Journal of Experimental Psychopathology

Sensory imagery is a powerful tool for inducing craving because it is a key component of the cognitive system that underpins human motivation. The role of sensory imagery in motivation is explained by Elaborated Intrusion (EI) theory. Imagery plays an important role in motivation because it conveys the emotional qualities of the desired event, mimicking anticipated pleasure or relief, and continual elaboration of the imagery ensures that the target stays in mind. We argue that craving is a conscious state, intervening between unconscious triggers and consumption, and summarise evidence that interfering with sensory imagery can weaken cravings. We argue that treatments for addiction can be enhanced by the application of EI theory to maintain motivation, and assist in the management of craving in high-risk situations.

A visuospatial grounding task, making shapes from modelling clay (plasticine), has been shown to reduce encoding of traumatic images (Stuart, Holmes & Brewin, 2006). We tested the impact of this task on retrieval of emotional memories. Non-clinical participants recalled autobiographical memories of negative and positive events under control (no concurrent task) or experimental (clay modelling) conditions. As predicted by a working memory model of recollection, the clay modelling task reduced the self-rated vividness and emotional intensity of the memories. We suggest that clay modelling may be a useful treatment aid for dampening emotional distress during recall of traumatic events.

Intrusive vivid images of future catastrophe (“flashforwards”) are important in social fears, like performance anxiety. Previous studies in healthy volunteers found that eye movements reduce vividness and emotionality of negative mental images of past events and future–oriented events. This study tested whether eye movements reduce image vividness and emotionality in students with performance anxiety. Participants (N = 29) imagined two feared future events related to performance anxiety during six 24 s blocks per image: one image was accompanied by eye movements, the other was not. Image vividness and emotionality were assessed before and after these blocks. Relative to the eyes stationary condition, eye movements resulted in a significant decrease in image vividness, and a trend was observed for reduced emotionality. The findings add to earlier experimental findings on the benefits of dual-tasks during mental imagery, and suggest that eye movements and related procedures may be helpful in the treatment of performance anxiety.

Recalling distressing memories from a third-person, observer vantage perspective has been conceptualized as a form of avoidance of memory-related affect (McIsaac & Eich, 2004). The possibility that observer recall of positive events might similarly be linked to avoidance has not been explored. A mixed sample of undergraduate students and community members described a positive and negative intrusive memory and responded to items about features of each memory. Experiential avoidance was associated with a tendency to recall positive intrusive memories from an observer perspective, and this association approached significance for negative intrusive memories. For negative intrusions, field perspective recall was associated with greater memory-related distress. The opposite was true for positive intrusions: observer recall was linked to more distress. We also observed expected mood-congruent relationships: depression was associated with the frequency of negative but not positive intrusive memories, and there was a trend towards a relationship between depression and decreased vividness of positive memories. Finally, dysphoric participants reported less of a sense of reliving their positive intrusions than did their non-dysphoric counterparts. We speculate about the reasons for the direction of these effects and discuss the potential utility of therapeutic techniques that encourage patients to remember positive events from a field perspective.

This study sought to replicate previous work concerning the impact of positive mental imagery on emotion. Previous experimental studies found that imagining positive events was superior to verbally processing the same events in producing positive affect, and further that field rather than observer perspective imagery had a more powerful impact (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). In the current study, 78 students listened to 100 positive events randomly allocated to one of three conditions (between-subjects): imagining them via a field or an observer perspective or listening to the same events while thinking about their verbal meaning. Positive affect was measured before and after the task. Positive affect change was greater after imagery (field and observer) than the verbal condition, replicating previous research. Contrary to predictions, there was no significant difference in affect change between the field and observer conditions. To explain the latter result, we reflect on methodological explanations. In conclusion, there was greater positive affect change after positive mental imagery than positive verbal thinking. If results can be translated from the lab to the clinic then imaging positive situations may help people feel more positive than only discussing them verbally in therapy.

Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) is a therapeutic technique addressing specific memories of earlier experiences associated with present problems. By imagining that the course of events is changed in a more desired direction, powerful therapeutic effects have been found. The interest in and applications of ImRs are quickly increasing. This review discusses clinical studies assessing effects of ImRs, as well as possible processes underlying ImRs, and laboratory studies examining these underlying processes. It is concluded that although research into ImRs is still in its infancy, and many studies have their methodological limitations, results are promising. Therefore a research agenda is sketched, suggesting the next steps in both clinical and fundamental research.

The present study aimed to replicate the beneficial effect of imagery rescripting (IRS) over imagery reexperiencing (IRE) in a trauma analogue experiment. The impact of anxiety on the manipulations was also examined. Anxious (n = 33) and non-anxious (n = 40) participants were randomly assigned to IRE or IRS, taking place 30 minutes after watching an aversive film. Intrusive memories were recorded in the subsequent week. Results showed that IRE resulted in more intrusive thoughts and intrusive images than IRS. Frequency of intrusive thoughts or images did not differ for anxious and non-anxious participants. However, anxiety influenced the effect of the manipulation: IRE resulted in higher levels of intrusive images than IRS in anxious but not in non-anxious participants. Such anxiety × condition interaction was not present for intrusive thoughts. The results suggest that anxious individuals may be particularly sensitive to interventions in the memory consolidation phase.

Current cognitive models of social phobia, all stress the importance of negative self-perceptions in maintaining social anxiety (Moscovitch, 2009, Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Clark & Wells, 1995). In some models, (Clark & Wells, 1995) negative self-perceptions are embodied in the form of a visual image. In this study, 58 socially anxious participants were assigned to either a positive (n =19) or a negative (n =19) self-imagery condition and we tested the impact of repeated imagery practice on self-concept (self-esteem and self-concept clarity), and on anxiety and performance in a conversation with a stooge. Participants in each condition practiced holding either a positive or a negative self-image in mind over eight days while at the same time imagining themselves in a series of increasingly challenging social situations. After the final imagery practice, participants took part in a conversation with a stooge. We hypothesised that repeated practice with a positive image would produce higher levels of self-esteem, more self-concept clarity, and would lead to less anxiety and better ratings of performance than holding a negative image. The hypotheses were partially supported. Positive self- imagery practice led to higher self-esteem ratings and higher self-concept clarity on a computerised measure of self-concept clarity, but not on a self-report measure. Positive self-imagery practice also produced better performance ratings in the social test (in both subjective and objective assessments of performance) and a trend towards reduced anxiety. The results are discussed in relation to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) self-memory model and the clinical implications are considered.

Therapy with mental images is prevalent in the field of chronic pain, and this has been the case for centuries. Yet few of the recent advances in the cognitive behavioural understanding of spontaneous (i.e. intrusive) mental imagery have been translated to this field. Such advances include imagery as a component of a psychopathological process, as an emotional amplifier and as a cognitive therapeutic target in its own right. Hence very little is known about the contents, prevalence and emotional impact of spontaneous mental imagery in the context of chronic pain. This article discusses the evidence in favour of spontaneous imagery being a potentially important part of patients' pain experience, and makes a case, based on neurophysiological findings, for imagery having an impact on pain perception. Furthermore, it presents how mental imagery has been used in the treatment of chronic pain. A case report illustrates further how spontaneous negative imagery linked to pain can be distressing, and how this might be addressed in therapy. Additionally, the case report demonstrates the spontaneous use of coping imagery, and raises a discussion of how this might be enhanced.

A number of mental disorders comprise aberrant perceptions that are often described as possessing a perceptual quality approaching real-life sensory experience, while at the same time lacking a sensory correlate in the real world. Healthy individuals can also have perceptual experience without an external correlate when they engage in mental imagery. Aberrant perceptions differ from mental imagery in their lack of voluntary control and the sense of reality. Early theories suggested that increased imagery vividness could lead to aberrant perceptions in a number of clinical disorders. However, cognitive and neuroimaging studies do not endorse this view, and instead suggest that mental imagery comprises a functional architecture that is at least partly shared with memory and perception. Miscommunication or disconnection between brain areas or functional modules within this architecture may give rise to aberrant perceptions and their sense of reality. We describe the evidence for this view in relation to psychotic hallucinations in schizophrenia, hallucinations in neurodegenerative disorders and flashbacks of traumatic events in post-traumatic stress disorder. We suggest that an impaired neural architecture of imagery, rather than merely increased intensity or vividness of imagery, underlies aberrant perceptions. This view fits with neurobiological models of mental disorders that suggest that psychopathological symptoms arise from disrupted communication between brain areas.

Rumination appears to predict and maintain posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) but evidence for a causal effect is lacking. This experimental study investigated the impact of manipulating film-related and non-film-related rumination on the development of post-trauma intrusive memories and mood. Sixty healthy participants selected for being moderate ruminators were exposed to a trauma film and then allocated to three conditions: film related rumination; non-film related rumination; and no task. Rumination tasks were completed post-film and daily for one week. The two rumination conditions combined resulted in more intrusive memories of the film over one week than the control condition but there were no differences between rumination conditions. In contrast, the two rumination conditions combined, compared to the control group, did not increase negative mood either in the short or long term. These results extend previous findings to show a causal effect of general and trauma-related rumination on intrusive memories.

The present study tested whether unconscious thought (versus conscious thought) would reduce frequency of intrusions from an analogue trauma film. Participants viewed a distressing film and were subsequently instructed to think about the film deliberately (conscious thought), to perform a demanding task while knowing that the film information was important later on the experiment (unconscious thought), or to perform the task while believing the experiment had ended (control condition). Afterwards, sequence memory and intrusions of the film were measured. In line with predictions, the results showed significant lower intrusion frequency in the unconscious thought condition compared to both conscious thought and mere distraction. As there were no differences in sequence memory for the film, it remains unclear what mechanism was responsible for this effect. These results encourage further research into a new and exciting area.