Multi-distribution bi-deniable inner product encryption based on Decision-LWE

Abstract

Bi-deniable Encryption scheme means that when the sender and the receiver are coerced, the coercer can obtain fake plaintext, random numbers, and secret keys. It’s a solution strategy in the case of information leakage. Compared with traditional encryption, deniable encryption can provide secret communications in situations of coercion in the Post-Quantum era. Compared with sender-deniable encryption and receiver-deniable encryption, bi-deniable encryption can achieve secret communications in the situation that both sender and receiver are coerced by the coercer. So, we propose to design a bi-deniable encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model.

In our bi-deniable encryption scheme, we construct a bi-deniable encryption scheme based on the assumption of Decision-Learning With Errors (DLWE) under the multi-distribution model. Firstly, the principle of Inner Product Predicate Encryption (IPPE) is applied in our scheme. Secondly, we apply the framework of Bi-Translucent Set (BTS), combined with inner product predicate encryption. Thirdly, we construct a series of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, which apply linear transformation between different lattice structures, and Regev dual encryption. Fourthly, the statistical indistinguishability between the sampling algorithm with discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm, and the computational indistinguishability between LWE’s ciphertext samples with uniform samples, the property of indistinguishability is applied in theorem proving, which obtain Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) security and the property of bi-deniability.

Given the value range of the Gaussian parameter and security parameter in our scheme, the correctness of the bi-deniable encryption scheme is guaranteed. We also give the security proof of IND-CPA and bi-deniability’s property by a series of games. The ‘Inner-Product Bi-Translucent Set’ Bi-Deniable Encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model is based on Decision-LWE assumption, and can avoid quantum-resistant attacks. The bi-deniable encryption scheme is firstly constructed by the inner product with the Decision-LWE assumption, which can provide better properties of security and deniability.

Keywords

Multi-distribution model bi-deniable encryption Decision-LWE inner product Bi-Translucent Set post-quantum cryptography

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