Political Studies Review

This review looks at the failure of Russia to consolidate democracy over the past decade. Most explanations of this failure concentrate on the role of institutions, particularly the influence of the presidency. The design of Russian democracy has undermined democratic governance and lessened the chance of democratic consolidation in the future by weakening two preconditions for democratic maturity in Russia, the development of a common legal and political space through the improvement of the federal system and the construction of a national market economy. The review concludes by asking whether, and in what dimensions, Russia's partial democratic system can be stable.

This article offers a critical response to arguments developed by Jeremy Waldron on the subject of democracy and constitutional rights. In particular it responds to three claims made by Waldron: first, he claims contemporary Western societies are characterised by deep and intractable disagreement; second, collectively binding decisions should be reached by democratic means alone; and third constitutional devices, such as bills of rights, should be rejected because they act as constraints on democracy. I argue that Waldron is unable to argue for the primacy of democracy from the baseline of intractable disagreement that he posit. He implicitly relies upon a position of moral consensus to confirm the priority of democracy over alternative decision-making procedures. Further, the moral stance that Waldron takes towards democracy is based upon a Kantian theory of justice which is shared by liberal-constitutional theorists, such as Rawls and Dworkin, who advocate bills of rights. Finally, Waldron does not provide the arguments necessary to justify the rejection of bills of rights. Good reasons exist for tempering democratic procedures with constitutional devices. However, this conclusion is qualified. It depends upon counterfactual claims that can be resolved only by taking into account the specific institutional and cultural practices of particular political systems.

The concepts of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ have become increasingly influential ways of understanding public policy, especially in the UK. However, the main proponents of the concepts, Rose for ‘lesson drawing’ and Dolowitz and Marsh for ‘policy transfer’, have difficulty in providing convincing answers to three questions that are important for them and those engaged in similar studies. First, can they be defined as distinctive forms of policy-making separate from other, more conventional, forms? ‘Lesson drawing’ is very similar to conventional accounts of ‘rational’ policy-making and ‘policy transfer’ is very difficult to define distinctly from many other forms of policy-making. Second, why does ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ occur rather than some other form of policy-making? The proponents of ‘policy transfer’ put a set of diverse and conflicting theories under a common framework, obscuring differences between them. Third, what are the effects of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ on policy-making and how do they compare to other processes? Whilst the effect of more ‘lesson drawing’ seems to be more ‘rational’ policy-making, the effect of ‘policy transfer’ on policy ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is less clear. Dolowitz and Marsh redescribe aspects of ‘failure’ as different forms of ‘transfer’ rather than giving independent reasons for outcomes based on features of transfer processes. Overall, particularly in the case of ‘policy transfer’, researchers may be better off selecting from a range of alternative approaches than limiting themselves to these conceptual frameworks.