Cooperation and Conflict

Proceeding from the assumption that there is a living past influencing decision-makers' images of their country and the world, this article discusses probable conscious and subconscious perceptions of the nature of Russia's foreign relations among the present Soviet leadership. The article argues that Soviet leaders have been used to looking upon the foreign relations of their state as one of dominance and surveillance of weak neighbors- the precedence being the incorporation of the Kazan Khanate into Russia in 1552 - and of isolationist peaceful coexistence with strong empires - the precedence being relations with Manchu China in the 18th century. The article maintains that Soviet foreign policy can be interpreted as having attempted to pursue the Kazan-dominance and the Manchu-coexis tence line simultaneously. Relations developed with Finland and Yugoslavia from 1940 are seen as the result of aborted Kazanization. It is concluded that the reaction of the Manchu partner USA to the Soviet Kazan-like treatment of Afghanistan in 1979-80 indicates that the two models interfere with each other and are thus difficult to uphold.

The Soviet view on the role of nuclear weapons is of critical interest and therefore widely discussed not only in strategic but also foreign policy circles. This paper analyses the views of three Soviet personalities who are central to any such discussion: Secretary General Brezhnev, the former Minister of Defence Grechko, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. It is shown that the views of these persons differ substantially, with the former Minister of Defence appearing as the most divergent. Several explanations for these differences are considered, and various clues for future interpretations are offered. Caution is urged against the propensities to use Soviet pronouncements to substantiate assertions either that the Soviet leadership perceives nuclear weapons in 'war-fighting' or in deterrence terms. It is suggested that statements must be evaluated in their particular context.

In comparison with the more general structural features in the Baltic region, a special kind of functional system with the participation of all the Baltic states has been created for the protection of the marine environment and living resources in the Baltic Sea area. The questions posed by the author are: What is the function of this particular 'system' in the context of the more general systemic structures of the region? Is it relatively isolated from, or linked to, other more politicized issue-areas? What are the possibilities for, and limits to, further cooperation? Two approaches could be taken to evaluate these matters. First, such cooperation could be considered in instrumental terms, i.e. we could focus on its contribution to the creation, strengthening and diversification of the structures of détente at a sub-regional level; the forms of cooperation discussed could be regarded as prime examples of such manifold multilateral cooperation between states representing different socio-economic systems, the promotion of which is encouraged in the Final Act of the CSCE at an all-European level. However, a different approach, turning the functionalist formulation upside down and asking to what extent the politicization of technical coopera tion limits advancement of collaboration in these fields is considered more relevant in this context. It is concluded that the process of détente cannot be said to have generated the cooperation, and that the cooperation that has evolved is likely to function despite certain political impediments and deadlocks.

Debate and research on Nordic governmental cooperation has for long been premised on the assumption that the impelling forces behind such cooperation are to be found inside the Nordic countries themselves. Nordic cooperation has been regarded as an alternative to Europe. This article proceeds from the assumption that international or external factors have to be taken more into consideration. They form a framework for the political activities of the Nordic countries and could be characterized as long-term factors. Other relevant long-term factors are economic, industrial, and social structures of the Nordic countries. Considering these external and long-term factors does not imply disregarding internal factors and day-to-day events or current affairs, short-term factors. The three dichotomies external/internal, long-term/short-term, and economic/political factors are used as tools of analysis. A systematic use of the concepts leads to the conclusion that external political and economic long-term factors operate centrifugally on Nordic cooperation. Internal political factors have occasionally worked for Nordic cooperation. Yet these internal political factors, as a rule of a short-term kind, have been exceeded by the stronger external political and economic factors of a long-term kind. There has been no independent Nordic alternative to Europe. This conclusion is based on a long historical perspective.