Abstract
This paper provides a brief summary of the Yên Bay mutiny of 10 February 1930, before examining its links to a wider insurrectionary attempt by the Vietnamese Nationalist Party in parts of Tonkin and the reasons why the attempted insurrection was to begin at Yên Bay but not in other garrison towns. It then places the mutiny in a context in which the use of Vietnamese soldiers in French service was necessary in order to maintain French supremacy as a colonial and protectorate power in French Indo-China. But instead of focusing on the mutiny itself and its causes, the main emphasis of this paper is on its consequences – in terms of the military and civilian policies subsequently adopted by the French. These included disciplinary measures, changes in the military and civilian intelligence services, as well as policies reducing the relative number of Vietnamese troops. While these measures aimed at reasserting French control and discipline in a key colonial institution, the conclusion briefly discusses their impact on the defence capability of French Indo-China and on the nature of French–Vietnamese relations.
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