Allaz and Vila (1993) have shown that forward markets could mitigate market power and improve efficiency. This paper shows that efficiency-improving effect of forward markets is sensitive to the assumption that market participants behave like rational expectations agents when forecasting prices. The existence of forward contracts could increase spot prices and hurt efficiency if buyers engage in bilateral forward contracts and forward rates are influenced by historic prices. These findings have important policy implications for the electricity industry.
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