Abstract
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is the EU's tool to provide prosperity, stability and security in the Eastern European neighbourhood. However, current events in Ukraine demonstrate–-as did events in Georgia in 2008–-that the EaP does not offer the countries involved sufficient prospects for the future. This article explores alternative scenarios wherein the EaP countries would be offered more stability in the political sphere, economic area and security environment.
Keywords
Introduction
The unexpected decision of Ukrainian President Yanukovych not to sign the Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DFCTA) at the Vilnius Summit on 29 November 2013 surprised the EU. Simultaneously it triggered spontaneous protests in Ukraine that lasted for months and turned into rallies well-organised by political parties and movements. The leading figures of the protests, including Vitali Klitschko of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) and Arseniy Yatsenyuk of the All-Ukrainian Union ‘Fatherland’ (‘Batkivshchyna’), were clearly expressing their preference for a pro-democratic and European path.
This development initiated debate in the EU: how could Ukraine be kept on the European path it had been on until November 2013 and which had continued to be followed by its citizens thereafter? Some politicians argued that Ukraine's protests proved that its citizens were committed to Europe, and should be offered more tangible prospects. Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro, Olli Rehn, said that ‘Europe [should] … be able to provide Ukraine with an accession perspective in the medium-to-long term–-if Ukraine can meet the conditions of accession’ (Smyth 2014). However, other politicians maintained that ‘the EaP is not a “pre stage” for EU membership talks’ (Rettman 2014). Rehn's declaration raised an interesting point: should Ukraine be offered the prospect of EU membership? And if offered to Ukraine, should it then also be offered to all the countries participating in the EaP? This article addresses the question of whether the prospect of EU membership is desirable for the EaP countries and for the EU, and, if not, what alternatives could be offered instead.
The offer of the Eastern Partnership
In order to create a stable neighbourhood, the EU initiated the EaP by bilaterally and multilaterally providing prosperity, security and political stability (Council of the European Union 2009). The EaP, based on Europe's fundamental values of democracy, respect for human rights, freedom and the rule of law, was set up across four practical platforms dealing with democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; energy security; and contact between people. What has the EaP brought the participating countries–-Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia–-and the EU?
The official viewpoint from Brussels is that the EaP has achieved a lot (Wiśniewski 2013). The regular meetings between heads of state, government officials, parliamentarians, civil society and business representatives provide the broadest engagement possible and opportunities to understand each other's cultures. This is further supported by the successful visa liberalisation framework that enables citizens of EaP countries to visit the EU without facing too many administrative obstacles. The annual reports the European Commission produces on the progress made by the EaP countries provide a good record of the achievements on both sides, and serve a useful purpose as a basis for improving cooperation and focus.
But the EaP is not perfect. While both sides produce many initiatives, implementation often lags behind. Improvements to democracy and human rights have been less visible. Democracy promotion is difficult, as the Eastern European political systems and parties are based on personalities and elites who want to maintain their power. Furthermore, little to no progress (or effort for that matter) has been made towards the peaceful settlement of the separatist regions, mostly frozen conflicts that flare up every now and then, destabilising the region. Russia plays an important role in maintaining this status quo by politically, economically and militarily pressuring the weaker countries, mostly Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. Therefore, the EaP initiative has been able to achieve more in some of the countries than in others.
Moldova has become the front runner of the EaP, due to an EU-friendly government and political will from Brussels, which boosted EU financial aid and economic reforms that have stabilised the economy and improved the business climate. However, Moldova has problems with corruption, encounters pressure from Russia and has a fragile pro-European coalition government. Close behind is Georgia, which is ready to sign the DCFTA in the summer of 2014. The peaceful transition of power after the 2013 elections did not interfere with successfully concluding the 17 month-long negotiations. However, two countries have not been able to withstand Russia's military and economic pressure, respectively, and have stopped their AA and DCFTA negotiations with the EU. Armenia had worked hard to meet the criteria to initial the DCFTA at the Vilnius Summit, but President Sargsyan had to accept Russia's offer of membership of the Eurasian Customs Union (CU), automatically incompatible with the DCFTA, in order to secure itself from a (Russian-stimulated) escalation with Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych voluntarily accepted Russia's offer of a profitable gas deal. Nevertheless, since Yanukovych has been removed from power, the interim government has signed the political section of the AA, thereby progressing on the European path. So far Azerbaijan and Belarus have not shown interest in investing in closer relations with the EU. Due to its million-dollar oil and gas revenue, Azerbaijan can afford to take an independent course, while Belarus's unwillingness to make any political concessions towards democracy keeps the EU sanctions in place and prevents further progress.
No matter how useful it could be on a certain level, the EaP is not sufficient for what the EU is trying to achieve in terms of prosperity, stability and security. With the efforts made by Moldova, the progress Georgia has made and Ukraine's recent signing, the EaP may have been given a new lease of life. But will it be enough for the future? The speed of the hefty reforms the countries are making may have placed a heavy burden on their citizens. To pacify them, it may be necessary to offer something more: prospects for after the reforms.
How feasible and desirable is EU membership?
Only recently, the European Parliament (2014) adopted a resolution on Ukraine stating that the AA ‘does not constitute the final goal in EU–Ukraine cooperation’ and reiterating Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty, that ‘all European States, including Ukraine, … may apply to become a member of the Union, provided that it adheres to the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and ensures the rule of law’, as stated in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. The enthusiasm of the Members of the European Parliament to offer membership is currently high, but will this remain the case after the 2014 European elections when a new parliament is formed?
Furthermore, states that apply should fulfil the Copenhagen criteria of guaranteeing that the state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU (European Council 1993). The EU enlargement policy also demands that applicants are ‘complying with all the EU's standards and rules, having the consent of the EU institutions and EU member states, having the consent of their citizens–-as expressed through approval in their national parliament or by referendum’ (European Commission 2013). The European Commission has always been the driver behind enlargement policy. In his speech on the tenth anniversary of the accession of the Czech Republic, Štefan Füle (2014), Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, confirmed that he has made it his mandate's priority ‘to further strengthen the credibility of the enlargement process’. Foremost, he was referring to the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, for whom it would be unfair if the EaP countries were to receive priority over their accession processes. But Füle (2014) added that the EaP's final objective should be more closely reflected upon and that the EU should match the ambitions of those EaP countries that aspire to EU membership. The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries proves the success of enlargement. It has created stability for the old as well as new EU member states and has helped democracy and prosperity in the acceding countries from the former Soviet bloc.
Additionally, the enlargement policy states that the EU should have the capacity to integrate new members. The largest problem here will be within the member states. Institutional management by the 28 member states is already challenging and after enlargement it will not become easier to reach a consensus among more members. Larger member states are afraid that new member states will burden the EU budget, while some poorer member states fear that they will have to compete for structural funds (Debating Europe n.d.). But they also recognise that the EU's strength lies in its diversity and its size: when more countries adhere to European values and when more countries back Europe's vision, the EU's voice can play a more important role on the world stage. Many opponents will use the financial and economic crisis as a reason to hold off membership for the EaP, or any other candidate country. The crisis has taught the tough lesson that the EU needs anticipative thinking which should not per se exclude enlargement.
Meeting the accession criteria
Just like any other member state before them, candidate countries would need to comply with all the criteria of EU membership. When briefly analysing whether Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova–-the front runners of the EaP in terms of democracy and market economy reforms–-could meet these criteria, the results are mixed. 1 The values of Article 2 have not been consistently respected since these states’ independence. All three though, have a market-based economy while still encountering problems in terms of high state debt, structural reforms and unemployment.
Armenia is not considered here as it has excluded itself from future membership by becoming a member of the CU.
The European External Action Service produces annual progress reports through the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the EaP platforms also regularly provide progress reports for each of the thematic areas. These could be a tool to evaluate the advancement of the partner countries and to anticipate the duration of the progress still needed. On the one hand, candidate countries would have to meet the criteria and implement the acquis communautaire. If these countries meet the set conditions, legally there seems to be no obstacle to the EaP countries applying. It is unlikely that the EaP countries would meet the criteria any time soon–-too many hurdles need to be overcome first–-but there are no legal restrictions on offering EU membership or on applying. On the other hand, exceptions have been made for some EU member states (for example Greece and Romania) by accepting them before they were completely ready. Could these precedents speed up the accession process for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova? Most likely not: it is more probable that the member states would be wary and less politically willing to fast-track accession. Furthermore, it is no more than reasonable to demand that the requirements are completely fulfilled as set out by the European Commission.
Alternatives to membership: ever closer partnerships
Offering the prospect of membership may not be possible due to the lack of political will on the EU side, and in any case accession would be a long-term project. The immediate priority is to stabilise the situation in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to gain control of the country by supporting pro-Russian separatists. Other options for supporting a closer relationship between the EaP countries and the EU should be considered. The following sets forth three scenarios on how the region could be stabilised militarily, economically and politically.
Another economic free trade area
If the partner countries could grow faster economically, thereby more closely meeting EU economic regulations and standards, and become more economically independent from Russia, the region would be much more secure.
The DCFTA is already a good tool for achieving this as it offers more than a normal free trade agreement. It ‘concerns the liberalisation of trade in all areas, by lifting customs barriers and trade quotas, but also the harmonisation of the partner countries’ trade-related legislation with EU standards and the acquis communautaire’ (EaP Community 2014). However, the downside of the DCFTA is that each EaP country negotiates its own deal with the EU–-thus not promoting regional integration. Also, a precondition for a DCFTA is WTO membership, which excludes Belarus and Azerbaijan from negotiating a DFCTA with the EU. Armenia is excluded from further negotiating for a DCFTA as it is a member of the CU, which maintains different values and standards. This leaves only Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova with the chance to access the EU market and align their economies with that of the EU.
An alternative to create faster economic growth and a closer economic partnership with the EU would be to completely open up the EU market to the EaP countries, as it has done with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. As part of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) these countries participate in the EU's internal market. Should the EaP countries be offered this option–-as they would not be part of the EU they would keep their national-level law-making–-the standards of their export products would still need to conform to EU norms. Also, this situation would not include them in the decision-making process; thereby they would merely be offered a take-it-or-leave-it framework according to European standards. However, each country would be able to further negotiate a bilateral deal tailored to their country's needs. For the EaP this would be a great way to experience an economy based on free market principles rather than one ruled by the state or oligarchs. This would increase the level of standards for products, and bring about closer relations with the EU. Like the members of the EFTA, they would have to organise themselves and cooperate with each other; this supports the EaP's goal of achieving integration among the EaP countries. This alternative offers more than what is on the table now as it would give them a chance to be closer to the EU and integrate regionally.
‘Communautaire thinking’ and semi-political participation
Very generally speaking, the political systems of the EaP countries, including those of pro-European Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, are very different from Western European political systems. Through party-to-party cooperation the political parties in EaP countries are able to experience some Western practices regarding democratic procedures and transparency. However, existing cooperation is not enough to achieve transformation of the parties or of the political thinking as such. Eastern European parties are dependent on charismatic personalities: a strong leader who rules the party in a semi-authoritarian way. Without such a leader the party is weak and has no direction. Classic democratic party training is helpful, and provided by many expert nongovernmental organisations. However, the environment these parties operate in does not provide them with the opportunity to work transparently, nor to compromise on decisions. One way to gain experience of ‘communautaire thinking’ (thinking on the basis of the common good, consensus building and compromise) would be to enable the EaP countries to have access to the European consensus-building decision-making procedure. For example, EaP ministers could attend the meetings of the Council of the European Union as guests in order to experience the European administrative and debating culture. Besides seeing these values put into practice, this would also provide an opportunity for the EU and the EaP representatives to exchange thoughts on modern decision-making procedures.
The EU improving security in cooperation with NATO
Furthermore, the EU could offer more security to the region, something that is marginal to non-existent right now. Russia's freedom to exert influence over the region as it pleases is damaging to each of the countries’ economic prospects, as well as politically destabilising the European neighbourhood. If not for the EaP countries, it is in the EU's own interest to improve security in the region and the EU cannot afford to leave this matter unresolved. As an economic and political project, the EU cannot provide military support to any of the frozen conflicts in the region, but nor has it promised it would. The EU's past efforts to create its own army and defence agency have not yet resulted in a successful strategy. For the EU, NATO is still its military department, but NATO is also part of the transatlantic relationship with the US. Extension of NATO membership is therefore not a decision that the EU can take alone.
This may well be an advantage for the EaP countries who seek NATO membership: so far the US has been in favour of extending NATO membership, at least to Georgia and Ukraine. For these two countries NATO membership could have created very different outcomes for the 2008 Russian–Georgian war and the Crimean crisis. However, Germany and France blocked these countries’ applications at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, concerned by Russia's anger (BBC News 2008). Russia threatened it would be ‘a huge mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security’ (BBC News 2008).
Improving relations with NATO and NATO accession would provide such security. This move would most likely enrage Russia, and NATO accession would incite new tension between the West and Russia. Russia would feel more threatened by NATO membership for the EaP countries than the prospect of EU membership, which focuses on social and political issues. The Crimean crisis and the 2008 Russian–Georgian war, however, demonstrate the need for regional security provided by third parties, and this would protect a country in the region against Russian aggression. It is almost unthinkable that Russia would attack a NATO ally, or meddle with a NATO member's internal affairs. Therefore, accepting Ukraine and Georgia now as NATO members would possibly not be such bad timing.
Conclusion
Although the Eastern Partnership is a solid tool for achieving economic progress and providing a platform for interaction, it does not present enough to accomplish a real partnership with strong political transformation and fast economic reform.
In order to keep the EaP countries engaged and committed to European values and principles, and to ensure prosperity, stability and security both for them and itself, the EU should offer prospects for the future; thus the EaP's politicians could then offer their citizens some assurances regarding the period after the reforms. Whether any of the three proposed scenarios is feasible is a question that is difficult to predict in such a volatile region. It is intended to feed the debate and encourage the EU to look into options other than the standard ones. If the EU wants the EaP countries to come closer and become economically and politically viable states, it should make much more of an effort than today's Eastern Partnership.
Footnotes