Abstract
This study examines the hypothesis that changes to high-powered incentive regulations have a positive efficiency and productivity growth effects in a regulated electricity distribution industry. We estimate an input distance function using the stochastic frontier analysis method to compute technical efficiency scores for 121 Norwegian utilities over the period 2004-2012. We explore sources of productivity growth by parametrically decomposing the Malmquist productivity index into efficiency change, technical change, and scale change. Unlike previous studies, we examine the difference in performance across two regulatory regimes: yardstick competition (2007-2012) and RPI-X incentive regulation (2004-2006). Results show significant efficiency and productivity growth improvements with embodied technical change as the main driver.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
