A change of government and the future of EU-Georgia relations

Abstract

The decade of the Rose Revolution in Georgia has ended with the defeat of the United National Movement (UNM) in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2012 and 2013. With this, Georgia has gone through the first peaceful transfer of power as the result of democratic elections in its political history. As Georgia is about to sign Association and Free Trade Agreements with the EU, further consolidation of its democracy will be a decisive factor in making Georgia's European future irreversible. Following the change of government, the country has entered a new and important stage in the development of a modern democratic state. With this in mind, this article will review some of the challenges facing Georgia's democracy and identify the potential threats they pose to the future of EU-Georgia relations.

Introduction

The efforts preceding the birth of a modern democratic nation can be a messy sight for observers and extremely painful for those involved in the process–-the people of the emerging democracy. Georgia has not been an exception. Since regaining its independence in 1991, the country has gone through an armed coup d’état and civil and territorial wars, followed by an economic collapse and years of mismanagement and corruption. After the state was virtually destroyed by vested corrupt and criminal interests, the peaceful and democratic Rose Revolution of 2003 brought to power a political team of young reformers, who have succeeded in addressing the rampant corruption and rebuilding the state. Though often criticised for their failure to consolidate the democratic institutions, the most important legacy of the government of the Rose Revolutionaries was securing the necessary conditions for the peaceful transfer of power after a decade of their rule.

The parliamentary elections of October 2012 have ushered in a new era in Georgian history. The Georgian Dream Coalition (GDC), led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, defeated the United National Movement (UNM) and formed a new government, led by Ivanishvili as prime minister. The defeated party quickly conceded victory and Georgia has gone through a monumental change–-the first democratic and peaceful transfer of power in its history. The democratic transfer of power, a rare development in the post-Soviet world, has also been a welcome, if unexpected, development for the international community. Georgia seems to have accomplished an important precondition for moving forward on the road towards Euro–Atlantic integration, fulfilling the necessary democratic criteria.

In November 2013, the GDC candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili won the presidential elections with a comfortable margin, defeating his main rival, the UNM candidate David Bakradze. Following the presidential elections, Bidzina Ivanishvili resigned from his post and left behind a hand-picked successor, Irakli Garibashvili, to lead the government. Bearing in mind that the volatile domestic political scene in Georgia does not mandate early elections, the current governing coalition is set to lead the country until the parliamentary elections of 2016. As an important new chapter in Georgia's history begins and the GDC is set on a course to consolidate power, it is timely to assess what the future of democracy, and hence the prospects for Georgia–EU relations, looks like.

Politics driven by personalities rather than political parties

The GDC, hastily created a year before the 2012 parliamentary elections, brought together political actors with little in common. It includes parties such as The Industrialist Party and the Georgian Forum, with their considerable record of anti-Western rhetoric and strongly nationalistic, almost isolationist attitudes. At the same time, the GDC also has some committed pro-Western players, such as the Republican Party and Our Georgia-Free Democrats. In essence, the GDC was based on anti-Saakashvili unity. It lacks both a clear programme of action and an ideological platform.

Looking at the polling numbers for the individual parties of the Coalition just a year before the 2012 elections, it is clear that on their own, none of them was likely to pass the minimum threshold of votes necessary to win a seat in parliament. This leads us to conclude that, while the opportunity for a protest vote played a significant role in garnering support for the GDC, it was not a decisive factor. If casting a vote against the UNM was the only motivation for Georgian voters, they could have chosen to support one or another member party of the GDC on its own merits. As mentioned above, those parties offered something to the voters of every political taste: those who believe that Georgia's future should be in Europe, as well as those who think that the Free Trade Agreement with the EU will only destroy national industry and who prefer to look to Russia for potential markets. Yet, each one of them, taken individually, enjoyed only marginal support.

Therefore, it would be both fair and justified to assert that the defining factor in securing the victory of the GDC was the personality of Bidzina Ivanishvili. He was probably aware of this as, instead of giving tacit financial or political backing to the coalition, which is often the preferred way for oligarchs to influence politics, he decided to run for election himself. However, the fact that in these elections Georgian voters decided to place their trust in the personality of Bidzina Ivanishvili, rather than in a political party, makes it clear that political parties as such, an important attribute of a pluralistic democracy, are still very weak in Georgia.

It remains to be seen if the UNM, founded by former President Mikhail Saakashvili and now the strongest opposition party, can sustain itself without the strong personal leadership of a charismatic politician. While Saakashvili continues to be chair of the party, he has been living abroad since leaving his post and could possibly face prosecution if he chose to return to Georgia. The general secretary of the party, former Prime Minister Ivane Merabishvili, was sentenced to a lengthy prison term shortly after the presidential elections of 2013. The UNM does not lack political talent, but lacks internal democratic structures and has been run in a top-down management style. However, it seems to be going through an uneasy process of reinventing itself, not least by introducing democratic elements into its own structure. For example, the presidential candidate for the 2013 elections was chosen through primary elections, and the governing bodies of the party have been expanded to include more members of the party in order to create space for internal debate. Some supporters of the UNM feel that these changes have in fact paralysed the decision-making process in the party and will hinder its progress. Therefore it is too early to say whether these changes will make the UNM stronger as a party or, in contrast, result in its demise and break up.

The lack of democratic processes also seems to be an issue within the currently governing GDC. The election candidates for the posts of both president and prime minister were selected unilaterally by Ivanishvili. There has been no democratic procedure, primaries or otherwise, to decide who would be heading the government following Ivanishvili's departure. The leader of Our Georgia– Free Democrats, Irakli Alasania, a well-respected politician in the West who can take credit for giving the GDC legitimacy abroad, has, in fact, been ‘punished’ by demotion from the post of vice–prime minister for discussing his potential presidential candidacy within his own party.

European integration and political parties

There is an ongoing attempt among the political parties in Georgia to position themselves along the ideological lines of the main pan-European political parties. For several years the UNM has been an observer member of the European People's Party. The Republican Party of Georgia and Our Georgia–Free Democrats have developed a similar alliance with the European Liberals, while the GDC has nurtured a relationship with the European Socialists. This cooperation is a very welcome development and hopefully will help the Georgian political parties to learn from the European experience. Specifically they could benefit from learning how to develop democratic internal political structures and how to bring more clarity to their ideological framework. Hopefully this cooperation will be an important vehicle for strengthening the parties as political organisations that can survive without ‘mega-personalities’ such as Saakashvili or Ivanishvili. Stronger links between the Georgian political parties and their European counterparts is also important for strengthening EU–Georgia cooperation. It will help to develop important political relationships and strengthen the capacity of the country to position its interests in Europe. Closer associations between the political elites of Georgia and Europe, which such cooperation fosters, might ultimately play a very important part in Georgia's future in Europe.

Uninformed voters

The last elections have once again exposed the preference of Georgian voters for omnipotent leaders–-Ivanishvili's unimaginable wealth, as well as the legends about the scale of his philanthropic activities and his implicit promise to use his personal wealth for the benefit of all Georgians, has been a decisive factor in the choices made by Georgian voters. In a predominantly poor society, the lack of a middle class has made it possible to win the support of voters through ultra-populist pre-election promises, which have often verged on an attempt to buy votes. A good example of this is the ‘wish-list’ questionnaires circulated at the rallies organised by the GDC as part of its pre-election campaign, in which voters were invited to write down their dreams. Many Georgian voters filled them with their dreams of washing machines, cars, refrigerators and apartments. It seemed that a considerable number of voters were confusing the political leaders with fairies, exposing just how low the level of political and civic culture is amongst the population.

While Bidzina Ivanishvili warned from the outset of his debut on the political scene that he would leave politics after just one or two years, it seems that the overwhelming majority of Georgians assumed that this was not true. When he did resign from his post, the majority of GDC supporters believed that he should have stayed and now feel reassured by the assertion that he continues to make vital decisions concerning the future of the country from his informal position. In a demonstration of their strong trust in Ivanishvili's choices, Georgians elected his choice for the post of president, current President George Margvelashvili, who was largely unknown to the Georgian public prior to the elections. Ivanishvili's selection for the post of prime minister was also surprising. Rather than trusting one of the relatively experienced politicians from the coalition, Ivanishvili placed his trust in a political novice and close business associate, Irakli Garibashvili. This was also accepted by the GDC supporters, who clearly believe that Ivanishvili knows best. His choice of a close associate for the post of prime minister only proved to them that Ivanishvili continues to run the show. The fact that the majority of Georgians accept that their country can be governed from outside the realm of accountability given by public office is very worrying. This clearly demonstrates the lack of understanding of the democratic institutions among voters and also the lack of political culture.

In the context of Georgia's European future, it once again proves the need to mobilise substantial resources to increase the public's awareness of the expectations set for political leaders in a democracy. While even in developed democratic European countries voters are not averse to it, in developing and poor states, like Georgia, it seems that popular opinion can be even more easily manipulated by populist rhetoric which does not pretend to create even the slightest hint of a responsible party platform.

Constitutional model

Georgia has undergone another important change with the latest elections–-a change in its constitutional model of governance from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. Weathering the challenges posed by these important institutional changes will be an important stage in the consolidation of its democracy. The governance of the UNM was widely criticised for the absence of a strong parliamentary role–-with the UNM having a comfortable constitutional majority, it rushed desired legislation through the Parliament at lightning speed. Often this was important for the speedy reinforcement of reforms, which were vital on many fronts following the Rose Revolution. However, it also created ample opportunity to tamper with the system of checks and balances needed for an adequate legislative process and democratic government.

The new constitutional model, which was adopted under the UNM's rule, and has entered into force under its successor, presents an important opportunity to address this shortcoming, by increasing the powers of the Parliament vis-à-vis the executive branch. The fact that the GDC has not managed to garner a constitutional majority in this parliament is a welcome development for Georgian democracy. However there is confusion and a lack of coordination in the governing coalition with respect to the legislative agenda. A closer look at the ongoing political process clearly shows that the prime minister seems keen to concentrate the power in his own hands and further curtail the already-limited functions of the president. It is also clear that there is an internal power struggle occurring within the coalition to claim the credit for the reform initiatives. There are also proposals for further constitutional amendments. It is likely that the different players of the GDC will be pushing their own agendas through regarding the proposed changes. What kind of obstacles this will create, both for the consolidation of democracy, but also for the speedy enforcement of the reforms necessary for fulfilling the EU–Georgia agenda, is hard to say.

What one can assert with objectivity at this point is that clearly the new Georgian government does not have the same well-oiled machinery for getting reform initiatives through the legislative process as its predecessor. As Georgia moves forward on its path towards European integration it will require substantial support from the EU to address these problems. Considering the volume of legislative work that the Georgian Parliament must implement in order to secure harmonisation and approximation with the EU acquis, the legislative process has to run smoothly. The government needs to have better coordination in this regard and could also use assistance from the EU with this, as well as with reforming the state institutions and agencies in order to streamline their work with the new constitutional model.

Xenophobic and homophobic public attitudes, the role of the Georgian Church

One of the most unwelcome developments in the election campaign of the GDC was its pronounced xenophobic and homophobic rhetoric. The UNM government worked hard to develop the modern notion of citizenship, inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities. Unfortunately this trend has been reversed under the new government, and it has failed to prevent several instances of infringements of citizens’ religious rights in the regions of Georgia with substantial Muslim populations. Given the widespread homophobic attitudes in the country, gay rights is an issue that has always been controversial. How Georgia will rise to the challenge of adopting a law on non-discrimination, which will also apply to gay rights, remains to be seen. While the head of Georgia's Orthodox Church, Patriarch Ilia II has always been publicly very supportive of Georgia's European future, many representatives of the Georgian Church use strongly anti-Western rhetoric. It is safe to say that at least a considerable part of the Georgian Church subscribes to the conservative, Orthodox ideological base, which has been consciously cultivated by the current Russian leadership as an ideological counterweight to liberal Western traditions. Considering the enormous authority the Orthodox Church wields in Georgia, its position on the future of EU–Georgia relations will play a significant role in public opinion regarding Georgia's European future. It is important for the EU to work closely with the Georgian authorities, as well as civil society and the media, to develop an outreach programme that takes into consideration the enormous moral authority and public trust enjoyed by the Church.

As Russia is deploying its ‘soft power’ tools in order to rebuild ties with the former Soviet republics, it is important that the EU should find a way to reach out to the hearts and minds of Georgian citizens, retaining their support for a future with Europe. Russia's most recent aggression in Ukraine has derailed any progress it had made to rebuild its relationship with the neighbours. It has also destroyed the nonsensical foreign policy promise made by the current governing coalition in Georgia that through successful diplomacy it would be possible to convince Russia that Georgia's Euro–Atlantic aspirations are not directed against Russia. The West's reaction to Russian aggression in Georgia, as well as Ukraine, has also exposed its weaknesses vis-à-vis Russia. Russia is not likely to give up its dominion in the South Caucasus easily and Georgia will continue to be its main target.

EU–Georgia relations

As far as EU integration is concerned, the inheritance of a new Georgian government is excellent news. By the parliamentary elections of 2012, the negotiations with the EU on the future framework of cooperation had almost closed. The GDC has taken over where the UNM left off, has completed the negotiations on the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA), and is preparing to sign them in the summer of 2014.

Looking forward, however, the new government needs to retain strong public support for Georgia's future in the EU. While Georgians overwhelmingly support the European choice, it is important to ensure that they see, sooner rather than later, the benefits of closer political and economic cooperation with the EU. In this respect there are three areas which need to be highlighted: economic benefits, mobility and wide public outreach.

The economic benefits of the DCFTA for the Georgian population will not be delivered immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a clear and efficient plan for deploying the DCFTA as soon as possible. So far the governing coalition has failed to produce a vision that is relevant in this regard–-it seems to be consumed with both internal power struggles and a continuing campaign against the party it defeated in the elections, the UNM.

Conclusion

While the peaceful transfer of power has made it clear that Georgia has graduated to the next level of its democratic development, it has also exposed the immaturity of the country's democratic traditions and institutions. As Georgia signs the Association and Free Trade Agreements with the EU, it is important that the pro-Western political forces in Georgia, both in the new government and in the UNM, continue to work together to address these shortcomings. The EU needs to make support of further consolidation of democracy in Georgia the key priority area of assistance and cooperation. In order to demonstrate how closer Georgia–EU cooperation would benefit citizens, it is also important to ensure that an agreement on visa-free travel between Georgia and the EU is reached as soon as possible. If Georgian citizens find it impossible to travel to EU member states due to cumbersome visa restrictions, it will be difficult to convince them that EU–Georgia relations are advancing.

As the pressure from Russia is likely to increase in order to derail the advancement of Georgia's democratic and European future, the EU and pro-Western political players in Georgia must make sure that the fear of Russia and disappointment due to Europe's perceived weaknesses are not exploited to draw the support of Georgian citizens away from their Western future. This, in turn, requires all the shortcomings of the Georgian democracy, as described in this article, to be addressed.