By considering the supreme-utilities among fuzzy action vectors, we adopt several sensible inequality constraints to propose a different generalization of the core on multicriteria fuzzy transferable-utility (TU) games. We also adopt the duality results of linear programming theory to analyze the non-emptiness for this extended core under inequality constraints. Further, we define an extended reduction to characterize this extended core. Based on the notion of domination among fuzzy payoff vectors, some coincidences are investigated.
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