origin is not always clear, and none of them is purely military or can be addressed through purely military means. New threats require the complex use of a range of instruments and a comprehensive approach. Therefore, when creating a strategic document, it is important to take into consideration the correlation between security and development policies, as well as the successful combination of civilian and military instruments through the ‘comprehensive approach’, which frequently generates hybrid strategies.
If the EU is to be able to respond appropriately to security challenges, it urgently needs to develop strategic guidelines for planning and strengthened cooperation and complementarity with NATO, and to optimise available resources through Pooling and Sharing and NATO's Smart Defence.
The new policy environment and legal framework
The Lisbon Treaty introduces important changes in the field of foreign, security and defence policy, which aim to strengthen the EU's role and its instruments in crisis management and human rights and development, as well as to achieve foreign policy coherence through improved coordination. These changes are the introduction of the positions of the high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy and the president of the European Council, and the creation of the European External Action Service. In respect to security and defence policy, these concrete changes create opportunities for deepening defence cooperation and increasing EU relevance for providing international security: the EDA is mentioned for the first time in the treaty, the scope of CSDP missions is extended (‘Petersberg Tasks’), and the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the common defence and solidarity clauses are introduced.
Despite those improvements, the level of ambition of the EU as a defence community is unclear. Some of the clauses require clarification of their practical significance. The common defence clause (art. 42(7) Treaty on European Union), 2 which resembles Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, provides for the furnishing of support to a member state subject to military aggression on its territory but does not specify whether that includes military means.
The text of art. 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union is as follows: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’.
Putting CSDP on the agenda of the December European Council (2013) for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was a step forward, showing a certain degree of political commitment to security and defence issues. The decisions made on the three clusters–-effectiveness, visibility and impact; enhancing the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe's defence industry–-should serve as a roadmap for achieving results and concrete plans for CSDP development before the 2014 NATO summit in order to guarantee optimal coordination between the two organisations. The high representative, in consultation and cooperation with member states, is tasked to assess the impact of changes in the global security environment and in 2015 to report on the challenges and opportunities for the Union. This creates the possibility of updating the ESS (2003) or drafting a new one corresponding to the current realities. Based on the definition of EU strategic interests, a capabilities review should be undertaken in parallel and a new capabilities plan for 2020–25 drafted.
Europe needs an updated or a new security strategy
The EU needs an updated strategic framework for CSDP. The current ESS dates back to 2003, and since that time there has only been one implementation review (in 2008). This is a document that should reflect the security environment and guide EU actions within it. However, with 10 years having passed, it does not provide the guidance needed for an appropriate response to the challenges and threats of the new security milieu.
The economic difficulties and defence budget restrictions in EU member states and the US, as well as the US strategic reorientation to the Asia–Pacific theatre, mean that while Europeans are put under pressure to focus on their own neighbourhood, the EU–NATO complementarity in missions and capability generation is acquiring strategic importance. Although NATO remains the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and will continue to be so for at least the next 10 years, the development of European defence also holds great potential. Timely strategic rethinking and capabilities management could turn the idea of the ‘EU as a second NATO pillar’ into a well-grounded goal.
The EU has the largest civilian crisis-management capabilities and is the biggest net development donor in the world. This makes it a unique actor. Development policy and peace have never been so interlinked. Therefore, implementing a comprehensive approach both in EU foreign policy and within the CSDP is the key to successfully addressing conflicts and managing crises.
The problem is that Europe still lacks an effective common foreign policy and a related defence policy because the sovereignty of member states dominates. Without a long-term foreign policy strategy accepted by all members, an effective defence policy cannot be implemented. The introduction of a comprehensive approach in foreign policy should be related to the necessary CSDP improvements.
Ukraine: a case in point
The crisis in Ukraine shows the need for a rapid and active EU foreign policy response. Otherwise, the difficulties that face the Eastern Partnership countries should they wish to pursue their European prospects will present a challenge for Europe. The frozen conflicts in four out of the six partner countries and the current challenge to the EU integration process in Ukraine all demonstrate that political forces exist in these countries that impede the choice of most of their citizens to move towards the Euro-Atlantic community. Given the diverging perceptions of member states about Russia, as well as its balance-of-power policy and defensiveness towards potential eastward NATO enlargement, the reordering of the direction and sequence of Euro-Atlantic integration stages could be a solution. This means that post-Soviet republics could join the EU first, before joining NATO. This might alleviate Russian concerns to some degree and further the argument against its unnecessary promotion of an alternative to the existing security system in Europe, combining the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security communities.
The situation in Ukraine is an example of a ‘new war’, an internal conflict that is destabilising the region. It poses the challenge, both to the EU and the international community, of finding a balance between respect for state sovereignty and the need for timely actions in response to violence in order to defend citizens’ human rights. In principle, a strategy that loses the initiative and passively waits for events to unfold is a bad strategy. In the report of the high representative and head of the EDA on the CSDP in the lead up to the December 2013 Council (Ashton 2013), it is noted that the challenges to Europe's security come from the southern neighbourhood, disregarding potential risks from Eastern Europe. Hence, the developments in Ukraine add to the arguments in favour of the need for a clear EU strategic vision and an early-warning system for conflicts, supported by all member states. In order to be an effective actor in the Ukrainian crisis, the EU should move to consolidate its foreign policy on the issue.
Conclusion
The sooner Europe perceives the dynamics of current developments, the more capable it will be of responding appropriately to the new security realities, threats and challenges. The absence of a new strategy or an update to the existing one leaves a number of unanswered questions regarding
the existence of an end goal for the EU;
its level of ambition;
the kind of player it wants to be;
the type of power, soft or hard, it wants to use;
the relationship it wants with NATO, given that they share the same theatre of operations;
the level of political maturity of member states; and
public support for CSDP development.
The EU should be an autonomous, proactive global player. To achieve this, it needs a relevant strategy, a reliable military instrument and the implementation of a comprehensive approach, planning operations that combine military and civilian capabilities and provide added value to regional and global security.