The widespread use of composite indices has often been motivated by their practicality to quantify qualitative data in an easy and intuitive way. At the same time, this approach has been challenged due to the subjective and partly ad hoc nature of computation, aggregation and weighting techniques as well as the handling of missing data. Partially ordered set (POSET) theory offers an alternative approach for summarizing qualitative data in terms of quantitative indices, which relies on a computation scheme that fully exploits the available information and does not require the subjective assignment of weights. The present paper makes the case for an increased use of POSET theory in the social sciences and provides a comparison of POSET indices and composite indices (from previous studies) measuring the ``stringency'' of fiscal frameworks using data from the OECD Budget Practices and Procedures survey (2007/08).
ACIR, Fiscal discipline in the federal system: National reform and the experience of the States. Washington, D.C., Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1987.
2.
AlesinaA., HausmannR., HommesR. and SteinE., Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America, Journal of Development Economics59(2) (1999), 253-273.
3.
Ayuso-i CasalsJ., González HernándezD., MoulinL. and TurriniA., Beyond the SGP - features and effects of EU national-level fiscal rules, European Economy - Economic Papers, vol. 275, 2007.
4.
BohnH. and InmanR.P., Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: Evidence from the US States, in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 45, Elsevier, 1996, pp. 13-76.
5.
BrüggemannR., HalfonE., WelzlG., VoigtK. and SteinbergC.E., Applying the concept of partially ordered sets on the ranking of near-shore sediments by a battery of tests, Journal of Chemical Information and Computer Sciences41(4) (2001), 918-925.
6.
BrüggemannR., SørensenP.B., LercheD. and CarlsenL., Estimation of averaged ranks by a Local Partial Order Model, Journal of Chemical Information and Computer Sciences44(2) (2004), 618-625.
7.
BrüggemannR. and PatilG.P., Ranking and Prioritization for Multi-indicator Systems: Introduction to Partial Order Applications, vol. 5. Springer, 2011.
8.
BrzozowskiM. and Siwińska-GorzelakJ., The impact of fiscal rules on fiscal policy volatility, Journal of Applied Economics13(2) (2010), 205-231.
9.
CandelonB., MuyskenJ. and VermeulenR., Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe: An update, Oxford Economic Papers62 (2009), 323-349.
10.
ChambersC.P. and EcheniqueF., Supermodularity and preferences, Journal of Economic Theory144(3) (2009), 1004-1014.
11.
DebrunX. and KumarM.S., The Discipline-enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence, vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007.
12.
DebrunX., MoulinL., TurriniA., Ayuso-i CasalsJ. and KumarM.S., Tied to the mast? national fiscal rules in the European Union, Economic Policy23(54) (2008), 297-362.
13.
De LoofK., De MeyerH. and De BaetsB., Exploiting the lattice of ideals representation of a POSET, Fundamenta Informaticae71(2) (2006), 309-321.
14.
De LoofK., De BaetsB., De MeyerH. and BruggemannR., A hitchhiker's guide to POSET ranking, Combinatorial Chemistry and High Throughput Screening11(9) (2008), 734-744.
15.
FatásA. and MihovI., The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics4 (2003), 1419-1447.
16.
FatásA. and MihovI., The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the US States, Journal of Public Economics90(1) (2006), 101-117.
17.
FilcG. and ScartasciniC., Budget institutions and fiscal outcomes: Ten years of inquiry on fiscal matters at the research department, in Presentation at the Research Department 10th Year Anniversary Conference. Office of Evaluation and Oversight. Inter-American Development Bank, 2004.
18.
ForemnyD., Vertical aspects of sub-national deficits: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy in European countries, MPRA Paper No.37729, 2011.
19.
ForemnyD. and Von HagenJ., Sub-national budgetary discipline during times of crisis: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy, European Economy, Economic Papers 501, 2013.
20.
ForemnyD., Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy, European Journal of Political Economy34 (2014), 86-110.
21.
FreudenbergM., Composite indicators of country performance: A critical assessment, Technology and Industry Working Papers, vol. 2003/16, 2003.
22.
Gal'ıJ. and PerottiR., Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe, Economic Policy18(37) (2003), 533-572.
23.
GleichH., Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Central and Eastern European Countries, tech. rep., European Central Bank, 2003.
24.
GuichardS., KennedyM., WurzelE. and AndréC., What promotes fiscal consolidation: OECD country experiences, OECD Economics Departments, 2007.
25.
HalfonE. and ReggianiM.G., On ranking chemicals for environmental hazard, Environmental Science and Technology20(11) (1986), 1173-1179.
26.
HallerbergM., Budgeting in europe: Did the domestic budget process change after maastricht?Paper Prepared for the 2003 EUSA Conference, Nashville, TN, 2003.
27.
IaraA. and WolffG.B., Rules and risk in the Euro area: Does rules-based national fiscal governance contain sovereign bond spreads?Rules and Institutions for Sound Fiscal Policy after the Crisis, 2010, pp. 277-299.
28.
JacobsR., PeterS. and GoddardM.K., Measuring Performance: An Examination of Composite Performance Indicators. A Report for the Department of Health, Centre of Health Economics, University of York, 2004.
29.
KopitsG. and SymanskyS.A., Fiscal Policy Rules, vol. 162. International Monetary Fund, 1998.
30.
KumarM., BaldacciE., SchaechterA., CaceresC., KimD., DebrunX., EscolanoJ., JonasJ., KaramP., YakadinaI. and ZymekR., Fiscal rules-anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances, IMF Staff Paper, Washington D.C., 2009.
31.
LercheD. and SørensenP.B., Evaluation of the ranking probabilities for Partial Orders based on random linear extensions, Chemosphere53(8) (2003), 981-992.
32.
MagginoF. and FattoreM., New tools for the construction of ranking and evaluation indicators in multidimensional systems of ordinal variables, Proceedings of the `New Techniques and Technologies for Statistics', Brussels, 2011.
33.
NerlichC. and ReuterW.H., The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact, European Central Bank, 2013.
34.
PerssonT., RolandG. and TabelliniG., Separation of powers and political accountability, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, pp. 1163-1202.
35.
PerssonT. and TabelliniG., Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes, American Economic Review94(1) (2004), 25-45.
36.
PoterbaJ.M. and von HagenJ., Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, University of Chicago Press, 2008.
37.
SchaechterA., KindaT., BudinaN. and WeberA., Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis-Toward the `Next-Generation' Rules. A New Dataset, Andrews McMeel Publishing, 2012.
38.
SmithP., Developing composite indicators for assessing health system efficiency, In Smith, P. C. (Ed), Measuring up: Improving the performance of health systems in OECD countries. Paris. OECD, 2002.
39.
SoltysM. and WilsonC., On the complexity of computing winning strategies for finite POSET games, Theory of Computing Systems48(3) (2011), 680-692.
40.
Von HagenJ., Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European communities, Economic Papers96 (1992), 1-79.
41.
WagnerG.A., Are state budget stabilization funds only the illusion of savings? Evidence from stationary panel data, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance43(2) (2003), 213-238.
