Parametric Analyses of Attack-fault Trees *

Abstract

Risk assessment of cyber-physical systems, such as power plants, connected devices and IT-infrastructures has always been challenging: safety (i. e., absence of unintentional failures) and security (i. e., no disruptions due to attackers) are conditions that must be guaranteed. One of the traditional tools used to consider these problems is attack trees, a tree-based formalism inspired by fault trees, a well-known formalism used in safety engineering. In this paper we define and implement the translation of attack-fault trees (AFTs) to a new extension of timed automata, called parametric weighted timed automata. This allows us to parameterize constants such as time and discrete costs in an AFT and then, using the model-checker IMITATOR, to compute the set of parameter values such that a successful attack is possible. Moreover, we add the possibility to define counter-measures. Using the different sets of parameter values computed, different attack and fault scenarios can be deduced depending on the budget, time or computation power of the attacker, providing helpful data to select the most efficient counter-measure.