This paper presents several concepts critical to improving the interface between engineers and managers. A case study approach is used to illustrate fundamental problems that continually result in negative and disastrous consequences for organizations, including: (1) differences in the roles, functions, and decision-making prerogatives of engineers and managers; (2) different communication styles that lead to the misinterpretation of information; and (3) ethics of institutional taken-for-granted paradigms that perpetuate and exacerbate communication failures.
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