Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

The reconciliation process in South Africa has been hailed as an astounding example of a non-violent transition to democracy, and its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has subsequently served as the starting point for reflections on reconciliation, transitional justice and the possibility of truth commissions in other countries. This article suggests that it is necessary to examine South Africa's reconciliation process more critically, focusing on why it has not brought about a reduction in the high levels of violence. It is argued that the reconciliation process has failed in this respect - despite good intentions - because it has not managed to transform the macro/micro dynamic in South Africa, i.e. the interaction between macro-level divisions and micro-level tensions which have fed off each other throughout South Africa's history. Macro-level violence has included - and still includes - economic policies that generate wealth for a minority while perpetuating the production of poverty for the majority. Micro-level violence includes extremely high levels of violent incidents at an interpersonal and local level. The use of the concept ‘reconciliation’ in post-apartheid South Africa may in certain respects have served as opium for the people - opium that has enabled continued accommodation of the interaction between macro and micro-level violence in the country.

The current peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is unprecedented on several counts: talks have never lasted this long, been this stable, or been at such a high level in the past. Also unprecedented, and perhaps key to the early success of the process, has been an agreement (referred to in this article as the ‘Killinochchi consensus’) between the main stakeholders that the first priority of conflict resolution is realising the ‘peace dividend’. This has resulted in considerable action and cooperation on reconstruction of the war-torn Northeast and development of the island's economy. It is suggested here that, apart from their direct benefits, these efforts have two further aims: to bolster popular support for the peace initiative, and to foster cooperation between the two negotiating sides ahead of discussions on more contentious issues. Also novel in the Sri Lankan case has been the willingness of international donors, particularly the international financial institutions, to get involved in the peace process well before a permanent solution has been achieved. While several questions remain about the nature and scope of the development imperative, whether it has been correctly sequenced, and whether it can deliver a sustainable peace, a constructive and pragmatic approach to peacebuilding through development holds some promise in Sri Lanka and perhaps elsewhere.

This paper examines the practice of dialogical development in the context of the agribusiness sector of post conflict Kosovo. It looks at the role of an INGO (international nongovernmental organisation) in facilitating sectoral growth, while deliberately addressing deep historical divisions in order to promote stabilization, reintegration and ultimately societal transformation. It also attempts to define the place of dialogue in this process.

This article looks into one way of assessing the conflict impact of a development, humanitarian or peacebuilding activity or intervention in a conflict area. Following an explanation of the origins and purpose of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, the practical consequences are examined with reference to examples and experiences in Angola. This article illustrates the importance of being sensitive to the conflict environment in which one is operating. The ‘conflict sensitive’ concept was triggered by the authors' observation – from field missions and evaluation methodologies – that there is a high level of conflict ignorance among many development, humanitarian and peacebuilding workers.

The US-led war on terror has made global security the foremost international priority. The true measure of international commitment to this goal will be whether and how it extends to areas of national interest, particularly in the economic domain. The campaigns for and against the Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act both invoke commitments to security which, upon scrutiny, prove to be specious. Both the US and the Philippines argue variations of the popular contention that greater trade will lead to greater security. In reality, greater trade in the Philippine fisheries sector has contributed to both the food and livelihood insecurity of low-income Filipinos and small-scale fisherfolk. It would seem that policies justified in the name of security more truly serve elite national economic interests. Where elite national interest trumps international commitments, contradictions become apparent and undermine the moral claims of the war effort.