Abstract
The media's job is to report the daily news, and so decision makers are preoccupied by whatever the fait du jour happens to be. As I write these lines, the subprime meltdown and the credit crunch, the chaos in Zimbabwe and Kenya, worries about rising food and commodity prices, the sluggish American economy and protests about the Chinese Olympics dominate the news and thus the conversations in the corridors of power.
We politicians are particularly prone to this preoccupation. We have to react to public opinion, we have to forge compromises and we have to win elections. And we all know that while voters claim to care about the big, long-term issues, in practice they vote according to very short-term concerns. One gaffe, and a distinguished servant of the people sees her career cut short. One great speech, and the poll figures explode.
In the chaos of the everyday, it is all too easy for us to lose track of the major trends that affect hundreds of millions over longer time frames.
I have been privileged to be part of one of these major trends—the spread of democracy across the European continent. It has arguably been the most important trend for Europeans as a whole. Literally hundreds of millions have seen their lives improve as totalitarian systems crumbled. People have gained rights hitherto undreamt of to speak freely, to travel freely, to innovate freely and to vote freely.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall was like a stone thrown into a still pond. The ripples quickly spread out, and in one country after another communist dictatorships fell. For many Westerners, this process seems to have been an almost instantaneous one: few remember the exact sequence of events that started with the breaching of the Wall and seemingly ended with the break-up of the Soviet Union. With that event, the papers largely relegated the story to the inner pages and moved on.
Yet the ripples did not travel at the same speed everywhere. In countries like Estonia, the effect seemed almost instantaneous: the public perception of the country quickly changed from “a poor oppressed little colony of the Russian empire” to “a prosperous little Finland with cheaper booze”. In other countries, like Slovakia, the process was more tortuous, with an erratic detour via dangerous nationalism. In yet others, the ripples travelled much more slowly and at first led to chaos and bloodshed. Georgia is such a place.
In Georgia, the ripples of the Berlin Wall's collapse hit the country like a storm. The 1990s were a wasted decade, when Georgia was beset by terrible events. One civil war and two secessionist wars killed tens of thousands and caused hundreds of thousands more to flee for their lives, without food or water, across high, snowed-in mountain passes. Hundreds more died of exhaustion. The state almost did not survive these repeated shocks. Our economy collapsed; our political system became dominated by a small, corrupt and incompetent elite. As the new century dawned, few gave Georgia much of a chance.
Today, however, Westerners with experience of Eastern Europe who visit Tbilisi can be heard to say things like “Georgia reminds me of Estonia in 1991”, or “It is like Hungary in the 1980s”. They marvel at the almost Italian feel of my country: the importance of food and hospitality, the fanatical attention to looking good, even the sometimes baroque political theatre. Yes, we have come a long way. What happened, of course, is that with the 2003 Rose Revolution Georgia finally changed course and found the better path that other Central European countries had travelled in the 1990s. The rippling expanse of democracy, born on that heady November night in 1989, finally reached the south Caucasus 14 years later.
The task that faced us was immense. Take one failed state, beset by crime and corruption. Add a liberal dose of life-sapping misery, and mix in a huge helping of displaced persons. Throw in two secessionist regions, season with an almost complete lack of experience of democracy and finally bake over with a thick coating of Russian interference. Rarely have more repulsive ingredients been cooked up in hell's kitchen.
That we have come this far is every day a marvel. We have rapidly climbed the various corruption and business environment league tables compiled by bodies like the IMF, the World Bank and Transparency International. The economy is growing vigorously; foreign investment is flowing in at close to exponential rates. Our soldiers are serving with distinction in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Tbilisi has been transformed from a dowdy Soviet basket case into an attractive city full of sidewalk cafés, shops and hotels.
But leave the city centre and you can see how much remains to be done. Poverty, attested by collapsing buildings and widows begging on the streets, is still widespread. Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons dream of going home to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And the reform process has yet to transform crucial elements of the state. Our potential in agriculture and tourism remains largely unexploited. Politics is still characterised by blood-curdling opposition threats and street theatre and has yet to mature into a system of two or three major parties that is common in most of Europe.
We have got a lot left to do and are doing a lot by ourselves. But there are some things we simply would not have been able to do without the support of our partners in the EU and in NATO. The money and guidance we have received over the years have been precious. The willingness of countries like Estonia to share their experience with us has saved us much time in trial and error.
But the most important support we depend on is political, not financial nor technical. It is the knowledge that the doors of Europe are open to us that helps Georgians put up with the wrenching reforms that are so necessary. And it is the unyielding support of partners like the US and many others that reassures us that, one day, the issue of the secessionist territories will be solved without bloodshed and that Abkhaz, Ossetes, Georgians, Azeris, Armenians and others will live peacefully side by side in a prosperous and united Georgia.
At its Bucharest summit, NATO promised us that one day we would be full members of the Alliance. This sends a powerful message to Russia and the secessionist leadership that our unity is not negotiable. But it is not enough. The secret to a successful resolution of this difficult situation also lies with Europe.
The Russian authorities have been giving Russian passports to any Abkhaz or Ossete who asks. Since they live in regions whose independence is not recognised by anyone, the choice they faced is stark: get a worthless passport that would not take them across any border, or take up a Russian one. With the latter, one can at least travel in much of the former Soviet Union.
Russia's behaviour is completely at odds with international law, and we reject it strongly. But we understand why the people of those regions are tempted by the offer.
Our government has made sweeping proposals to peacefully resolve the crisis. This includes unlimited autonomy for Abkhazia, granting the Abkhaz people a veto on constitutional and legal changes that affect the region, and the creation of a post of Vice President of Georgia reserved for an Abkhaz. Of course, any Abkhaz or Ossete is eligible for the full rights of Georgian citizenship, including a Georgian passport. And this is where Europe can help us move this peace process forward.
Abkhaz and Ossete people want a peaceful, free life, like all people everywhere. Their leadership is using them as pawns in a revolting game to maintain their own power. When their choice is limited to a moderately useful Russian passport and a worthless Abkhaz one, they naturally choose the Russian one. The day their choice includes a Georgian passport allowing them to easily travel to Western Europe, this balance of interests will shift.
Yet today, getting a Schengen visa is an impossible dream for most Georgians. It takes money, time, energy and a consular official who feels good that day. This is counterproductive. It leads to hopelessness and human trafficking, and slows our growth and development. And it makes it more difficult to reintegrate the populations of the secessionist regions. Resolving the EU visa issue is crucial for us and for Europe. It is a key that guarantees not only that Georgia will stay on the path of reform, but also that old conflicts can be solved naturally.
Free trade is the other crucial issue for Georgia. Our economy is already growing much faster than those of the secessionist regions, and this discrepancy will increase. Georgia will keep on becoming more attractive to people who simply want a better future. But this organic growth is hampered by the difficulty our producers have in accessing European markets.
We are a small country whose potential is still largely unexploited. Yet our fruits, our vegetables and our wines already enjoy a legendary reputation. Letting us access European markets will make a huge difference to us, at a minimal cost to Europe. We are simply too small to seriously impact a European market of over 500 million people.
Easier visas and free trade are absolute necessities. They are at the heart of what it means to be a member of the European family. For a country of 4.5 million people, they mean the world. For a Union of 500 million, they will make no discernible difference. That is why we count on our European partners to make rapid progress on these issues. Open trading relationships and easier travel will do much to secure freedom, democracy and stability in a united Georgia.
The issue is an obscure one for most Europeans. It certainly does not warrant headlines. The chaos of the everyday will continue to dominate debates in Brussels, London and Berlin. But the opportunity is there, ready to be grasped by a far-seeing Europe. It would be a tragedy if it were ignored.
Footnotes