Using panel estimation, this paper shows that higher oil abundance does not hinder crude producers’ growth. This sample controls for specificities of oil economies, but the usual cross-section ‘curse’ result is found—it disappears allowing for unobserved effects. The chosen model controls for a potential (but unconfirmed) oil curse working through institutions, and for other growth factors such as education, which is considered by deriving real wage growth as the dependent variable. We measure the oil growth-effects through labor and capital efficiency, and as a factor of production. They are all insignificant for oil production, but rig productivity benefits growth through capital efficiency. However, oil concentration only fosters growth (by reducing the capital necessary to oil exploration) significantly if there is fiscal responsibility, and in developing countries, where institutions are weaker and there is a broader scope for factor-efficiency and technological improvements arising from the oil sector. Keywords: Economic growth, Institutions, Oil curse, Panel data
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