The Kyoto agreementasoriginally draftedsought to mitigateanthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions through policy measures by most industrialized countries. It now seems likely that the agreement will be ratified and implemented without the participation of the United States. Any emissions abatement policies which have a measurable reduction in global emissions will induce changes in the terms of trade and comparative advantage and competitiveness To the extent that aggressive policies are undertaken to reduce CO2 emissions, there are likely to be strong calls in the Kyoto coalition for greenhouse-gas related border adjustment measures. This paper uses a multi-region, multi-commodity static general equilibrium model to quantify and assess the implications of such policies.
BabikerM.Subglobal Climate-Change Policies and the International Relocation of Energy Intensive Production, Journal of International Economics, Forthcoming.
2.
BabikerM.BautistaM.JacobyH.ReillyJ. (2000). Effects of Differentiating Carbon Policy by Sector: A United States Example, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No 61, Cambridge, MA.
3.
BabikerM.CriquiP.EllermanD.ReillyJ.ViguierL. (2003). Assessing the Impact of Carbon Tax differentiation in the European Union, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 8, 187-198.
4.
BabikerM.JacobyH.ReillyJ.ReinerD. (2002). The Evolution of Climate Regime: Kyoto to Marrakech, Environmental Science and Policy, 2, 195-206.
5.
BabikerM.MaskusK.RutherfordT. (1997). Carbon Taxes and the Global Trading System, Working Paper 7, University of Colorado, Boulder.
6.
BabikerM.MetcalfG.ReillyJ. (2003). Tax Distortions and Global Climate Policy, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 269-287.
7.
BabikerM.ReillyJ.MayerM.EckausR.WingI. SueHymanR. (2000). The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model: Revisions, Sensitivities, and Comparisons of Results, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No 71, Cambridge, MA.
8.
BernardA.VielleM. (1999). Report to the MIES on Greenhouse Effect: An Evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol with the GEMINI-E3 Model, Ministere de L’ Equipment des Transports et du Logement, Commissariat a L’Energie Atomique, Paris.
9.
Betz, EichhammerSchleich (2004). Designing National Allocation Plans: A first Analysis of the Outcome, Energy and Environment, May, 375-425.
10.
BohringerC. (2001). Climate Politics from Kyoto to Bonn: From Little to Nothing?!?, Working Paper, Center for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany.
11.
BohringerC.RutherfordT. (1997). Carbon Taxes with Exemptions in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of the German Tax Initiative, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, 189-203.
12.
BovenbergA. (1999). Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: An Updated Reader’s Guide, International Tax Public Finance, 6, 421-434.
13.
BoydR.IbarrarianM. (2002). Costs of Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: A Developing Country Perspective, Energy Economics, 24, 21-39.
14.
CarraroC.SoubeyranA. (1996). Environmental Taxation and Employment in a multi-sector General Equilibrium Model in: CarraroC.SiniscalcoD. (Eds.), Environment and Fiscal Reform and Unemployment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, London.
15.
FelderS.RutherfordT. (1993). Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The Consequences of International Trade in Oil and Basic Materials, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25, 162-176.
16.
GoulderL. (1995). Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 271-297.
17.
HertelT. ed. (1997). “Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, MA.
18.
ManneA.RichelsR. (2001). US Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: The Impact on Compliance Costs and CO2 Emissions, Working Paper 01-12, AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C.
19.
NguyenH. (1987). Energy Elasticities Under Divisia and Btu Aggregation, Energy Economics, 9, 210-214.
20.
OECD, The Costs of Reducing CO2 Emissions: Evidence from GREEN, Economics Department Working Paper 115, Paris (1992).
21.
PindyckR. (1979). Interfuel Substitution and Industrial Demand for Energy: An International Comparison, Review of Economics and Statistics, 61, 169-179.
22.
PoterbaJ.RotembergJ. (1995). Environmental Taxes on Intermediate and Final Goods When Both Can be Imported, International Tax and Public Finance2, 221-228.
23.
ProopsJ.FaberM.Wagenhalsand G., eds. (1993). “ Reducing CO2 Emissions: A Comparative Input-Output Study for Germany and the UK” Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag.
24.
ReillyJ.PrinnR.HarnischJ.FitzmauriceJ.JacobyH.KicklighterD.MelilloJ.StoneP.SokolovA.WangC. (1999). Multi-gas assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, Nature401, 549-555.
25.
RutherfordT. (1999). Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS Subsystem: An Overview of Modeling Framework and Syntax, Computational Economics, 14, 1-46.
26.
RutherfordT. (1995). Extensions of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising in Applied Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control19, 1299-1324.
27.
RutherfordT.BabikerM. (1997). Input-Output and General Equilibrium Estimates of Embodied Carbon: A Dataset and Static Framework for Assessment, Working Paper 2, University of Colorado, Boulder.
28.
ShackeltonR.ShelbyM.CristofaroA.BrinnerR.YancharJ.GoulderL.JorgensonD.WilcoxenP.PaulyP.KaufmanR. (1993). The Efficiency Value of Carbon Tax Revenues, Energy Modeling Forum EMF, Working Paper 12.8, Stanford, CA.
29.
United Nations (1997). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, 10December.
30.
US Department of Energy (1998). Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA. http://www.eia.doe.gov.
31.
WeyantJ. (ed.) (1999). The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, The Energy Journal Special Issue.
