Abstract
Today, demographic change is an omnipresent subject in the European media. One of Europe's most distinguished demographers, Professor Josef Schmid of the University of Bamberg, made the following statement to describe the current population situation in Europe: ‘Demography is our destiny’. Schmid referred to four core challenges which European society and its political protagonists will have to confront in the next 25 years, namely:
Coping with the continuing effects of the birth deficit and decline in the birth rate;
The effects on and the social costs to European society as a result of the increase in life expectancy and obvious (over) ageing;
The internal and external migration pressures;
The need to remain an efficient and innovative industrial and economic location in the face of threatened labour shortage.
These four challenges are already causing scientists to speak of a ‘demographic century’. The development problems in the West and in the countries of the South cannot be understood without dealing with this demographic trend, to which a great many of them can be traced back.
At the same time that Europe is debating a supposed lack of children, the United Nations has once again had to make an upward correction in its prognosis for the growth of global population. Currently, 6.6 billion people live on the earth, and this is expected to increase to 9.2 billion in the year 2050–-with all of the corresponding negative consequences. The standard of living in the poorest countries will sink even further, while global problems such as environmental pollution and climate change will become increasingly acute.
A continent grows older
Europe in particular is confronted with demographic change: the average age of the European population is higher than in any other region of the world and is increasing every year. The population in the European Union is ageing by 2.5 months every year–-the equivalent of 2 years in 10 years. The segment of under 20-year-olds in the population will decrease even further, from more than 23 to 19%, whereas those over 60 will increase from 21 to 34%. At the same time, the average age across Europe will increase from approximately 39 years today to 45 in the year 2030.
If the current trends continue to develop in this manner, many European countries can expect to be faced with a genuine population decrease. In spite of migration, the population of Italy will decline from the current 58.2 million inhabitants to 52.8 million in 2050. A population decrease of 8 million, from 82.6 million today to 74.6 million in 2050, has been forecast for Germany [1]. Italy's population decrease began in the year 2000; it is predicted that Spain's will follow in 2013, with Greece in 2017, Austria in 2021, the EU-15 in 2022, Finland in 2025, Sweden in 2032 and Ireland in 2049. It is also possible to observe a decline in the birth rates in Central and Eastern Europe. The fertility rates in these countries have decreased even more markedly than in the rest of Europe. This trend started in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The decrease was particularly pronounced in Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic. The fertility rates are lowest in Poland and Slovakia, with an average of 1.24 and 1.25 children per woman, respectively. This means that without substantial immigration or a significant increase in the birth rate, these countries will experience a dramatic population decrease. Currently, each generation only reproduces itself at a rate of 60%, and the population will diminish in the long term. The increase in life expectancy can only slow down this process, not stop it.
These figures are clear proof that even under the most favourable conditions, Europe will become smaller as well as older. Even if the birth rates were to increase from 1.45 to 1.85 children per woman (the French level, throughout Europe) and there were to be net immigration amounting to 33 million from outside the EU-25, the population would decrease by 20 million. For the first time in more than one hundred years, there would be two million more deaths than births each year–-and that, without a war. Half of the population would be older than 50, the majority of the electorate almost 60 years of age. There would be more than twice as many over 65-year-olds as children and young people up to age 15.
The increase of poverty
Looking beyond the borders of the European continent offers no relief–-quite the contrary. Although there is positive population development in most African and Asian countries, they are unable to profit from it. In the 50 least-developed nations–-most of them in Africa, a few in Asia and only one, Haiti, in Latin America–-poverty is increasing, agricultural productivity is either stagnating or sinking, an insufficient number of jobs are being created in the industrial sector and the average time spent at school is decreasing to only three years. High birth rates and unemployment create an increase in the pressure to emigrate. An ever-increasing number of the few university graduates from the poorest countries are emigrating to Europe or the US, even though these well-trained people are urgently needed to assist in the development of their home countries. In order to promote economic growth and create jobs in developing countries, it will be necessary to make greater investments in their infrastructure and production and, at the same time, reduce their birth rates. In these countries, a high birth rate results in poverty and hunger for large portions of the population, whereas Europe is confronted with other problems as a result of demographic change.
Europe under double pressure
In 1900, both Belgium and the Philippines had seven million inhabitants; today Belgium has 50% more 10 million–-and the Philippines 11 times or 1,100% more–-namely a population of 76 million. In 2050, Belgium will still have only about 10 million inhabit-ants–-and that, thanks to massive immigration–-while the Philippines, despite mass emigration (approximately nine million people, or the total population of Belgium) will have approximately 127 million.
In 1950, the 25 nearby countries of the EU-25, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, had 164 million inhabitants compared with 350 million in the EU; that is, less than half. In 2000, the relationship had changed to 452 in the EU-25 versus 588 million–-an excess in the number of neighbours to the south and south-east for the first time. Even if we accept the most positive assumptions, the population of the EU-25 countries will sink by 21431 million in 2050, while that of North Africa and West Asia will develop in the opposite direction: the prognosis is for 1.26 billion inhabitants, three times as many as in the EU-25, and this on the assumption that the fertility rate will sink from 4.0 to 2.1 and an additional 12 million will emigrate. The surrounding countries will grow at six times the rate of the EU-25 and its percentage of the global population will sink from 13.8% in 1950 to 4.9% in the year 2050.
Therefore, Europe is doubly affected by demographic developments. On the one hand, the birth rate in Europe is sinking, and on the other, there is considerable migration pressure on Europe from abroad. When dealing with this demographic change, it is essential for Europe to set the following priorities:
Preservation of a way of life: maintaining the social standards and services that guarantee our life expectancy;
Preservation of democratic and social order: our cultural foundations (legal traditions, sovereignty of the people, the will of the people and its representation) and the national-state interpretation of Western liberty must be preserved and in no way allowed to drift towards universally cosmopolitan principles which could not be credibly anchored and guaranteed anywhere;
Recognition that the national and cultural integration of migration is not automatically fulfilled by social help: it is not immigration per se that burdens a society but the nonintegration of those who have immigrated, regardless of who is responsible for the lack of willingness or inability to integrate;
Recognition of the pressure for economic success resulting from social costs that, according to the demographic trends, can only become greater (due to ageing), and the necessary investments in education which must also be increased as a reaction to the diminishing number of young people–-it will be necessary to make use of their human capital in order to survive in the diffuse sphere of a global economy [3].
All of these changes have not only a temporal but also a spatial dimension: they are taking place in our municipalities and cities. In 2008, we are living in a period when intentionally or unintentionally, by either taking or neglecting to take action, important precedents are being set in connection with the changing European population. ‘Tempus fugit’–-time flies–-and we are hardly noticing. In 15 years, the consequences of this demographic upheaval will affect each individual European citizen in one way or the other–-and will become visible. Although subjects such as climate change and the fight against inflation are crucial, Europe must not neglect the demographic crisis it is facing and fail to seize the chances which still exist today. If neglected, this would force us at some time (and that, sooner rather than later) to answer questions which are both pressing and unpleasant. A considerable lead time for taking measures on those developments which are becoming apparent is needed. An ocean-going tanker steaming full-speed ahead that wants to make a 180° turn in a stormy sea requires several dozen miles for that manoeuvre. Europe must also plan today for the changes that will take place in the next decades.
Unlimited migration is undesirable
Immigration as compensation for an ageing population has been considered a political magic formula for decades. But this is only because the degree to which immigrants must be recruited in order to stop an implosion on the scale of that projected for the German population is unclear. The Population Section of the United Nations has calculated–-under the title of ‘Replacement Migration’–-how much immigration would be necessary to help countries like Germany and the entire EU get out of this demographic tight spot. The numbers are enormous: in order to maintain its population level at 81 million until 2050, Germany would need a migration surplus of 325,000–-meaning one million immigrants annually (with around 600,000 people leaving the country).
In order to maintain the current number (around 53 million) of employable people (those between 15 and 64) in Germany, a migration surplus of 460,000 would be necessary, meaning that a total of 25 million foreigners would have to be brought into the country before 2050. It has to be possible to integrate immigration quotas like these into the social and work environment: the labour market must be prepared to accommodate them and ideally, they should all be young, highly qualified and have at least two children. In reality, immigrants like this are difficult to find, putting an end to the dream of unlimited immigration as a solution to the problems–-and as a reserve army for industry–-for Europeans who are either unable or refuse to have children. The following premises for immigration should be observed:
Immigration should begin gradually, with a preliminary stage of attracting and employing experts. An immigration policy has to determine who should come from where and for what purpose, what is expected of the immigrants (personal characteristics) and what they can expect.
Policies that make having children more attractive cannot be put off, because their effects can only be seen after 15 or 20 years.
Work and motherhood should be made compatible and family service more highly valued; i.e., treated as being just as important as participation in the labour force between the ages of 20 and 65.
More births would justify less immigration but would require a campaign to increase the levels of education among the youth. Young people are tomorrow's human capital and must be educated. They must grow up in a spirit of creativity and innovation.
Changes in values as a cause for the reduction in the birth rate
Society must rid itself of its value conflicts concerning the family and children: the virtues of the individualised New Economy (flexibility, risk-taking, mobility) conflict with permanent relationships and bringing up children. The wish to have children takes second place to the next step on the ladder of success until, finally, having children cannot be realised. However, it is essential to consider the reasons why an ever-smaller number of families decide to have children before governments introduce birth subsidies.
The second demographic transition
Demographers have been talking about a ‘second demographic transition’, a fundamental change in Western societies’ values and behaviour, for a long time. The idea of self-realisation has assumed a central position while the family and children have lost their status. A lack of gender justice aggravates this climate, which is not conducive to reproduction. Women earn less and, in spite of their own employment, work twice (in Western Europe) or even three times as much (in Eastern Europe, including Austria) in the home as their male partners. When can they find time for children? However, it is not clear if, and by what percentage, greater gender equality would increase the birth rate.
Where should we begin? A society's system of values cannot be altered by a centrally directed policy. In order to upgrade the value of having children, a society must promote this on all levels–-in the media, the economy, organisations and the family.
Upgrading parenthood
A liberal pro-natal policy should be built on several approaches. First of all, it is important to investigate and fight the causes of the declining birth rate. A study conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), under the leadership of Christine Henry-Hutmacher and Michael Borchard, provides a good analysis of the problem [2]. As numerous studies have shown, birth rates have declined continuously since the introduction of the Pill–-and this, in spite of generous transfer payments to parents, the development of kindergartens and full-day care in the schools, in spite of wide-ranging political formulations of objectives which encourage individuals, both male and female, to become parents. For many years now, politicians have attempted in vain to counteract this development. Children's allowances, the development of all-day schooling and care centres were attempts to once again increase fertility rates. With the exception of France, these attempts have been rather unsuccessful in Europe. Therefore, these methods alone will not lead to a long term increase in the birth rate. That is why family expert Christine Henry-Hutmacher selects a different scientific approach: the status of parenthood. Henry-Hutmacher presents the thesis that a child-friendly environment can only develop if the status of parenthood is upgraded. It is really quite simple: without parents, a state cannot function and will have no future. The central question of the qualitatively and quantitatively conceived KAS study by Henry-Hutmacher and Borchard is this: how do parents feel today and what do they need? The study produced astonishing findings. Today, young people no longer feel that parenthood is, automatically and unquestionably, the desired and natural life model. Formerly, children were a ‘normal’ component in one's adult biography but in the first years of the new millennium, this is only one option among many other lifestyles and forms of partnership. Parenthood demands close ties and long term solidarity–-however, in an economy that demands flexibility and permanent availability from the individual, these values are often regarded as being old-fashioned and conservative. Today, the pressures of work and everyday life have led to parenthood being increasingly regarded as a restrictive and unrewarding living situation. This dispiriting finding revealed in the study can be explained by the following factors: changes in childhood, the great importance of the child's well-being, the discrepancy between the demands of being a parent and reality, as well as responsible parenthood as a guiding concept.
These factors play a role in parenthood being increasingly regarded as difficult to integrate into professional and everyday life–-almost as being an alien element. The result is that new sociological categories such as DINKs (double income, no kids) and singles are continuously increasing in number–-with the fatal consequences that Europeans are becoming increasingly unused to children and are losing their vitality and innovativeness. This is a painful thesis, but one that is absolutely necessary when giving a neutral depiction of the social status quo. It is neither politically correct smooth talk nor a demand for a return to the ‘normal’ family of the 1950s, but an accumulation of argument upon argument and explanation upon explanation that leads to the following diagnosis: in spite of generous state transfer payments and other measures, our labour society remains hostile towards children and parents. At the same time, parents from the lower levels of our society, as well as the broad middle class, are faced with enormous financial pressures when they decide to have children. Today, financial pressure means that a single salary is no longer sufficient to organise everyday life in a dignified and independent manner. Therefore, European societies urgently need a new social contract containing a redefinition of the position of families and their contribution to public interests, with the goal of providing parents with financial and non-material support.
Can demographic change be managed politically?
There is no doubt that a family friendly environment cannot be established merely through transfer payments. But what possibilities are there to intervene politically in demographic change? In the opinion of most demographers, the current age structure along with future developments in the three factors of fertility, mortality and migration will be decisive for the size and age structure of the future population. The demographers’ findings show that over the long term, fertility is the most important of the three factors. Changes in fertility not only have an effect on the number of children but also on the number of grandchildren. For this reason, relatively minor alterations in fertility can have a major influence on the size and age structure of a future population. Migration is the least certain of the three demographic components. The number of people who enter or leave a country can change rapidly as a result of political events or new legislation. Migration is, therefore, not a long term viable solution for dealing with the existing problems of ageing in a society. Scientists have proven that over the long term, massive migration has no significant influence on the ageing of the population (assuming that immigrants immediately adapt to European fertility rates) and can only have a short-term effect on the age structure of a society (a higher number of employed persons). An annual increase of one million immigrants would increase the total population in Western Europe by 13% (505 million); without migration it would decline by 3% (433 million). However, immigration would only lead to a reduction of 2.1 percentage points in the increasing numbers of those over 60 from 17.8 to 15.7%, as the immigrant population would also grow older and fall into the over-60 age group.
Fertility is, therefore, the only really effective component for influencing the demographic ageing of the population. However, the effect of governmental measures on fertility is questionable: only the GDR was successful, in 1976, in increasing fertility by around 20% through pro-natal measures. To a large extent, this could be traced back to the fact that having a child was the only possibility for young men and women to get an apartment of their own; the policy only functioned because a free housing market did not exist in the country. This also shows that demographic developments only appear to be precisely predictable, as the example of the US in recent decades makes clear. At the end of the 1930s, all calculations and prognoses assumed that there would be a decline in the US population after 1945. The birth rate sank by almost 50% in the years between 1925 and 1935, followed by a baby boom in the late 1940s. The birth rate doubled between 1947 and 1957, from 1.8 to 3.6 children per couple. The second American baby boom at the end of the 1980s provided a similar surprise. There is no explanation for the two baby booms. The American example shows that demography is only conditionally predictable and–- above all–-hardly controllable or manageable.
Before politicians attempt to find magic formulas and to make demographic development completely calculable, one should undertake a brief historical review to ascertain that the subject of demography has itself ‘boomed’ for the past one hundred years. Absolute birth figures were already sinking at the beginning of the 20th century. This collapse in the number of births led to a lively debate in the scientific community and was discussed as a live controversy by the public and in the media. A portion of the debate became radical and took the wrong track, leading to the pro-natal expansion policies of National Socialism.
The next cycle of interest began in 1972 in the of the Club of Rome milieu. This came in the aftermath of the first public interest in the consequences of the introduction of the Pill, which resulted in the annual number of births being lower than the number of deaths for the first time. The tone became increasingly alarmist until the end of the 1970s. As early as 1975, newspapers published reports with titles like ‘Are the Europeans Dying Out?’, and family and demographic measures were discussed in papers by political experts, with the intention of promoting an increase in the number of children. A third phase began in 2002 with an extremely controversial public discussion about demographic change. We are aware of many of the arguments and terrifying scenarios from the last two debates. However, the experience of more than 30 years of continuous low fertility and the understanding that generous government transfer payments cannot significantly increase birth rates is new. In the future, the increasing birth deficit will no longer balance immigration, as in the post-war years. In the past two decades the previously suppressed costs of integrating immigrants have become increasingly obvious and the dangers of immigration without an efficient planning strategy and a strong integration programme–-as we have seen in the emergence of a violence-prone sub-proletariat in the Parisian suburbs–- increasingly apparent.
The continuously increasing life expectancy of Europe's population is also new. Demographic ageing will, therefore, be more pronounced than expected in the past. Politicians are called upon to develop a moderate but resolute Europe-wide strategy for more children and a child-friendly Europe in order to finally end the Continent's demographic downward spiral and to sustainably assure Europe's competitiveness in the globalised economy of the twenty-first century. Demographic policy is not a qualitatively neutral matter. Financial assistance for families, instead of an increase in transfer payments, must be expanded. More children and a younger Europe will strengthen the innovative potential of our societies and guarantee the long term prosperity of our nations. Only young societies have the capability to develop and offer new products and processes which nobody else has and, therefore, cannot be sold cheaper. If Europe wants to remain an economic locomotive, political elites must understand that saying ‘yes’ to the child is a strategically decisive area and develop innovative concepts for more openness towards children.
In December 2007, the Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy of Sciences under Wolfgang Lutz organised an international conference entitled ‘Can Policies Enhance Fertility in Europe?’, with researchers from all over the EU, North America, Israel, Russia and Ukraine. The presentations showed clearly that there is a multiplicity of explanations for general trends and for the differentiation of development within the European continent. There will not be a simple answer for what is a very complex situation. An effective policy certainly must comprehend a whole spectrum of idealistic influences and structural factors. New orientations in politics, economics, social and cultural life will be necessary to influence family and demographic beliefs, values and behaviours, and to bridge the macro and the micro level.
Demographic research should be the sound basis for a broad and deep political discussion in order to establish a new social contract on the importance of children, families and the demographic development in Europe, and to provide the necessary structural hardware in order to enable individuals to live up to their ideals on family size and to match them with reality.
Footnotes