Abstract
In 2009 Azerbaijan joined the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme, officially confirming its devotion to the once-preferred strategic foreign-policy course–-that of integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures. However, Azerbaijan's official interest in such integration has since waned, which is reflected in the country's near-last-place position in signing the EaP agreements. In 2014, of all the areas involved, Azerbaijan has so far only signed the visa facilitation and readmission agreements. On key interests only one appears to be mutual in practice–-that of energy security. Of all EaP countries, Azerbaijan appeared to be the most capable of resisting various Russian pressures by avoiding policies provoking its powerful northern neighbour, while at the same time balancing interests and playing a strategic role in the area of EU energy security. However, this political avoidance and balancing act has been reached at the expense of increasing deviation from its key strategic path and identity as laid down by the founders of the modern nation state of Azerbaijan, resulting in a change in the nature of relations with the EU.
Keywords
Introduction
Why Europe? For Azerbaijan and its citizens this question is almost existential. It is based on the very essence and foundation of the modern nation state, which took place within the common process of nation-state formation in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Haussmann architecture in central Baku, which was graciously adjusted to meet local aesthetic traditions and skilfully synthesises both oriental and western influences, is evidence of this. It was during the industrial capitalism of the second half of the nineteenth century, boosted by the oil economy and the wave of enlightenment on the Muslim periphery of the Russian Empire, that the deepest economic, social, political and cultural reforms took place. These completed the formation of the secular nation and the eventual formation of a republic based on liberal democratic values. Thus its Europeanness is, in effect, at the core of the very existence of Azerbaijan as a nation, which makes EU integration the only option for the survival of the state and its national identity. Integration with Russia or Iran is out of the question for historical and cultural reasons, as the modern nation-state concept has evolved in opposition to Russia's imperial identity and to a religious or ‘Iranian’ affiliation. Liberal freedoms, as the basis for the new state, were declared and promoted at all levels during the first Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.
There is also a realist logic behind Azerbaijan's firmly pro-Western position after the Cold War. More than 130 victims of 1990s Black January, when Baku was taken by Soviet troops on orders from Moscow, are buried in the most visible place in the city, the Alley of Martyrs. Furthermore, it is confidently believed that without Russia's direct support, Armenia would never have taken control of territory spreading far beyond the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous area. The participation of the Soviet 366th Motorised Infantry Regiment, located in Nagorno-Karabakh, in the bloodiest episode of the massacre–-in Khojaly on 26 March 1992–-has cemented the objective of moving out of Russia's influence for generations of Azerbaijani politicians. This also explains why so far no political forces with a pro-Russian orientation have developed in Azerbaijan. It is also understood that Russia used the conflict as a way to preserve its political control of the region.
Thus Azerbaijan, taking advantage of its powerful assets–-energy resources and a strategic location–-took the lead among other like-minded states united by security concerns (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova–-collectively ‘GUAM’) in the re-orientation of the region to promote their integration into European and Euro–Atlantic structures. GUAM was created, but has not become a viable organisation, as the countries appear to resolve their security issues with Russia not through coordinated efforts and a common strategy, but at the individual, bilateral level. Yet, the states have begun cooperation with both the EU and NATO while the West has received access to Caspian resources and the alternative supplies of oil and gas to their markets.
Does Azerbaijan really lack European aspirations?
Against the background of dramatic events in Ukraine and the earlier U-turn of both Ukraine and Armenia on the eve of the EaP Vilnius Summit, assessment of the EU aspirations of individual countries, as expressed at the official level, has proven to be unreliable. In fact, the reversal in Ukraine and Armenia of what had been considered successful negotiations on Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) has called into question the sustainability of the official intentions and aspirations in these post-Soviet states. The question is whether the cause is simply vulnerability vis-à-vis the pressure applied by their big neighbour or whether it is a much deeper reflection of the weakness of the institutions of power which determine the political identity of the state, the elites and the people.
One-man rule, which made making international bilateral deals in business and security easier, has now become an obstacle on the path to EU integration, as it has deprived society of the ability to contribute to the country's identity, reforms and aspirations. It has also led to corruption of the key institutions of power, which has undermined the very basis of the stability of the state and thus blocked the necessary reform process. In the case of Azerbaijan, the ‘firm and centralised hand’ of former President Heydar Aliyev was often praised behind the scenes by external observers as a valuable asset that allowed him to consolidate power, manoeuvre around the clashing interests of regional powers and run with independent policies. Contrary to the expectations of supporters of the ‘controlled transition’, this presidentialism, strengthened by abundant oil resources and coupled with a lack of popular control during the last decade, has consistently slowed down reforms and, consequently, the establishment of a ‘European’ political identity and the integration process. It is no accident that the new wave of political protests across the European part of the former Soviet Union aims to prioritise the replacement of the presidential form of governance with the parliamentary one. Political elites and civil society in Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine have been pushing for and have promoted constitutional changes that would significantly limit presidential powers in their countries.
In its analysis of ratings of six EaP states, the EU Integration Index (International Renaissance Foundation 2011), among other publications (Popescu 2013), includes the EU aspirations of the state as an important factor influencing the effectiveness of EU policies and progress in the integration process. On this indicator Azerbaijan is grouped with Armenia and Belarus because, if based on open official statements, the answer to European aspirations is simply ‘no’. This idea, however, should be approached with caution, as there is obvious hypocrisy on the side of the ruling elites, who have successfully integrated into European life. A significant number of Azerbaijani bureaucrats, even at the mid- or lower levels, enjoy their assets in Europe, some even commuting weekly between their houses in Europe and Baku. On the other hand, Azerbaijan's societal European aspirations were clearly demonstrated in 2006, although this did not reach the current level of crisis in Ukraine. The absence of the European Aspirations clause in Azerbaijan's European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan was immediately noted by civil society, which undertook a widespread public campaign, with the involvement of the opposition, media and leading public figures. As a result of the campaign, the European Aspirations clause was included in the text of the final draft of the national Action Plan.
There are a few reasons behind Baku's motivation to keep its distance from Europe. Two are clearly of a geopolitical nature. First, it is known in the region that expressing European aspirations, or taking specific, even intermediary but real, steps towards them will provoke Russia. This was especially clear on the eve of the Vilnius Summit in the cases of Ukraine and Armenia. Russia appeared to have a whole range of levers available to apply pressure to those states that were ready to sign Association Agreements with the EU.
The second reason for the weakening of the passion for EU integration is unrealised security expectations. Azerbaijan's leadership's contribution to the Western presence in the region has been decisive. Of the 15 states of the former Soviet Union, then President Elchibey was the first to get rid of all Soviet military bases, although at the expense of the state's power and part of its territory. In 1994 President Heydar Aliyev signed a contract with foreign oil companies, resisting Russia's ambitions in the energy area in this part of the Caspian, and actively promoted the alternative Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline route. Both of these factors created a solid basis for the region's re-orientation towards the West. However, on the top-priority security issue for the country–-the Karabakh conflict–-official EU support for the state's territorial integrity never reached the degree of that provided to Georgia, or most recently to Ukraine, although it later evolved into a more non-partisan stance. There is also a suspicion, based on the EU's policy towards Cyprus, and Turkish–Greek relations, that Europe's position will always be influenced by its historical and political ties with Armenians, and greater integration will not lead to a fair or non-biased resolution of the conflict.
Resource abundance and the EU conditionality principle
The rationalisation driven by the monopoly on oil resources held by the ruling elite is another reason behind the less integrative attitude.
There is a growing opinion that the ‘more for more’ principle has limited, if any, application to Azerbaijan. First, at its peak in 2011, the daily income from Azerbaijan's oil revenues was $55 million (Ibadoglu et al. 2013), which made EU aid rather an insufficient incentive for reform. The phenomenon of resource nationalism and the growing self-confidence of the Azerbaijani elite, especially after the major inflow of oil revenues began in 2005 via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, undermined both the drive for reform and, consequently, the passion to integrate.
An analysis of the budget policies reveals the increasing investment of oil revenues in the state's infrastructure projects, many of which have been conducted by the respective ministries or ministers (National Budget Group 2012), or are affiliated with their relatives and companies (Fatullayeva 2013). This has led to the strengthening of oligarchic state monopolies with strong vested interests in the status quo, which has created resistance to any integrationist move at the policy level. This is reflected in the still-ongoing 16-year-long process of negotiations on WTO accession, which is consequently preventing Azerbaijan from beginning DCFTA negotiations within the EaP. Baku's stance has become clearly less favourable to WTO accession during the last two years. President Ilham Aliyev has stated twice during this period that in the short term Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the organisation, explaining this by the need to protect local producers (Contact.az 2014). However, independent experts consider WTO entrance important because of the decline in oil production and have explained the official position because of the resistance of economic monopolies (Contact.az 2012).
On the other hand, the temptation to use the state's abundant resources to ensure international support has been increasingly strong. The lobbying activities of the government resulted in the failure to adopt Special Rapporteur German Parliamentary Deputy Christoph Strasser's report on political prisoners in Azerbaijan in January 2013 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) session. This circumstance was widely referred to as evidence of the absence of political prisoners in the country by several officials, including President Ilham Aliyev (NATO 2014). 1
The head of the Human Rights Committee of the Milli Majlis, Member of Parliament Rabiyat Aslanova, was quoted by the Turan agency on 13 February 2014, referring to the resolution of PACE. President Ilham Aliyev made reference to the PACE meeting in his press conference with Rasmussen as proof that there were no political prisoners in Azerbaijan (NATO 2014). Earlier, on 21 June 2013, at a joint press conference in Brussels with President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, President Aliyev stated that there were no political prisoners in Azerbaijan (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2013), which caused uproar among the country's civil society.
Resistance to EU criticism, rather than attempting to improve the situation and international perceptions, is yet further proof of the growing lack of political will among the ruling elite to reform and integrate into the EU. One should recall that the aggravation of relations with Germany on the eve of the Eurovision Song Contest in 2012 took place after critical coverage in the German media of the human rights situation in the country. The most recent example is the reaction of Azerbaijani officials to an EU statement expressing concern about the restrictive legal amendments to a number of laws which have made the activities of national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) much more difficult. Foreign Ministry spokesman Elman Abdullayev commented that Azerbaijan's legislation on NGOs is more democratic than in some EU states and called the critical statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Stefan Füle a manifestation of ‘bias and political pressure’ (Turan 2014). Moreover, in the aftermath of the presidential elections the authorities detained the chair of the leading NGO on election observation in the country and the coordinator of Working Group 1 on Human Rights Democracy and Good Governance of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Anar Mammadli. The Civil Society Forum issued a statement calling for the immediate release of Mammadli.
The European Parliament delegation of observers of the presidential elections in October 2013 refused to sign the critical preliminary opinion of the elections given by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which was followed by a letter from Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, denying the opinion of the European Parliament observers.
The government continued to contribute financially to international initiatives, such as NATO's operation in Afghanistan, to which Azerbaijan allocated a few million dollars. It also appeared that Azerbaijan was among the donors (along with Japan and the US) of the aid which Ashton proposed to give to Ukraine during its crisis; however Baku rejects knowledge of this.
According to independent sources (European Stability Initiative 2012), oil revenues have been generously used to buy the support of institutions and the personalities representing these institutions. Although it had become clear that the principle of conditionality did not work when applied to one particular country in the EaP, there were no signs of the incorporation of this, or other related issues, as a specific structural obstacle to democracy, in the programming papers of the EU. None of the strategy papers suggested adjusting this principle to suit the individual conditions of the EaP partner country so as to make the EU policies, primarily in promotion of democracy, more effective in Azerbaijan. However, in recent years a trend of increasing EU aid being given to non-state actors has been observed and, in 2013, Azerbaijan received the largest amount of aid, compared to the other EaP states, to support projects by NGOs.
Yet, in 2014, the perception of corruption spreading beyond the national borders to Europe is one of the most important factors in people's scepticism with regard to the EU's capacity to promote values and apathy in the expression of European aspirations.
From ‘partly free’ at the end of the 1990s to ‘not free’ since 2003…
The inflow of oil revenues and growing geostrategic importance of Azerbaijan has been accompanied by a worsening human rights record and situation with freedoms in the country. On some occasions, the government has succeeded in creating a façade for institutions, such as with the new law on political parties, which introduced public funding for them but in reality only strengthened the state's monopoly on power.
The political patronage which has built up with the help of abundant resources in the absence of the rule of law has caused social protests, both spontaneous and organised, which the government has dealt with in a very heavy-handed way, punishing the organisers, rather than the officials responsible. 2
In the Guba region the government only fired the head of the local executive power due to the protests, while in the case of the protests in Ismayilli in January 2013–-involving a few local citizens and two Baku-based activists, Ilgar Mammadov and Tofiq Yagublu–-the activists went on trial for inciting ‘mass disorder’. Ilgar Mammadov was sentenced to seven years, while Yagublu to five years of imprisonment.
According to Freedom House (2014), Azerbaijan's rating has fallen since 2003, as compared to the end of 1990s, from partly free to not free. Unjustified and politically motivated arrests and the harassment of journalists, political and civil activists, youth movement leaders, and bloggers are growing. According to various local estimates, by 2013 the number of political prisoners had reached 142 (Civic Solidarity 2013). NGOs have been facing increasing limitations on freedom of assembly, while political parties have been deprived of their offices. Critical newspapers, such as Azadlyg (‘Freedom’), are on the verge of closure due to the burden of enormous fines for defamation, while television channels are under the total control of the government. On several occasions in the past few years, legal amendments have been passed restricting NGOs’ activities, in addition to the limitations on basic freedoms becoming harsher.
The EU has come up with a few strong statements related to these violations but, as has already been mentioned, Baku has rejected these criticisms.
However, the fact that Azerbaijan is the EaP state with the highest number of political prisoners testifies not only to the degree of state pressure put on dissenters, but also to the degree of resistance and activism. Azerbaijan's civil society mobilises and campaigns against harassment and pressure on organisations, journalists, the opposition, and human rights’ defenders and activists. Many NGOs, as well as political parties and social movements, function under the complicated conditions of limited freedom of assembly and association. More than 1,000 NGOs are unable to become registered. Yet, recently, more than 90 NGOs signed a petition and participated in a campaign against the adoption of the reactionary legal amendments to the law on NGOs. Although, with minor changes, the president signed the amendments into law, civil society showed its capacity to unite despite state pressure. Similarly, the main opposition parties united in the National Council in the election year and produced a united candidate for the presidential election. While this election was conducted with even greater violations than the previous one, the opposition proved its capacity to consolidate their efforts and thus restore the confidence of the electorate. Azerbaijan's civil society is consistently among those of the EaP states that submits the highest number of applications to join the EaP Civil Society Forum.
… And from negotiating an Association Agreement in 2009 to the idea of a Strategic Modernisation Partnership in 2013
The growing demand for gas supplies and the discovery of abundant gas resources in Shahdeniz Phase Two in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea have significantly contributed to the growth of the country's geostrategic importance.
In reaction to Azerbaijan's prolonged and unproductive negotiations on an Association Agreement, the EU agreed to start negotiations on a Strategic Modernisation Partnership, in an attempt not to lose the important energy security player. For Azerbaijan, as President Aliyev put it, it is preferred, as a ‘higher than association level of relations’ with the EU (Abc.az 2014).
Azerbaijan has already signed an Energy Cooperation Agreement, in addition to the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan in 2006, which has committed it to strategic energy cooperation with the EU and confirms the special role of Azerbaijan in EU energy security. Among several projects competing for the rights to gas transportation from the Shahdeniz field to the European markets, Azerbaijan eventually opted not for the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline but for the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines. This decision reflected not only a combination of commercial and political factors, but also the greater confidence and ambitions of Azerbaijan as a state and its unwillingness to support purely political projects without visible benefits–-whether commercial or political–-for the country itself. By taking this decision Azerbaijan managed to stay committed to the EU Southern Gas Corridor, involving new European actors in the energy deal, such as Switzerland, Belgium and Germany, while not alienating Russia, and also preserving its own control over the pipeline through major stakes up to the Turkish borders.
Unlike negotiations on the Association Agreement with the other EaP states, negotiations with Azerbaijan have progressed slowly and, in 2013, information began to appear about negotiations on an EU Strategic Modernisation Partnership Agreement. As negotiations take place behind closed doors, there is little knowledge about the agreement among the expert community or the wider public. However, the move obviously shows a growing preference among the Azerbaijani elite to cooperate with, rather than integrate with, the EU. The Strategic Modernisation Partnership is reminiscent of a similar project between Russia and the EU, reflecting Azerbaijan's growing ambitions, as was made apparent in an interview with President Aliyev in Davos, in which he said that ‘Azerbaijan is a self-sufficient country, both in the sense of politics and economics’ and that ‘the very word Association is not quite acceptable to us’ (Abc.az 2014). On the EU side, the media had already reported Commissioner Füle's expression of the EU's firm dedication to the issues of human rights and democracy in its relationship with Azerbaijan, even if new agreement negotiations are launched (Abc.az 2013).
Every now and then some foreign observers privately express their doubts regarding Azerbaijan's European identity, as well as the degree of European aspiration among its population. This is primarily connected to their limited knowledge of the country and its historical European experience, and to its geographical distance from Europe. 3 This perception was most recently expressed by a high-level European diplomat (Astapenia 2013) at the EaP Civil Society Forum conference timed to coincide with the Vilnius Summit. During the discussion session the diplomat noted the EU's double standards regarding Belarus and Azerbaijan by pointing out the ‘undecided European identity of Azerbaijanis’ in contrast with that of Belarusians. In the absence of convincing arguments as to why one authoritarian regime was more European than the other, he appeared to be the conductor of a widespread perception regarding the degree of Europeanness of Azerbaijanis.
Western scepticism regarding the capacity of Muslims to develop European liberal values; recent calamitous experiences with multiculturalism, democracy and democratic elections leading to the greater expression of a Muslim identity in previously secular authoritarian states; and complicated EU relations with Turkey do not help things either.
Conclusion
During the last 150 years Azerbaijan has undergone a dramatic transition. It has gone from the republican parliamentarianism of the first democratic republic in the Muslim East in the 1900s to a dynastic autocracy in the 2000s. The latter, to a greater degree, is conditioned by the logic of the political economy of oil, combined with the bureaucratic legacy of the Soviet era and the strong interests of all the actors (Russia, the EU, the US and Turkey) who have invested in energy resources in order to preserve the political status quo, rather than resting on a solid societal/cultural basis.
The dynamic of the last few years in EU–Azerbaijan relations and the emergence of the idea of a Strategic Modernisation Partnership Agreement show a convergence of interests in energy security among the elites on both sides, which has been expressed through the trend of replacing an agenda of integration with mere cooperation. However, integration in the EU, aside from interests, is about political identity and values. This means that the elites based in Brussels and Baku might only continue to be able to define relations between the two in a short-term perspective. As the events in Ukraine have shown, sooner or later the people will have their say in this process. It is in the EU's interests that this is in the hands of societies that are open-minded and pro-European, and share its liberal values.
There are certain factors which could contribute to the speeding up of the country's integrationist policy. First, the signing of the visa facilitation agreement in 2013 in Vilnius and of the readmission agreement in 2014 are specific steps towards integration, which will ensure that the societies communicate more freely with each other and will reinforce the inter-political and intercultural influences. On the economic side, there is the decline in oil production, which will put pressure on Baku to reform, diversify its economy and join the WTO. In addition, there is the increasing pressure from geopolitics–-the improving relationship between the West and Iran, the growing threat and unpredictability of Russia, the political dynamic and its outcome in Turkey–-which will urge the EU to become a more active actor, utilising its values-based approach more consistently, as well as speeding up countries’ EU accessions. Twice during the twentieth century has Azerbaijani society demonstrated its capacity to build the basics of a democratic and liberal state–-in 1918–20 and in 1992–3. But, most importantly, despite the unfavourable objective conditions for democratic development of the ‘resource curse’, Azerbaijani society–-the opposition, NGOs and journalists–-has shown the capacity to resist the power of oil-fed patronage and of a repressive state and continues in its struggle for freedom and liberal values. The EU should not overlook this potential and should act before the next crisis situation unfolds.
Footnotes