Politics

Joseph Nye concentrates on the positive attractive aspects of soft power as a foreign policy tool. This article will argue that the Chinese discussion of soft power is interesting because it does the opposite: soft power is negative rather than positive, and is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign affairs. It will use Chinese President Xi Jinping's new ‘China Dream’ discourse to explore China's ‘negative soft power’ strategy. Rather than take for granted that we understand what the ‘Chinese values’ are that inform the PRC's soft power, it argues that soft power discourse is a useful heuristic device for understanding how Chinese policy makers and public intellectuals are actively constructing a ‘China’ and a ‘world’ to promote regime legitimacy. The Chinese case thus suggests that we need a more complex view of power that considers the contingent dynamics of its hard/soft, positive/negative, foreign/domestic aspects.

As China's national image is haunted by its poor human rights records and increasingly assertive foreign policies, the Chinese diaspora has become an important platform for the country's public diplomacy. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Chinese government has made great efforts to launch soft power campaigns in order to better engage the 50 million overseas Chinese and communicate China's ideas to the outside world. The Xi administration's diaspora engagement policies focus on: (1) indigenising international communication to improve China's national image; (2) jump-starting immigration reform to win the minds and hearts of overseas Chinese; and (3) strengthening education exchanges to shape the diasporic identity of overseas Chinese. Through historical comparisons and policy analyses, this article argues that China's current diaspora engagement policies are based on the Chinese leaders' new vision of public diplomacy, which is approached with soft power strategy. However, due to the limits of Chinese soft power – particularly the lack of political reform and rule of law – the Chinese government will face an uphill battle to attain its long-lasting appeal of soft power and implement its diaspora engagement policies effectively.

China and Russia have devoted significant resources to developing their international broadcasting capacity as an instrument of public diplomacy. Focusing on CCTV-N (China) and RT (Russia), this article discusses the strategies each has developed to communicate with international audiences and further the foreign policy ambitions of policy makers in Beijing and Moscow. It highlights the differences between the two stations – namely CCTV-N's ambition to rectify perceived distortions in the global flow of news about China, and RT's focus on reporting events in the US. Hence the case studies expose the fine line between propaganda and public diplomacy.

This article examines the Russian and Chinese perspective of soft power. It argues that Russia and China are not simply authoritarian states; rather they are authoritarian states of a specialised sub-category that share a joint legacy of adherence to a Communist experience which significantly informs their behaviour and sense of national identity. As a consequence, both the Kremlin and Beijing consider that the soft power methods of the West present nothing less than an existential threat, and conceive of a soft power policy as the outcome of state initiatives rather than the product of an autonomous civil society.

This article explores the use of conspiracy theories by the Russian international television channel Russia Today (RT). Based on Mark Fenster's definition of conspiracy theory as a populist theory of power, the article studies the process of how various conspiratorial notions in programmes broadcast by RT legitimise Russian domestic and foreign policies and, in turn, delegitimise policies of the American government. It argues that the conspiratorial component of RT's broadcasting appears as a political instrument in the context of the post-Cold War world and is applied to attract various global audiences with different political views.

The article adopts an interpretive approach to explore Russian soft power as a discourse that has emerged in response to Joseph Nye's hegemonic narrative of soft power. Russian elites are drawn to soft power for status and influence in the international system. Their discourse is influenced by Russia's dual great power identity shaped by a ‘love–hate’ relationship with the West. When Russia fails to meet the hegemonic criteria for soft power and recognition, it resorts to a countervailing discourse that claims soft power and great power status in opposition to the West and its hegemonic discourse.

This article argues that for all its efforts to implement soft power techniques, the Kremlin still fails to grasp the subtle, voluntaristic essence of soft power. This is reflected in a style of public interaction that has practical implications for how Russian soft power overtures are received by the audience. This is demonstrated through the findings of mixed-method empirical research from four Ukrainian regions. Thus, while surveys show that the worldview promoted by Russian public diplomacy resonates to some extent, insights from focus groups indicate that potential attraction is nevertheless limited by Russia's ‘hard’ and obtrusive approach to cultural influence.

This article examines the specifics of Moscow's soft power strategy. The sources of the Kremlin's interest in the soft power concept are explained. The article discusses how the soft power concept fits in the current Russian foreign policy philosophy. Russia's soft power resources, institutions and instruments are described. Special attention is given to the limitations and constraints of Moscow's soft power strategies. The reasons why these strategies are often being inefficient are explained. The Kremlin's inclination to the combination of the soft and hard power strategies is identified.

Through exploring Iran's public diplomacy at the international level, this article demonstrates how the Islamic Republic's motives should not only be contextualised within the oft-sensationalised, material or ‘hard’ aspects of its foreign policy, but also within the desire to project its cultural reach through ‘softer’ means. Iran's utilisation of culturally defined foreign policy objectives and actions demonstrates its understanding of soft power's potentialities. This article explores the ways in which Iran's public diplomacy is used to promote its soft power and craft its, at times, shifting image on the world stage.