Abstract
A revision of the Lisbon Treaty may not be on the current political agenda. But this does not diminish the responsibility of political actors and scholars to debate what a more democratic EU should look like and how it could be achieved in the future. Ideas on democratising the EU are usually based on the parliamentary model of government established in all Member States. Although the presidential approach has gained more support in the scientific literature recently, scholars have generally avoided discussing how such a system could be implemented. This article seeks to fill this gap by providing answers to the following questions: Which voting system should be used for the direct election of the Commission president? Who selects the members of the Commission? How will the portfolios be distributed? And should the offices of the Commission president and the president of the European Council be merged?
Debates about the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU are no longer limited to political and social scientists but rather have become commonplace among politicians as well. What seems still to be missing, however, is a willingness among European leaders to finally draw conclusions from this fact and to begin to counteract the further delegitimisation of the European integration project. This applies also—even particularly—to Germany. Since the EU nearly doubled its membership through the Eastern enlargement, the trend towards intergovernmentalism has been unmistakable (Ahrens et al. 2005). The Treaty of Lisbon has taken this into account by establishing, among other things, the office of a permanent president of the European Council, which is currently held by former Belgian premier Herman Van Rompuy. While German governments have favoured, at least officially, maintaining a balance between intergovernmental and supranational institutions, French governments have tended to equate deepening integration with government-level cooperation among states. During the euro bail outs, the leadership role was played by the Franco-German duet (‘Merkozy’), which was met neither with open arms nor with protest but, ultimately, with sober acceptance by the smaller EU states. This in turn has led to growing support for an intergovernmental approach in Germany as well.
Indicative of this new shift is not only the growth of a Eurosceptic wing in the Christian Social Union,
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but even more so the European political U-turn of former foreign minister Joschka Fischer. Though once an avid supporter of enhanced supranational democracy whose 2000 speech at Humboldt University helped trigger a wider debate on Europe's
The CSU is the Bavarian affiliate or sister party of the otherwise Germany-wide Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which has maintained a strongly pro-integration stance since its inception.
While Joschka Fischer has renounced his former standpoint and recommends a departure from any supranational model, Jürgen Habermas (2011, 73) continues to support the position that enhancing democracy at the supranational level is not only desirable but also possible. In contrast to the intergovernmental path, which has been taken for instance by Merkel and Sarkozy to resolve the debt crisis (and is now favoured by Fischer), Habermas posits a model of European federation which would commence with only a smaller circle of particularly integration-friendly Member States. According to him, the key to democratisation lies in building a transnational, European public space. Conducive and even imperative to these ends would be a change in patterns of behaviour, for instance on the part of the media, which report far too little at present on European issues and, when they do, what they do report is mostly filtered through national politics. At the same time, institutions would need to be constructed that would facilitate the Europeanisation of elections and representation. To do so, emphasises Habermas, we will need to put our imagination and creativity to work.
With that in mind, however, his own suggestions remain relatively conventional. Building on the notion of shared sovereignty in a union of citizens and states, he prescribes for the European legislature a symmetric, bicameral system. The only significant divergences from a ‘normal’ federal system would be the position of the Commission on the one hand, which is supposed to be responsible to and depend on both the Parliament and the Council, and, on the other, the continuation of the European Council as an overarching executive body, which Habermas apparently deems worth maintaining. Extremely vague, however, are the philosopher's proposals regarding the core institutional issue of democratisation, that is, how parliamentary and government elections should be linked. On this point he tends, like the majority of supporters of supranational democratisation, towards the parliamentary model most familiar to nearly all Europeans in their own national contexts. This is further suggested by his call to have the Commission responsible to the Parliament, as well as his demand for real transnational elections to the EP, which would have to coincide with a harmonisation of electoral systems and a ‘certain’ Europeanisation of the current party system.
Considerably more concrete are the proposals of European Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding of Luxembourg on further developing the EU as a parliamentary system. She has recently called for an institutional upgrade of the Commission, while its president should take over the parallel position of the president of the European Council (Reding 2012). The Lisbon Treaty as it stands, according to Reding, allows for such a constellation. This would correspond with the ‘double hat’ solution that was found for the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. At the same time, Reding suggests granting the EP the sole right to elect the Commission. The heads of state and government, in consequence, would be left out of the nomination process and the Commission would be responsible to the Parliament alone, as would be typical of a parliamentary system. 2 In return, the Commission president would need to be granted the power to dissolve the EP. Hence, the Commissioner envisions in effect a system of government based on the dualism of a governing majority versus an opposition.
Alternatively, the role carried out by the heads of state and government in the European Council could still be exercised and nevertheless be of a parliamentary nature if it were purely formal or ritual, as is quite common in parliamentary constitutional monarchies.
Whether this sort of model would actually work at EU level is doubtful. Given the fragmented multi-party structure of the EP, building a government coalition would in all likelihood turn out to be even more complicated than in the national parliamentary democracies with relatively comparable multi-party systems. The right to dissolve parliament in the hands of the Commission could not do much to change that. Furthermore, the antagonistic dualism of government and opposition that makes up the underlying logic of a parliamentary system requires organisationally and ideologically consolidated party groups; this of course would place enormous demands in the sense of Europeanising the current parties at EU level, which up to now have been rather loosely affiliated ‘families’ of national parties. Taking this into account, the formation of a ‘government’ based on a majority coalition of centre-right or centre-left parties seems practically out of the question. More feasibly and probably, the two largest party families in the EP—Christian Democrats/Conservatives and Social Democrats—would transform the already established cooperation into a formal grand coalition. Consequently, in an election citizens would only be able to choose which of the two parties would be the largest and thus could fill the office of Commission president. Compared with the current situation, this would constitute but a modest step forward.
It would make considerably more sense to give citizens the power to elect the Commission president directly. Doing so would mean a presidential rather than a parliamentary model of government. In such a system it would not be incumbent upon Parliament to form a governing coalition that installs the Commission and maintains it in office. Instead, the party groups could continue their coalition-building as before, but revert to ad hoc legislative coalitions that form on a vote-by-vote basis, which would also allow them to utilise their potential for power and influence in the legislative process (Hix et al. 2005). This power would necessarily diminish in a merger of the two branches, namely, a majority in the European Parliament and the Commission over an entire legislative period.
At first glance, the direct election of the Commission president would seem to be a more radical reform than investing that election in the European Parliament, as proposed by the supporters of the parliamentary model. On further inspection, however, it is evident that the direct-election reform model corresponds almost exactly to the fundamental structures of the European decision-making system and its separation-of-powers logic (Decker and Sonnicksen 2011). Its introduction would require neither the establishment of a power to dissolve Parliament, nor a reform of the vote of censure against the Commission, which currently requires a two-thirds majority in the EP. In the parliamentary model, the motion of censure—to be a true ‘vote of no confidence'—would need to be lowered to a regular majority, since the same majority that elects the government or the Commission president has to be able to remove it. Indeed, a directly elected Commission president would fit well with the current political system of the EU. Yet how such an election should take place is anything but simple to resolve.
Any reform will require readjustments of the current EU polity. This applies equally to the direct-election reform, which entails challenges with regard to the practical design of the presidential democratisation approach, to which even its supporters have only given moderate attention. One fairly significant question to be answered is whether the president should be elected in a one- or two-round procedure. A one-round election is the more efficient route in the sense that only one election takes place and it can be easily scheduled together with the parliamentary elections, creating, furthermore, an incentive for higher voter turnout. One major and fairly certain disadvantage is that—especially given the multi-party systems in Europe—the winner would receive only a simple majority or plurality of the votes, quite possibly even far below 50 %. A two-round procedure, involving a run-off election between the top two candidates should no one win an absolute majority in the first round, is by far the preferable option from a democratic standpoint. The disadvantage lies in the lower voter turnout that would most likely come from voters being asked to vote twice in European polls within a short period of time. If opting for an absolute majority requirement, it would be advisable to hold the first round simultaneously with the elections to the EP. These elections would benefit from the higher mobilisation effect of the direct election of the Commission president. A different option altogether could be to use a preferential or alternative voting system, 3 which would combine the advantages of both election formats, allowing for a vote in one round while practically ensuring that one candidate would receive an absolute majority.
In this voting system, which is used in Australia, for example, voters rank the candidates in order of preference. Unless one candidate gets more than 50 % of the votes cast, the candidates with the fewest votes are eliminated one by one and their votes transferred to each voter's next choice. This procedure is continued until one candidate has more votes than the others combined.
The next issue is nominations to the College of the Commission and selection of individual commissioners. One possibility would be to leave this entirely to the Commission president, which would further enhance the president's institutional position. This option is also consistent with a direct election although, for all intents and purposes, in practice the Commission president would continue to depend on proposals from the Member States. The necessity of collaborating with the Member States is due in large part to the current principle of equal Member State representation in the Commission or ‘one state, one vote’ (Staeglich 2007, 259), that is, one commissioner per EU country; were this to be continued, there would inevitably be difficulties with respect to manageability and efficiency in a union of 27 or more Member States. And, in fact, the nomination issue becomes even more difficult once the rotation rule takes effect and the number of commissioners is reduced to two-thirds of the number of Member States (i.e., 18) as of 2014. Consequently, four problems need to be resolved at the same time: How large is the Commission supposed and allowed to be? How can the most adequate Commission representation possible be guaranteed to all Member States? Who selects the commissioners? And who decides which commissioner does what?
With regard to the size of the Commission, a relatively good figure for a well-functioning body, as confirmed by organisation research, would be 15 members. In order to solve the problem of equal representation, each member of the Commission could be joined by an assistant or vice-commissioner. Minus the directly elected president, there would be a total of 28 (2 times 14) positions to be filled; no Member State would have to be left out. The thornier task is distributing the 14 commissioner positions. Since the larger Member States will hardly forgo their claims to a full seat in the Commission, there is bound to be political conflict. Resorting to a rotation method yet to be determined by the European Council could prove one way out of the dilemma. Another approach to avoiding such institutional disputes would be to have the Commission positions allocated, not on the basis of tedious negotiation, but rather through a ‘weighted lottery’, as proposed by Buchstein and Hein (2009). Weights would be apportioned to Member States by degressive proportionality, which is already the underlying principle for distributing seats in the EP; allocation based on this principle would result in a slight under-representation of large and a strong over-representation of small Member States. Adopting this in conjunction with the lottery procedure would mean that the larger Member States would have a high probability of being represented in the Commission. At the same time, however, the smaller countries would receive a fair chance at representation. And when they gain a spot, they could not simply be handed portfolios of lesser importance. In any case, whether large or small Member State, each country would be entitled at least to a position of either commissioner or the assisting role.
Despite adhering to the proportion rule, the Commission president still cannot nominate commissioners and their assistants or vice-commissioners. The Member States retain their right to nominate candidates. The procedure as it is organised today remains unsatisfactory for two basic reasons. First, it is practically impossible for the Commission president to reject a nominee; he or she has to essentially accept the candidates the Member States offer. The solution originally envisioned in the Constitutional Convention to allow the Commission president to choose among three recommended candidates (European Convention 2003, Art. I–26 (2)) would have been much more sensible. Furthermore, the power to nominate rests solely with the national governments. Consequently, the political party composition of the Commission tends to reflect more that of the Council than the EP. A directly elected Commission president should, however, have the mandate to select individuals for the Commission ‘cabinet’ who share the same or similar political goals.
Both problems could be settled by giving voters the right to elect directly their own national candidates for the Commission. This would not only provide an additional incentive to participate in European elections, the parties would probably also campaign for candidates of the same party from other countries. The procedure could take place as follows: each Member State votes for candidates, of which the top three would then be suggested to the Commission president as candidates for the Commission. National parties nominate candidates in coordination with their European party families. The election occurs at the same time as the EP elections. Now, after the lottery has been completed, determining which countries will be assigned a position of commissioner, the Commission president appoints the members of the Commission, the commissioners and their vice or junior commissioners, from among the pool of three elected persons per Member State. The president also has the discretion to decide on how policy responsibilities as well as the position of vice-president are allocated. While two-thirds of the candidates would ultimately come away empty-handed, as a result of this method the Commission president would have the leeway necessary to put together a Commission and still balance representation from individual Member States.
The increased legitimacy of the office of Commission president as a result of a direct election would shift the balance of power among the EU governing institutions—Council, Parliament, European Council and Commission—in favour of the latter. Still, this would by no means equal the transformation of the European Union into a majoritarian democracy, especially since even a directly elected head of the European executive could hardly govern against the will of the Parliament or the Member State governments. Yet, at the same time if the election of the Commission president is supposed to reflect a decision about the political direction of the Union, then the office needs to be endowed with ample authority to set the governing agenda. At present the Commission already possesses a sort of veto power as it can rescind at any time during the regular legislative process a proposal it initiated; that is, at least before the Council has passed a decision. In addition, the leadership role of the chief executive would be enhanced if the office were merged—as proposed by Viviane Reding—with the office of the permanent president of the European Council. Above all, though, in the medium or long term, the Union would need to have the scope and type of responsibilities that make an election between political alternatives possible in the first place. This means, for instance, providing the EU with a significantly higher budget as well as further communitarising foreign, security and immigration policies. In other words, overcoming the democratic deficit demands a transition from predominantly ‘negative’ to more ‘positive’ integration.
Deepening integration in this manner is possible even if not all Member States take part. A direct election could even contribute to binding the ‘in-’ and ‘out-groups’ more closely. When the Commission makes decisions pertaining exclusively to the eurozone, the political representatives and, indirectly, the voters from countries without the euro have a say. The supranational Commission differs thus from the intergovernmental logic of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, where differentiated integration is not just a political, but an institutional feature as well. In this respect, the European Parliament holds a median position. It remains an unresolved legal question as to whether Members of Parliament from non-euro countries would have the right to participate in votes pertaining strictly to the eurozone. In any case, they certainly should not be excluded from the parliamentary debates. Non-euro Member States could just as well be included with consultative powers, as recently called for by Poland, in the European Council and Council of Ministers.
Finally, there remains the question of likelihood and whether such reforms could be realised at all. Sceptics refer to the current situation in Europe, where the signs point more towards re-nationalisation, and populists critical of the EU are enjoying growing electoral support (Hartleb 2011). From their perspective Europe needs anything but another discussion on a new constitution. Admittedly, in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty's arduous birth, it seems nearly inconceivable that the heads of state and government would take on the effort of reopening the treaty revision process at any time in the near future. What applies to the governments, however, need not necessarily be the case for parties, the media or other civil society actors, either at the national or the European level. Only last November (2011), the German Christian Democrat Party (CDU), for instance, added the proposal for introducing direct elections into its own party platform. That puts it, at least on this issue, well ahead of the Social Democrat Party (SPD), which continues to orient itself towards the parliamentary path and prefers to redress the democratic deficit through national referendums on European politics. At any rate, political parties should not miss the opportunity to enter a contest of ideas on how to steer the future of the EU, its institutions and democratic quality. The next European elections in 2014 represent an excellent and necessary occasion for generating that discourse.