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This article examines the issue of the credibility of the organisation known as the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, which released a series of statements claiming responsibility for several of the most important jihadist attacks perpetrated between 2003 and 2005. A critical analysis of the information available on the group leads to the conclusion that the questions concerning its involvement (or otherwise) in acts of violence and its formal ties (or lack thereof) to al-Qaeda remain unresolved and existing hypotheses regarding the nature of the Brigades must therefore remain open.
The way we see war – its visuality – is ever changing and dynamic. Despite the theoretical variety in International Relations (IR) scholarship, the themes of visuality, photography, and media have not been considered in a systematic fashion. The positivist core of IR is limited in its capacity to consider these themes outside of a cause-and-effect framework. This results in media mainly discussed in terms of its influence on international politics via its impact on (primarily American) foreign policy. The media and foreign policy literature follows this legacy; it arose as a response to post Cold War events and technological shifts. Similarly, the Revolution in Military Affairs of the 1990s opened up a space for strategic studies to address media and visuality. Recent literature from strategic studies engages with cultural and social theory in a way that shows how such tools may be used for exploitation as well as emancipation. In opposition, the post-positivist research tradition of critical IR theory problematizes the world created by rationalist–objectivist social science and seeks answers to constitutive questions about the construction, production, and performance of actors and structures in International Politics. Flowing from this, the visual securitization program rejects the rationalism of the
Australia’s World War I veterans, particularly the Anzacs of Gallipoli, are a quintessential part of Australia’s cultural imagining. Mythologised by the war correspondents of the time, refined and embellished by generations of politicians and myth makers and stripped of their shortcomings and human foibles through repeated renditions, the diggers of the ‘Great War’ continue to define duty and courage in contemporary Australian society. This article focuses on contemporary media coverage of two controversial wars – Afghanistan and Iraq – and how the news media tasked with recording those wars subscribed willingly to the politically charged ‘digger’ trope, which effectively served both to shield soldiers from any political fallout and to perpetuate the myth itself.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US, the ideological undercurrents of America’s popular music culture were brought into sharp focus, with the music of the pop ‘mainstream’ revealed as being largely consistent with liberal stances, and the broadly defined ‘country’ genre as more naturally aligned to conservative views. Several critical discussions of this ideological divide have focused on the case of the Dixie Chicks, a country group who controversially declared their liberalism by opposing US foreign policy in the weeks preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, such studies have tended to dismiss the group’s repertoire in this period (which centres on their 2002 album
This article is a response to theoretical and methodological gaps witnessed in both journalism and intelligence literature. The goal of this research is to better our understanding of journalistic practices when covering intelligence-related events. National and international news agencies’ coverage of the failed Mossad operation in Bern in 1998 serves as an empirical case. The article discusses the benefit of grounded theory as a bottom-up inductive qualitative coding method to address these methodological gaps, and provides an empirical study that traces the evolution of the news coverage of the Bern operation, rather than merely studying the content of the final news product. Results challenge three main theoretical areas: journalist–source relationships, agenda setting, and framing. Concerning the journalist–source relationship, the article shows that, in cases of intelligence events, newsworthiness criteria depend on what other media know about the story rather than publicizing new facts. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative analyses of sources show that, in cases of leaked information, the longer that time has passed, people, media, and officials are less willing to give sourced information. Regarding agenda setting theory, this study suggests that struggles between media, statecraft, and intelligence whilst covering leaks should be conceived as ‘agenda-silencing’, where the purpose of media coverage is also to communicate and legitimize silences orchestrated by security and intelligence censorship. Finally, the data suggest that the concept of framing is altered in case of intelligence-related events. In fact, the framing relies mostly on hypotheses of interpretation which media are not able to assert openly due to various types of censorship.
Journalists plunge into a social drama in which they interact with other actors, witness an event, and translate their observations into sensible texts to communicate with audiences who are not ‘on location’. A journalist’s account is the partial representation of the very reality that he or she constructs at the moment of witnessing an event within a specific context. A journalistic text thus does not merely create the archive, but works as the repertoire that invites us to participate in a continuous meaning-making process during subsequent memory constructions. Based on media coverage of the Korean War in 1950 by

