Journal of Eurasian Studies

The author argues that the current state of international relations can be characterized as a new Cold War with Eurasia emerging as its major battlefield and at the same time as a second, non-Western pole of a new confrontation. The reason for it is that the United States and some European countries are trying to reverse the decline of their dominance which they have enjoyed over the past five hundred years. The current situation is much more dangerous than it used to be during the previous Cold War, but this attempt will most likely prove futile. While the world comes through a period of intensifying competition, it will stimulate reformatting of the global geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-ideological space. The authors assume that the evolution of the international system goes in the direction of a new bipolarity, where Eurasia will play a role of a new geostrategic and economic pole, while the West, probably limited by “Greater America” will become another one. In this new international reality, the U.S. will drift from the status of superpower to the position of an important global center of power. However, at the moment the contours of Greater Eurasia are only beginning to take shape.

Responding to changes in the world, Russia has proposed the Greater Eurasian Partnership for the international cooperation agenda. At the same time, the possibility of linking that partnership with the Belt and Road Initiative for international cooperation is one of the key factors in implementing this agenda. Alignment between the development strategies of Russia and China in the field of global, regional, and bilateral relations lays the foundation of successful cooperation between a number of countries, regions, and organizations. For the Eurasian Partnership to succeed, it must strictly adhere to WTO rules and take a tolerant attitude toward the diverse mechanisms for cooperation that various countries and regions have developed.

This paper argues that Russia's strategic objective of developing its Asiatic regions is tied to its serious intentions in Asia as a whole. It stresses that Russia can only connect to the political, economic, and cultural life of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific through its own Asian regions. Moreover, leaders’ claims that Russia belongs to both Europe and Asia will carry little weight with their Asiatic neighbors if Russia's own Asiatic regions remain underdeveloped and subject to shrinking populations. The paper critically analyzes the results of various projects of development of Asiatic Russia beginning from late tsarist period until the 21st century and shows that Russia needs to put forward a formal strategy for developing the Eurasian infrastructure that is comparable to the SREB, Kazakhstan's NurlyZhol (Bright Path) economic stimulus plan, Mongolia's Steppe Road, and others. This strategy should reflect Russia's objectives for the economic development of its own Asiatic regions, and through them, the co-development with its neighbors of Eurasia generally. It argues that the Trans-Eurasian Belt Development, put forward by several Russia think tanks, could become Russia's contribution to the development of the Eurasian space and mesh with the Chinese, Kazakh, Mongolian, and other partner initiatives. Its implementation would help spur the economic development of Asiatic Russia, enabling that region to become part of the larger economic development of Eurasia. That would help turn Russia into a more important independent and constructive player in the Eurasian space, acting in close coordination with its partners in both the East and the West.

This article analyses the role and place of the SCO in the development of interstate interaction in the Eurasian space, as well as the condition of and prospects for the main areas of multifaceted cooperation within the Organisation. The author further analyses the characteristics of the SCO partnership system as a model of interstate interaction that can provide an institutional platform for broad regional economic cooperation within the context of the new realities of Eurasian development, the implementation of member states’ national development strategies, the linking of efforts to align integration processes within the EAEU, and the implementation of China's One Belt, One Road initiative with the potential to form an overarching partnership between countries of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.

This article examines U.S. policy toward the supercontinent of Eurasia from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present. The baseline for U.S. policy was established in 1992, the prevention of a peer competitor emerging in Eurasia. The initial focus for ten years was on assistance to promote Russia's transition to becoming a market democracy while simultaneously hedging against the return of a revanchist Russia through promotion of expansion of NATO and the European Union.

The 9/11 attack in 2001 shifted the attention of the Bush Administration to the War on Terror with the United States military getting bogged down in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration sought to end both wars and withdraw U.S. troops with mixed success. In 2011/2012 with growing concern over China's more assertive policy in East Asia, U.S. foreign and security policy aimed to put more military, economic, and diplomatic resources toward East Asia. These efforts, however, were distracted by Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the civil war in Syria, and the emergence of ISIS.

Almost in the background over this quarter century, a far more significant phenomenon has been developing – the reconnection of Eurasia. With the rise of China, India and Russia, as well as the emergence of middle powers including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and others, the Eurasian supercontinent is being “rewired” economically, politically, and strategically. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has garnered the most attention, but virtually every state – large, medium, and small – are adjusting their national interests and foreign policies in a very fluid environment. To date Washington has struggled to grasp the breadth and depth of change and failed to develop its own strategy as well as allocate adequate analytical and policy tools to advance U.S. interests.

Eurasia has never been one of major directions of Japan's foreign policy, but its importance for Tokyo is growing. This article analyzes its increasing significance to foreign policy of Japan, causes and consequences of this policy's duality and inconsistency. It also studies the reasons for the limited success of Tokyo's diplomacy in Eurasia and discusses possible prospects for growing Japanese involvement in the region. It concludes that Japan's Eurasian policy is inconsistent and is likely to remain so since the cause behind it remains unchanged – that is, the contradiction between Japan's actual economic interests and its willingness to follow in the ideological and geopolitical footsteps of the U.S. The path Japan takes in the future will largely depend on the economic results of the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt, its linkage with the plans of the Eurasian Economic Union, the progress of Russian–Chinese cooperation, and the project of Greater Eurasian partnership put forward by Russia and supported by China. If the economic projects of Eurasia's non-Western players prove effective, Tokyo will be more tempted to cooperate with them despite its close ties with the U.S. However, if Eurasia's non-Western states, and particularly China, are overly active with their foreign policy and militaries in the Asia Pacific, it will push Tokyo to create a variety of structures that would curb and serve as a political counterbalance to Chinese and Russian influence.

This paper explores the dynamics of state intervention policies in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector between 2001 and 2012. Although the government in this period had become more assertive in relations with multinational enterprises (MNEs), a full-scale nationalisation had not occurred as the state strengthened control over the industry without forcing out oil multinationals. The findings suggest that the increased state intervention in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector was motivated by a rationale of indigenous capacity-building rather than by an exclusively economic rationale of maximising rents. It is often overlooked that the government endeavoured to achieve a greater participation of Kazmunaigas national oil company (NOC) in the domestic energy sector. Contrary to nationalisation, participation doctrine does not prioritise asset expropriation and/or displacing foreign investors. In Kazakhstan, participation strategy facilitated a partnership between the NOC and MNEs with the aim of strengthening local expertise.

Since the triple disaster in Japan in 2011, the energy dimension of Japan–Russia relations in the Russian Far East (RFE) has developed at a more rapid pace. The integration of the energy markets of the world's top liquefied natural gas (LNG) importer, Japan, and major energy exporter, Russia, has paralleled a warmer bilateral political climate and been accelerated by Russia's turn to the East. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the globe's energy landscape has been significantly altered and both Russia and Japan have faced constraints economically and in terms of bilateral cooperation. Questions remain about how bilateral energy relations will develop in the face of competition from Japan's traditional energy suppliers and ongoing Japanese government efforts to diversify energy sources. Is energy prompting a stronger bilateral political bond or just fostering a limited partnership in this area? In considering the consequences of the Fukushima and Ukraine crises on Japan–Russia energy relations and the energy dimension of Russia's pivot to Asia, the topic is placed in a wider context of new dynamics in Japan–Russia relations.

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with the aim of fostering closer economic cooperation among member states for the well-being of the people of the region. This paper critically analyses the history and evolution of the EEU as well as its success, challenges and prospects. Despite numerous attempts and initiatives, the EEU's actions have hardly achieved any significant success because most of its goals have either been declarative in nature or politically motivated and not taken seriously. Russian domination, influence, control and pressure may also be reasons for lack of progress and success. Long, bitter historical memories and distrust among the member states also made the integration process difficult. The article concludes that this latest attempt at integration in the former USSR region seems to be in trouble and may result in failure because of deteriorating economic conditions in Russia, the crisis facing the ruble, Russia's continuous conflict with Ukraine and distrust among the member states.