tegrated learning practice within Australian universities. It considers how Australian universities are responding to, implementing, or overlooking the formal regulatory framework regarding work experience placements. The analysis is informed by data gathered in a series of 68 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals from 15 universities around Australia and provides unique insights into how Universities are acting as regulators in the broad sense of the word. Understanding the enforcement of educational regulation is important, because it is the only national tool directed to ensuring work experience opportunities afford real learning which will facilitate skills development and increase future employment opportunities and are equitable and safe for student participants.

28:T40e,

‘Penalty privilege’ is sometimes referred to as ‘the right to silence’ or more correctly the privilege against self-exposure to civil penalty. It is a procedural rule that applies equally to trade unions and corporations in Australian federal courts. This article critically investigates this equality of this treatment, revealing its historical evolution and arguing that it results in unequal outcomes, relative to the social and historical roles of unions and corporations. But it also discovers distinct incoherence in the application of penalty privilege, along with a host of related legislative interventions that have sought to entrench the equal treatment of trade unions and corporations more broadly. Accordingly, this article proposes a range of reform, with a particular focus on the application of penalty privilege in the federal arena. A more coherent application of penalty privilege, it is proposed, is one that applies in proportion to the social power exercised by persons and entities before the Court.

29:T457,

Exclusion of evidence when its probative value is exceeded by its risk of creating unfair prejudice has long been a fundamental safeguard against unfair trials and wrongful convictions. In 2016, IMM v The Queen (IMM) curtailed that safeguard by holding that trial judges should assess probative value on the assumption that the evidence is reliable and credible. The IMM majority placed emphasis on the capacity of the evidence. In doing so, it provided a mysterious qualification: some evidence may lack probative value not because it is unreliable, but because it is ‘simply unconvincing’. The majority illustrated unconvincingness with the example of an unreliable eyewitness identification. Courts and legal scholars criticised the majority judgment for its harmful implications and for its apparent incoherence. From a review of almost 4 years of post-IMM jurisprudence and deeper exploration into one particular case, we find that ‘simply unconvincing’ has accentuated the confusion and inconsistency in Australian evidence jurisprudence.