One option for entrepreneurs to finance and grow their companies is venture capital. After the boom and bust of the new economy, the venture capital industry has regained importance in financing innovative companies. This study contributes by providing a survey of the literature on the structural and behavioural aspects of venture capital financing from the entrepreneur's perspective. The aim of this survey is to organize and summarize existing theoretical and empirical work on venture capital financing with a view to making entrepreneurs aware of best practice for their interactions with venture capital companies. The authors conclude that entrepreneurs, before seeking venture capital finance, should consider this option carefully, as investors could pursue their own aims even if they are contradictory to those of the entrepreneur.
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