Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

Security sector reform (SSR) has come to be a cornerstone of the state-building project in postconflict contexts, providing an enabling environment for peacebuilding and development. However, an examination of the Afghan and Iraqi cases illustrates that the SSR model applied there is ill-equipped to confront the challenges of post-conflict environments. The failure to actualise the holistic, people-centred aims envisaged in both cases highlights a disjuncture between policy and practice consistent with the SSR experience in other post-conflict cases. This has led to questions concerning the feasibility of the SSR model in the aftermath of September 11. This article argues that resolving the crisis in which the SSR process is mired requires its re-conceptualisation and a fundamental shift in donor policy and practices.

The creation of stronger states in Africa is central to the success of conceiving, designing and implementing agendas that seek to enhance peace and human security. Most states in Africa exhibit chronic privatisation of violence by informal security actors, and this is symptomatic of the difficulties of state building more generally. Security sector reform (SSR) as a tool for peacebuilding and human security on the continent must therefore be part of a wider effort to address the problem of state weakness as well as respond to the crucial (in)security that is presented by informal actors such as militias and vigilante groups. This has become crucial in the light of the human security predicaments that informal security actors represent. This article uses the cases of Nigeria and South Africa to show how the current institutional approach to SSR ignores the critical importance of the nature of the state and the structural conditions that undermine the state-making process in Africa in both analysis and practice. It argues that the governance of privatised violence is central to the need for SSR in Africa and that the enhancement of state capacity is the key to the success of that governance.

Formal and accountable security systems are rare in many of the fragile states where the international community provides assistance. In most cases, individuals and communities create their own security mechanisms or accept compromised and unaccountable security provided by non-state actors. This article examines how such alternative security mechanisms have evolved in communities in two fragile states, Colombia and Liberia. The authors conclude that the ability of both state and non-state actors to provide security hinges on perceptions of the legitimacy of those providing security among the population at large. Systems that involve community representatives in managing security mechanisms are critical to developing this legitimacy. Without attention to this key element, programmes for security sector reform are unlikely to succeed.

The governance of security in West Africa manifests numerous challenges which point to the need for a comprehensive security agenda to integrate various actors often operating from opposing perspectives. This article argues that the disproportionate focus on the role of commercial security actors in West Africa effectively eclipses research and policy interest in other non-state actors in security governance and tends to undermine sustainable peacebuilding. The article attempts a typology of non-state actors engaged in security governance beyond security contractors and argues that the governance of security should be seen to include ‘insecurity actors’ (such as criminal networks and local mercenaries) because they form part of the ‘push-and-pull’ – exerted by various security actors – whose end result is the de facto governance of security. The challenge of peacebuilding therefore is to bridge the gap between the normative value of security governance (predicated on democratic principles of accountability, transparency and participation) and the reality of diverse interests and perspectives.

The Nepalese monarchy has always relied on the military to consolidate its power both against growing popular opposition and during violent uprisings. The issue of security sector reform and the role of the monarchy have therefore been at the core of the debate about conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This article attempts to critically analyse the political dynamics after the birth of Nepal's Maoist insurgency and its influence on the role of civil society and the parliamentary political parties in the popular struggle for democracy. It also examines how internal security in Nepal is threatened by the efforts of India, China and the United States to secure a role for the monarchy in a future political system.