Abstract
Authentication Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) is a scheme that preserves the integrity of both the cipher text and authenticated data. In AEAD, cipher suites like GCM_SIV and AES_GCM_SIV provides the message integrity through nonce-based authentication encryption technique. The problem of nonce-based authentication encryption is the repetition of nonce in two different messages that violates message integrity property when the number of message blocks is maximized to 232. This paper verifies the maximum limit of nonce usefulness and proves better security bounds attained in GCM_SIV and AES_GCM_SIV using nonce-reuse/misuse resistance authentication encryption (NRMR-AE) technique. The NRMR-AE resistance property achieves better security bounds and performance even when the nonces are repeated in different messages. But nonce repetition in NRMR-AE property reduces the number of message encryption and message length (in blocks) in GCM_SIV and AES_GCM_SIV AEAD methods used in QUIC(Quick UDP Internet Communications) and TLS Cipher suites which is found to be a greater drawback. This paper increases the number of messages encrypted even with maximum number of nonce repetition ensuring that the message length in AES_GCM_SIV meets the standard NIST bound 2-32.
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