Common Property,Political Economy,and Local Resource Management

Abstract

Between 1984 and 1994, Thailand earned the enviable distinction of having the world's fastest growing economy. This was largely the result of two salient factors: (1) an unprecedented amount of foreign direct investment; and (2) an economic strategy that promoted the production of export commodities. For the rural economy, the transformations of the 1980s and 1990s generated tremendous opportunity and wealth. At the same time, the rise of new markets (both within and outside Thailand) created strong incentives to ‘mine’ the natural resource economy. Such was the case in Thai fishing. From 1963 onwards, the acquisition of new technologies put increasing pressure on Thailand's most productive coastal areas, disrupting valuable spawning grounds and producing widespread conflict between village-based producers and corporate fleets, and among village producers themselves. Responding to these pressures, government officials, non-governmental organizations, and industry analysts have advocated a shift to a more decentralized style of fisheries management. At the heart of this perspective is a view that natural resources can be managed most effectively when rules are designed, monitored, and enforced by those who use the resource – as opposed to those who manage it from afar. A challenge in encouraging this type of strategy is that coastal resource management can be costly, particularly when the resource is readily available and in high demand. Drawing upon thirteen months' primary research, this article explores the viability and wisdom of encouraging local communities to monitor and enforce rules of restricted access in coastal fishing. The principal findings arise from a case study in southern Thailand, where villagers were able to implement and enforce rules of restricted access in their traditional fishing area.