Considering both cardinal characteristics and double powers, the anti-symmetric interval excess value is defined. The least square pre-nucleolus for interval cooperative games is presented by making a single-objective programming model. We obtain the analytic expression of least square pre-nucleolus using Lagrange multiplier method, and construct an effective quadratic programming model to derive the least square pre-nucleolus of incomplete interval cooperative games. In addition, the application of least square pre-nucleolus in land pollution control is provided to show the validity of the proposed solution concepts.
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