Russian Nationalism: Between Imperialism and Xenophobia

Abstract

The two major subcurrents within nationalism in Russia are imperial nationalism, which rests on the notion of Russia's political and cultural dominance in the region, and xenophobic nationalism, based on ethnic criteria and directed against immigrants. The Russian government uses both trends: by carrying out imperial nationalist policies (crowned recently with the annexation of Crimea) and by ‘managing’ xenophobic sentiments–-channelling social discontent and directing it against immigrants, but preventing any nationalist force from gaining influence by using the same agenda. Both trends are also represented in Russian society, which has welcomed Russia's annexation of Crimea, on one hand, and shows growing resentment towards non-Slavic immigrants, on the other. In the coming years, an accumulation of economic problems and decreasingly efficient state management are likely to boost social tensions in Russia. In this situation, the government will likely try to redirect this discontent against its ‘eternal’ opponents–-the West, Russia's internal opposition, oligarchs and immigrants–-further fuelling nationalist sentiments in Russian society.

Introduction

The text is devoted to different subcurrents in Russian nationalism, whose actors are the government, nationalist activists and society, and whose targets are migrants and the post-Soviet area, perceived by Russia as a zone of privileged interests. The text opens with a section presenting major subcurrents in current Russian nationalism, their background and assumptions. The second section describes popular sentiments and social support for various subcurrents of nationalism. Section three presents the dilemma between widespread anti-immigrant sentiments and the actual needs of the Russian economy. The text closes with the prospects of Russian nationalism in the context of economic, political and social developments.

Faces of Russian nationalism

In the case of Russia, the attempt to define nationalism and its subcurrents, as well as many other phenomena in Russian political life, requires abandoning scientific purity and accepting that categories are flexible and that the inclination exists to merge different (or even disparate) phenomena into peculiar hybrids. The two main currents of nationalism in Russia are ‘pure’ xenophobic/defensive nationalism, based on ethnic criteria and contained within the borders of a nation state, and imperial/expansionist nationalism, which extends beyond ethnic categories and is based on the notion of Russia's political and cultural dominance in the region. Elements of these two subcurrents are often combined, especially by the government. Many minor trends also exist, such as liberal nationalism, which advocates the creation of a liberal nation state based on, inter alia, the Western and Orthodox fundamentalist models (Popescu 2012, Gudkov 2013b).

The dominant stream of present-day Russian nationalism is imperial nationalism, which has been developing in reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is fuelled by a post-imperial complex that has a compensatory nature: national pride is based on the glory of Russia's imperial past (the collapse of which brought genuine trauma) which is supposed to compensate for the misery of the average citizen's condition and the nation's inferiority complex with regard to the West. Imperial nationalism accepts the state's multi-ethnic nature, albeit under Russian cultural and linguistic dominance. It exceeds national borders and stretches to Russia's near abroad, considered Russia's sphere of cultural, linguistic and political influence. It is reminiscent of pan-Slavism, including the notion of the cultural closeness of Slavs, and refers to the Russian identity from the time of the Russian empire, when the all-Russian nation comprised the Great Russians, White Russians (today's Belarusians) and Little Russians (Ukrainians). Its current manifestations are the post-Soviet reintegration project–-the Eurasian Union–-and a (more vague) concept of the ‘Russian world’, Russkiy Mir, understood as a multinational Russian-speaking community that identifies with Russian culture and Orthodox faith (Menkiszak 2014). It has recently been combined with the ‘conservative project’: offering Russian ‘conservative values’ (Orthodox values, traditional family model, etc.) as opposed to ‘Western moral decay’.

Imperial nationalism sees as its opponents not immigrants representing culturally different nations, but Western political entities that are geopolitically as well as culturally different and offer alternative values and models of development–-first and foremost the US and the EU. These two are perceived as aggressive players who seek to impose their standards in the post-Soviet area (as they did in Central Europe, once part of the socialist camp) and undermine Russia's influence there.

The impact of imperial nationalism soared after Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 under the banner of the reunification of the Russian nation and historic Russian territories. The case of Crimea and the ongoing struggle for Ukraine proves that Moscow is determined to defend its hegemonic position in the Russian-speaking world using all means possible. Imperial nationalism is represented at the highest level of the Russian ruling elite, starting with President Putin. Strikingly, after the annexation of Crimea, not only did public sentiment shift markedly towards the imperial idea, but there was a similar development among xenophobic nationalist activists, who used to focus on anti-immigrant activities. One such group, the 11 December Movement (whose name refers to anti-immigrant riots in Moscow's Manezh Square in 2010), now expresses its support for the idea of the reunification of Ukraine with the ‘Russian motherland’. Thus, Russian radical nationalists have subscribed to the Kremlin's imperial policy led by Putin, whom, only months earlier, they had harshly criticised for allegedly pro-migrant policies. As Lev Gudkov (2014) points out, whenever Russians speak of collective values and national identity, they inevitably switch to great-empire rhetoric with all its attendant consequences.

Another major current is ethnic/xenophobic nationalism that focuses on ethnic, national, cultural and religious criteria. It bases national identity on what it takes to be Orthodox Christian values, Russian national culture and traditions, and the Russian language, all of which are perceived as jeopardised by an influx of non-Russian/non-Slavic populations with their ‘alien’ influences, ‘defiant’ behaviour and unwillingness to adapt (Kholmogorov 2012). Even though these sentiments are widespread in Russian society, as the next section will show, they are not represented on the level of major parliamentary parties and the official political scene. On the other hand, moderate xenophobic principles are evident in the programmes and the rhetoric of many parties, organisations and politicians. They were used extensively in the Moscow mayoral election campaign in 2013 by most candidates, including Kremlin candidate Sergey Sobyanin. Despite a lack of official political representation, a great number of social organisations and several minor political parties openly advocate nationalist and xenophobic views. In the past these radical nationalist groups were infiltrated and controlled by the state, but with the influx of a young generation of radical activists, the groups have begun to turn against the government, which they hold responsible for the ‘invasion’ of immigrants. Their radicalisation is additionally fuelled by the fact that the government is banning some popular nationalist movements, refusing to register radical nationalist parties and launching criminal proceedings against radical right-wing activists.

Within ethnic nationalism there are also moderate currents that merge a nationalist agenda with liberal and democratic ideas. The best-known example is Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption activist and politician, who wants to restrict uncontrolled immigration to Russia and curb corruption in immigration matters. The face of what is often called ‘enlightened nationalism’, which is gaining momentum, is Egor Prosvirnin. The creator of the popular Sputnik & Pogrom portal, he is famous for his quasi-philosophical treatises that reflect the agenda of young Russian nationalists. Interestingly, there is significant dissent among moderate nationalists on key issues such as the annexation of Crimea: Navalny has condemned Moscow's strategy and argued for both Russia and Ukraine to join the EU, whereas Prosvirnin has ardently supported the Kremlin.

To make matters even more complex, Russia also must contend with the nationalisms of national minorities, related to both their cultural distinctiveness and Islamic faith. The most outspoken of them were at one time the Tatar and Chechen national movements, which voiced separatist demands in the 1990s. Today, under Putin's policy of centralisation, they have become more subdued and covert, but they still exist and are waiting for an opportunity to return to their agenda.

Open, outspoken ethnic nationalism is confronted head-on by the Kremlin, which fears that it might get out of hand, just as it fears any uncontrolled social activity, nationalist or democratic. The government opposes the existence of influential nationalist parties or organisations, which are seen as possible rivals to pro-Kremlin parties. At the same time, the Kremlin eagerly manipulates xenophobic sentiments, redirecting against immigrants what is actually social frustration with the state. Immigrants are identified as the root of all evil and accused of stealing jobs from native Russians, provoking conflict and increasing the level of violence (Gudkov 2013b). Politicians like to use labels such as ‘ethnic crime’ (Verkhovsky 2014).

Society: from passive xenophobia to outbreaks of violence

Even under the Soviet system, which advocated an ideology of internationalism and the peaceful coexistence of nations, nationalist and xenophobic sentiments existed, embodied by opposition to the West and by anti-Semitism. The collapse of the USSR brought an ideological void accompanied by severe economic problems; since then, nationalist sentiments have been on the rise, a reaction to the traumatic collapse of the USSR (compensatory, imperial nationalism) and a reaction to current economic difficulties (xenophobic sentiments against immigrants).

Xenophobia hit a peak in 2009, in the aftermath of the economic crisis that affected Russian living standards (Gudkov 2013a). Interestingly, the mood was also clearly directed against the government, generated by a sense of instability and insecurity, a lack of prospects, and disappointment with the government's unfulfilled promises. However, prompted by government manipulation of public opinion, the frustration was turned against ‘strangers’. Within the past two or three years, the level of anti-immigrant sentiment has grown significantly, proving, yet again, the effectiveness of state propaganda (the government controls major media) and society's suggestibility (Lenta.Ru 2014).

Public sentiment mostly turns against non-Slavic inhabitants of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as against domestic migrants, people from the North Caucasus republics who have flooded large Russian cities (predominantly in the European section) in search of work and opportunities. Russians perceive them as culturally different (many Russians were shocked by some Muslim religious practices, such as the ritual slaughter of animals in the streets), unwilling to adapt, defiant (especially Caucasians), engaged in organised crime and ‘spoiling’ the labour market.

According to the Levada Centre polling agency (Levada 2013), in late 2013, 66 % of Russians supported the idea of ‘Russia for Russians’; 41 % felt that way in 2012. The slogan ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus’ was backed by 71 % (62 % in 2011) (Volkov 2013). Sixty-nine per cent of Russian residents considered the presence of migrants in their region ‘excessive’, and 84 % opted for the introduction of a visa regime with South Caucasus and Central Asian states to reduce immigration. Russian citizens are convinced that the newcomers ‘increase crime rates’ (78 %), ‘take jobs from native Russians’ (67 %) and ‘destroy the Russian culture’ (46 %). One-third of Russians (34 %) are inclined to blame non-Russians for the ‘many misfortunes of our country’. The rise of anti-immigrant sentiments is particularly evident in Moscow, the place with the greatest concentration of migrants. Residents of the capital believe the influx of migrants to be Moscow's leading problem; this view was supported by 30 % in 2010 and rose to 55 % in 2013. Levada Centre Director Lev Grudkov puts it simply: ‘It's no longer shameful to say “Russia for Russians”’.

As widespread as they are, until recently these sentiments were predominantly passive, and could be described as moderate domestic xenophobia. Most Russians perceive radical nationalist or neo-Nazi groups as a threat to themselves rather than as defenders of a supportable cause. However, the year 2013 marked an upsurge of nationalist violence (Verkhovsky 2014): organised eruptions of xenophobic violence, attacks in the metro and on trains (such as raids on trains going to Central Asian states), and neo-Nazi or Cossack raids on the immigrants’ places of residence.

As mentioned above, the undercurrent of these attacks is growing social frustration with government policies and the efficiency of the state, and the accumulated discontent is detonated by resonant incidents. One recent case involved an anti-immigrant riot in the Moscow suburb of Birulyovo in October 2013, where a young man was killed by a member of the Azerbaijani diaspora. When these incidents occur, they are inflamed by the widespread Russian conviction that the police and other law enforcement bodies are corrupt (bribed by the diasporas) and will do nothing to protect citizens.

After the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in March 2014, and aided by the impact of the Winter Olympics in Sochi, the xenophobic nationalism that has predominated in Russia for years was suddenly outshone by an upsurge of imperial feeling. National pride soared, and so did support for President Putin, who was perceived as the author of the annexation. According to the VTSIOM polling agency, 91 % of Russians supported Russia's policy, and Putin's positive ratings soared to 82 % from about 60 % at the beginning of the year (VTSIOM 2014).

These feelings may be temporary, though, as it is Russian citizens who will bear the (extensive) costs of the Crimea operation. The annexation of Crimea will be a significant economic burden for the Russian budget, and Moscow's aggressive policies decrease its credibility on the international financial markets. This could well exacerbate economic difficulties that have already been forecast (Russia is likely to have zero economic growth in 2014) and contribute to cuts in social spending. That, in turn, could fuel social discontent.

The dilemma: xenophobia versus economic needs

Widespread xenophobia runs counter to the needs of the Russian economy. It is also in conflict with the state-fostered project of the Eurasian Union, wherein Russia is seeking to be an integrator of the post-Soviet region and is interested in tightening economic and social bonds with the Commonwealth of Independent States to keep them within its zone of influence. Finally, extensive immigration also reflects the veiled interests of the Russian elites, who benefit from a non-transparent system of migrant exploitation.

Demographic and economic trends in Russia have caused the extensive influx of immigrants to Russia; immigrants are a source of cheap labour and take the lowest paid jobs. Living standards in Russia are improving, especially in big cities, whereas the population is declining and ageing. According to a Gaidar Institute forecast made in 2007, the reduction of manpower on the Russian labour market was supposed to reach 1.3 million per year in 2010–14, and in Moscow it would reach 50,000–80,000 per year (Demoscope Weekly 2007). These pessimistic forecasts have been partly alleviated by a slight increase in the birth rate and a growing influx of migrants since 2008. Russia is now the main destination for labour immigrants from former Soviet states, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, but also Ukraine and Moldova, mostly because of Russia's higher living standards, immigrants’ command of Russian and a visa-free regime. The number of immigrants living in Russia in 2013 was estimated at more than 11 million people (similar assessments have been voiced by the United Nations and the Russian Federal Migration Service), with 40 % of the migration traffic concentrated in Moscow and neighbouring regions (UN 2013; Romodanovsky 2013).

Despite wielding anti-immigrant rhetoric, the Russian ruling elite is in fact a benefactor of the non-transparent system of exploiting both legal and illegal immigrants. Conducive to this is the deeply rooted corruption involving authorities at all levels and a lack of rule of law (migrants are practically devoid of their legal rights).

A popular example from Moscow is the situation of janitors, most of whom are migrants, predominantly Tajik. Most tenders for janitorial services are fictitious and are won by firms controlled by municipal officials. They hire migrants and pay them only a part of the salaries due. In addition, these companies provide bills for fictitious expenses, such as work equipment and clothes, whereas migrants often work and live in appalling conditions. Apart from that, police and other law enforcement agencies extort bribes from migrants, even legal ones, who are too intimidated to protest. It is widely believed that the profits from these dubious activities are divided among local authorities and the different state services responsible for this area.

Therefore, along with the needs of the labour market, corruption is one of the informal, albeit serious, arguments against reducing the number of immigrants entering Russia. Lack of effective legal protection for migrants and an extensive shadow zone make it possible for Russian officials of different levels to derive profits from the migrants’ work. Despite some anti-immigrant rhetoric, officials have not made serious efforts to reduce the number of immigrants. Quite the contrary, one of the recent laws passed in Russia (adopted by the parliament on 4 April 2014 and signed by the president on 20 April) are the amendments to the Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation which simplify the procedure of acquiring Russian citizenship by Russian-speaking citizens of post-Soviet states. This law has stirred discontent and prompted protests among nationalist groups and parties; it is perceived as encouragement for migrants to continue coming to Russia.

To manoeuvre between social resentment against migrants, Russia's economic needs and the profits of the elite, the Russian government has taken a number of measures that are meant to demonstrate its determination to put the situation with immigrants in order. It approves annual quotas for foreign workers (in 2013, the quotas totalled 1,745,000 people; 100,000 of them for Moscow). However, the reality of the situation often contradicts the legal framework. The head of the Federal Migration Service, Konstantin Romodanovsky, acknowledged in 2013 that the number of foreign nationals illegally employed in Russia amounted to 3.5 million (RIA Novosti 2013). The real number may be much higher: as mentioned, more than 11 million migrants live in Russia, most of whom are people of working age; the official quota covers only 16 % of them.

To demonstrate that it is determined to combat illegal migration, the government also inspires anti-immigrant campaigns, such as police raids in places of immigrant concentration and high-profile deportations of immigrants, which are broadcast on television. Top Russian politicians insist that migrants should respect Russian culture and adapt to Russian standards. President Putin did the same in his keynote article on national issues in January 2012 (Putin 2012).

Conclusion

The nature of Russian nationalism is intricate and complex. The Russian government combines imperialist, nationalist policies (crowned so far by the annexation of Crimea) with careful ‘management’ of anti-immigrant sentiments, channelling social discontent against immigrants but preventing any nationalist force from gaining influence by using the same tactic.

Also, different (and often disparate) sentiments within the society are closely intertwined, with public opinion being contradictory and fickle. At the moment imperialist sentiments predominate, which translates into growing support for the government, which drives the imperialist agenda. Equally widespread are xenophobic sentiments, and these often have an anti-government feel, as the ruling elites are held responsible for the influx of immigrants and are seen to benefit from it.

The future threatens to bring a number of negative developments. The costs of imperialist nationalism (the annexation of Crimea and the costly Winter Olympics among others) will soon be felt by the average Russian. The estimated cost of supporting the Crimean economy may total as much as $2.3 billion a year, not counting extensive investments in Crimea's infrastructure ( Newsru.com 2014); some experts have assessed the total scale of investments at as much as $82 billion (Pochinok 2014). As the government has already announced, funds will be redirected from other Russian regions, two-thirds of which already have budget deficits.

The accumulating systemic problems of the Russian economy and the decreasing efficiency of state management leave little doubt that Russia is facing rising social tension. In this situation, the government is likely to try to redirect the discontent against its eternal opponents–-the West, the Russian opposition (which has recently been called a ‘fifth column’ by President Putin), the oligarchs and immigrants. Thus, both major nationalist subcurrents, imperial nationalism and xenophobic nationalism, may be further fuelled.